20250902 CĐTL Truyền Thông Hoa Kỳ qua OPLS719 Mặt Trận Hạ Lào 1971
Dưới đây là một phần trong hệ thống truyền thông của Hoa Kỳ phê bình về mặt trận Lam Sơn 719 năm 1971 trên Youtube.com
Operation Lam Son 719 (1971) | South Vietnam’s Failed Invasion of Laos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AE3mBvgGPPU
Phần tài liệu dưới đây trong quân sử Hoa Kỳ phê bình về trận chiến nầy.
163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT Covert Action Campaign on Lam Son 719
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v07/d163
Overall ARVN performance was quite impressive and resulted in heavy damage to numerically superior NVA forces.
Co Roc Ridge limit of TacAir USAF
16°34'43.32"N 106°37'19.48"E
Toàn cảnh những căn cứ hành quân cùng mục tiêu Tchépone Nam Lào. Rặng núi Co Ro Ridge là ranh giới cuối cùng của các phi công Hoa Kỳ.
20250902 cdtl LS719 comm 01
Tất cả các phi cơ của không lực Hoa Kỳ không được phép vượt qua dãy núi Co Ro Ridge trong cuộc hành quân Lam Sơn 719.
20250902 cdtl LS719 comm 02
Khi vượt biên tiến vào Nam Lào, quân miền Nam hoàn toàn không có sự trợ giúp của không lực Hoa Kỳ, truyền thông Hoa Kỳ không biết rằng phi cơ Hoa Kỳ không được phép vượt quá dãy núi Co Ro Ridge dọc theo sông Tchépone.
Không quân Việt-Nam không đủ sức bao vùng cho toàn miền Nam ngay cả trong mặt trận Lam Sơn 719, đây là sự thất bại của quân đội miền Nam tuy nhiên hảy đọc lời phê bình của những vị tướng Hoa Kỳ.
20250902 cdtl LS719 comm 03
Những vị tướng Hoa Kỳ dưới đây đã phát thảo cuộc hành quân Lam Sơn 719 từ năm 1966. Khởi đầu là các chiến dịch Operation El Paso I, El Paso II
Harry William Osborne Kinnard II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Kinnard
https://www.vhpa.org/DAT/datK/G01456.HTM
Westmoreland William C.
Major General (USAF)
https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/william-childs-westmoreland
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Lansdale
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/lansdale-edward-g
https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Biographies/Display/Article/106443/
https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/6768280/edward-geary-lansdale
Abrams, Creighton William.,
General, USA; Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from July 3, 1968, until June 28, 1972; Army Chief of Staff from October 12, 1972, until September 4, 1974
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creighton_Abrams
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/people/abrams-creighton-w
https://militaryhallofhonor.com/honoree-record.php?id=51
https://www.agawam.ma.us/149/General-Abrams
Operation El Paso I 1966
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_El_Paso
Operation EL PASO II information Anloc 1972
https://www.vhpa.org/KIA/panel/battle/66060201.HTM
https://www.vhpa.org/cdrom.htm
OPERATION EL PASO II/III, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
Combat after action rept. 2 Jun-3 Sep 1966
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD0387606.pdf
Operation El Paso 1966 May 19 - 1966 Jul 13
https://war-maps.com/warmap/battles-of-the-vietnam-war/event/operation-el-paso
Operation El Paso
https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Operation_El_Paso
19 June 1966 CIA Memorandum Approved for Release 2004/12/14
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000900140001-1.pdf
Phần nhận xét về khả năng của quân đội miền Nam VNCH trong chiến dịch LS719 nầy đã được ghi trong tài liệu sử của Hoa Kỳ.
163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Covert Action Campaign on Lam Son 719
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v07/d163
Overall ARVN performance was quite impressive and resulted in heavy damage to numerically superior NVA forces.
Tựu chung, khả năng của ARVN rất đáng thán phục đã gây ra thiệt hại nặng nề cho lực lượng NVA có số lượng vượt trội.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v07/d163
Nếu!
Nếu cố Đại tướng Đỗ Cao Trí không tử nạn trong vụ nỗ phi cơ tại Cambodge ngày 23/02/1971 thì thế trận Lam Sơn 719 có thể đã đổi khác.
Cố Đại Tướng Đỗ Cao Trí mất ngày February 23, 1971
Chiến Dịch Bình Tây Hành Quân Kampuchia 1970
https://dongsongcu.wordpress.com/2016/05/24/chien-dich-binh-tay-hanh-quan-kampuchia-1970/
Hồi Ký Miền Nam | Chiến Dịch Bình Tây (Full)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmrua__EZQw
TD 8 TQLC Trận Cam Bốt 1969 1970
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td8-hq-cambodia.htm
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-hanhquan-cambodia.htm
Tiểu Đoàn 4 - Hành quân Cambodia
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td4-hq-cambodia.htm
Lữ Đoàn B - Vượt biên qua Kampuchia
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-ldb-hq-cambodia.htm
LỮ ÐOÀN B/TQLC HÀNH QUÂN VƯỢT BIÊN QUA KAMPUCHEA NĂM 1970
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-ldb-hq-cambodia.htm
Những ngày đầu của Tiểu Đoàn 7 Thủy Quân Lục Chiến
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td7-nhungngaydau.htm
29. Chiến Dịch Bình Tây (Từ ngày 27-3-1970)
https://nhayduwdc.org/ls/qsnd/2016/ndwdc_ls_qsnd_2016_bcnd20nChiensu_B_28_32_2016JUL30.htm#B29
30. Hành Quân Toàn Thắng 42 (29/4 – 22-7-1970)
https://nhayduwdc.org/ls/qsnd/2016/ndwdc_ls_qsnd_2016_bcnd20nChiensu_B_28_32_2016JUL30.htm#B30
31. Hành Quân Toàn Thắng 43 (1/5– 30-6-1970)
https://nhayduwdc.org/ls/qsnd/2016/ndwdc_ls_qsnd_2016_bcnd20nChiensu_B_28_32_2016JUL30.htm#B31
32. Hành Quân Toàn Thắng 45 (6/5 – 30-6-1970)
https://nhayduwdc.org/ls/qsnd/2016/ndwdc_ls_qsnd_2016_bcnd20nChiensu_B_28_32_2016JUL30.htm#B32
SOUTH VIETNAM: GENERAL TRI INTERVIEWED (1968)
https://www.britishpathe.com/asset/121940/
https://www.britishpathe.com/asset/121940/#
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J1zKwT2sN8
General Do Cao Tri - Vietnam War Tướng Đỗ Cao Trí trả lời phỏng vấn về vấn đề Campuchia năm 1970
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHEdSxUZpiw
Phỏng vấn tướng Đỗ Cao Trí
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sb2YCSeKR5E
SYND27/02/71 FUNERAL OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE GENERAL DO CAO TRI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAw_3QiB5as
Trung tướng Đỗ Cao Trí thị sát các đơn vị tại Campuchia năm 1970
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/J6L6mMjdjMI
Đỗ Cao Trí
https://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient/recipient-24907/
ĐẠI TƯỚNG ĐỖ CAO TRÍ VÀ TÔI || Hồi Ký Miền Nam VN
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYXrAwPrHFI
http://batkhuat.net/tl-tuong-dct-va-toi.htm
The Cambodian Incursion by Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA324718.pdf
Do Cao Tri born 1929 died on February 23 1971
https://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient/recipient-24907/
https://time.com/archive/6838606/the-world-the-death-of-a-fighting-general/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J1zKwT2sN8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHEdSxUZpiw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sb2YCSeKR5E
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAw_3QiB5as
https://www.youtube.com/shorts/J6L6mMjdjMI
https://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient/recipient-24907/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYXrAwPrHFI
U.S. Command Is Seeking Cause of Copter Crash That Killed Saigon General and Newsweek Man
The Patton of the Parrot’s Beak
The Death of a Fighting General
Two Fighting Generals. General Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Viet Thanh
https://web.archive.org/web/20130703132313/http://www.generalhieu.com/trithanh.htm
Vinh danh Cố Đại tướng Đỗ Cao Trí
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3uQcy6ok7s
Chân Trời Tím - Nguyên Khang, Ngọc Hạ I ST: Trần Thiện Thanh
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtMNfru9vPE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5x2KPzhcaE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v-BOVRPuVYg
Declassified CIA documents on the Vietnam War
https://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=browse&descriptor=DO+CAO+TRI
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00975A018300090002-8.pdf
20180529 Cái Chết Của Tướng Đổ Cao Trí
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2018/05/20180529-cai-chet-cua-tuong-o-cao-tri.html
Đại Tướng Đỗ Cao Trí - tác giả Trương Văn Quang (Úc)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WHU7c0g0Qh0
D175 corruption in SVN Saigon, January 31, 1970, 1140Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d175
HẠ LÀO Lam Sơn 719 February 08, 1971 - April 07, 1971
20190927 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 01
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/09/20190927-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-01.html
20190928 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 02
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/09/20190928-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-02.html
20190929 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 03
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/09/20190929-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-03.html
20190930 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 04
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/09/20190930-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-04.html
20191002 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 05
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191002-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-05.html
20191004 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 06
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191004-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-06.html
20191005 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 07
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191005-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-07.html
20191007 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 08
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191007-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-08.html
20191010 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 09
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191010-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-09.html
20191011 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 10
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191011-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-10.html
20191012 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 11
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191012-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-11.html
20191013 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 12
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191013-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-12.html
20191017 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 13
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191017-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-13.html
20191018 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 14
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191018-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-14.html
20191019 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 15
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191019-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-15.html
20191021 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 16
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191021-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-16.html
20191022 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 17
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191022-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-17.html
20191022 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 18
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191022-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-18.html
20191023 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 19
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191023-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-19.html
20191023 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 20
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/10/20191023-tu-chien-ha-lao-1971-20.html
20191225 ĐỒI 30 HẠ LÀO Trương Duy Hy
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/12/20191225-oi-30-ha-lao-truong-duy-hy.html
SƯ ĐOÀN NHẢY DÙ VIỆT NAM và CUỘC HÀNH QUÂN LAM SƠN 719
http://batkhuat.net/tl-sdnhvn-lamson-719.htm
Hạ Lào Người Lính Không Trở Về – Phan Nhật Nam
https://dongsongcu.wordpress.com/2024/08/15/ha-laonguoi-linh-khong-tro-ve-phan-nhat-nam/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_f86Qus0Xq0
Rồi người lính có về không?
http://nhaydu.com/index_83hg_files/left_files/T-Chien/RoiNguoiLinhCoVeKhong.htm
Hành Quân Lam Sơn 719 (Từ ngày 8/2 – ngày 6/4/1971)
https://nhayduwdc.org/ls/qsnd/2016/ndwdc_ls_qsnd_2016_bcnd20nChiensu_B_33_36_2016JUL30.htm#B33
HÀNH QUÂN LAM SƠN 719 – ĐƯỜNG 9 NAM LÀO NGÀY 8 THÁNG 2 NĂM 1971
LD 1 Biệt Động Quân LS719
http://bietdongquan.org/tailieu/bietdongquan/BDQ719.htm
Phóng Ðồ các trận đánh của Biệt Ðộng Quân
https://doanket.orgfree.com/quansu/ls719map.html
https://doanket.orgfree.com/dkpict/ls719.gif
BDQ Hanh Quan LS719 P01
https://doanket.orgfree.com/quansu/bdqpart1.html
BDQ Hanh Quan LS719 P02
https://doanket.orgfree.com/quansu/bdqpart2.html
BDQ Hanh Quan LS719 P03
https://doanket.orgfree.com/quansu/bdqpart3.html
BDQ Hanh Quan LS719 P04
https://doanket.orgfree.com/quansu/bdqpart4.html
BDQ Hanh Quan LS719 P05
https://doanket.orgfree.com/quansu/bdqpart5.html
TD 3 PB TQLC Tai Can Cu Hoa Luc Hong Ha Ha Lao 1971
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td3pb-hq-lamson719.htm
TĐ4/TQLC - Đêm Hạ Lào! Đêm sao dài quá!
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td4-hq-lamson719.htm
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2024/01/20240107-dem-ha-lao-dem-sao-dai-qua.html
Khoá 22 và Lam Sơn 719 Hạ Lào
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-khoa22-ls719.htm
Hành quân Lam Sơn 719
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-hq-lamson719.htm
TD 1 PB Loi Hoa Sang Lao1971
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-loihoa-sanglao.htm
TQLC Hanh Quan LS719 Ha Lao 1971
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td2-hq-lamson719.htm
TD 3 PB CCHL Hoang Ha 1971
http://tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-td3pb-hq-lamson719.htm
Cơn Uất Hạ Lào, Sự Thật Về Hành Quân Lam Sơn 719 - Mũ Đỏ Bùi Đức Lạc
https://quanlucvnchblog.wordpress.com/con-uat-ha-lao/
Cơn Uất Hạ Lào, Sự Thật Về Hành Quân Lam Sơn 719 - Mũ Đỏ Bùi Đức Lạc
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQxeVEYHExA&t=1462s
Cơn Uất Hạ Lào, Sự Thật Về Hành Quân Lam Sơn 719, Phần 2, Mũ đỏ Bùi Đức Lạc.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LC0-_YpAngw&t=257s
Cuộc Hành quân Lam Sơn 719 Thật Sự Thành Công Hay Thất Bại
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6bqzqE4_Qw&t=9s
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 1 Trương Duy Hy- Xác Định Một Tọa Độ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=waJ1Do8eDPw&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 2 Nhận Lệnh Lên Đường- Trương Duy Hy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_ASa612P_0&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=2
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 3 Vượt Biên Giới- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Tzxf8zJM2I&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=3
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 4 Tác xạ và thiết lập căn cứ hỏa lực 31 và A-Lưới. Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXdZofPYlD4&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=4
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 5 Cánh Thư Nhà- Trương Duy Hy- Giọng đọc Thiên Thanh
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEqQwG-2syI&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=5
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 6 Lời Ngợi Khen Của Thượng Cấp- Trương Duy Hy- Thiên Thanh đọc
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOs7F7XHH_E&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=6
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 7 Kỷ Luật Của Tiểu Đoàn 2 Dù- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhy6vj14Qk8&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=7
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 8 Khả Năng Pháo Binh Địch- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qa_mFv_BfqE&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=8
Đồi Hạ Lào- Kỳ 9 Trong Những Ngày Tử Thủ- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2seQ2It36I&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=9
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 10 Phút Chót Của Căn Cứ Hỏa Lực 31- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xUMmPHzmaMI&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=10
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 11 Vĩnh Biệt Đại úy Nguyễn Văn Đương- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wr9CVsg0MQs&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=11
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 12 Tử thủ căn cứ Hỏa Lực 30- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Djj-UY-Xdw&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=12
Hill 30 Lower Laos - Part 13: Defending Fire Base 30 (continued) - Truong Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hf8yRTNsrU0&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=13
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 14 Tử Thủ Căn Cứ Hỏa Lực 30 (tt)- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5VyG1Hws5E&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=14
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 15 Tử Thủ Căn Cứ Hỏa Lực 30 tt- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n04oxfbYR_o&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=15
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 16 Hai lần triệt thoái hai lần đình hoãn- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lI7lukVZqmc&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=16
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 17 Hai lần triệt thoái hai lần đình hoãn (tt)- Trương Duy Hy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHX40anUqTA&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=17
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 18 Trận đánh cuối cùng trước khi rời căn cứ Hỏa Lực 30
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3VrubrFZMcc&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=18
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 19 Triệt thoái ra khỏi căn cứ Hỏa Lực 30.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uLJMWf67eU&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=19
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 20 Sự Mất Tích Đau Thương Bí Ẩn Của Một Binh Sĩ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHcMoUuIP90&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=20
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 21 Về Khe Sanh sau 23 ngày tử thủ căn cứ Hỏa Lực 30
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ijrmEEvsA7o&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=21
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 22 và 23 Trở lại Khe Sanh tiếp tục chiến đấu
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGki9zLUYtM&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=22
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ 24 Đông Hà những ngày tạm trú
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tekU-f-ddaE&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=23
Đồi 30 Hạ Lào- Kỳ cuối Cảm Tưởng và kết thúc hành quân Lam Sơn 719
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nrz9XOyD2zc&list=PLTzRMLq3e4FmiOwYWQ0FunrtM4lyfBI08&index=24
163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Covert Action Campaign on Lam Son 719
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v07/d163
Overall ARVN performance was quite impressive and resulted in heavy damage to numerically superior NVA forces.
Tựu chung, khả năng của ARVN rất đáng thán phục đã gây ra thiệt hại nặng nề cho lực lượng NVA có số lượng vượt trội.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v07/d163
Operation Lam Son 719 (1971) | South Vietnam’s Failed Invasion of Laos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AE3mBvgGPPU
Dưới đây là phần Transcript của video
Transcript
0:00
February 1971, the jungles along the
0:03
Laotian’s border were about to witness one
0:05
of the most ambitious and disastrous
0:07
operations of the entire Vietnam War.
0:10
For years, the Ho Chi Min Trail had been
0:13
the lifeline of the North Vietnamese war
0:15
effort. A sprawling network of hidden
0:17
jungle routes stretching through Laos
0:19
and Cambodia, funneling weapons, troops,
0:22
and supplies into South Vietnam. No
0:25
matter how many bombs the Americans
0:26
dropped, no matter how many raids were
0:29
launched, the trail endured. And by
0:31
1971, the United States was running out
0:34
of time. President Richard Nixon had
0:36
promised the American people that US
0:39
combat troops would be coming home. His
0:41
strategy, known as Vietnamization, meant
0:44
South Vietnam's army, the ARVN, would
0:47
take over the fighting. To prove they
0:49
were ready, South Vietnam would have to
0:51
strike deep into enemy territory without
0:54
American ground troops beside them. The
0:56
target, Laos, the mission to cut the Ho
0:59
Chi Min Trail once and for all. It was
1:01
called Operation Lamon 719. On paper, it
1:06
looked like the perfect test of
1:07
Vietnamization.
1:08
20,000 ARVN troops backed by hundreds of
1:12
US helicopters, artillery, and B-52
1:15
bombers would drive across the border,
1:18
smash through enemy positions, and
1:20
destroy the supply network that had kept
1:22
the war alive. Success would prove that
1:24
South Vietnam could stand on its own.
1:27
Failure was unthinkable, but what began
1:30
as a bold offensive quickly spiraled
1:32
into chaos. ARVN units bogged down.
1:36
North Vietnamese forces struck back with
1:38
overwhelming ferocity. Helicopter after
1:41
helicopter fell from the sky in flames,
1:44
and what was meant to showcase South
1:45
Vietnam's strength, ended as a brutal
1:48
demonstration of its weakness. This is
1:50
the story of Operation Lam Son 719.
1:54
The invasion of Laos that Nixon hoped
1:56
would save his strategy and instead
1:58
exposed its fatal flaws. By early 1971,
2:03
the Vietnam War had dragged on for more
2:05
than a decade, and the United States was
2:07
desperate to find a way out. American
2:10
casualties were mounting. Anti-war
2:12
protests were growing louder back home,
2:15
and the political cost of continuing the
2:17
fight was becoming unbearable. President
2:20
Richard Nixon needed a plan that would
2:22
reduce American involvement without
2:24
simply handing victory to North Vietnam.
2:26
The answer was Vietnamization. Announced
2:29
in 1969, the strategy promised that the
2:32
Army of the Republic of Vietnam, ARVN,
2:35
would gradually take over combat
2:37
responsibilities while US troops
2:39
withdrew. In theory, South Vietnam would
2:42
be trained, equipped, and motivated
2:44
enough to defend itself while America's
2:47
role shifted to air support, supplies,
2:49
and advisers. But there was one problem.
2:52
The Ho chi Minh trail. This sprawling
2:55
network of jungle roads, paths, tunnels,
2:57
and hidden supply lines stretched from
2:59
North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia,
3:02
feeding men and weapons directly into
3:03
South Vietnam. It was the enemy's
3:06
lifeline. And despite years of bombing,
3:09
it was still fully operational. As long
3:12
as the trail flowed, North Vietnam could
3:14
continue the war indefinitely. For
3:16
Nixon, this was more than a military
3:18
issue. It was political. He needed proof
3:21
that Vietnamization was working. proof
3:24
that South Vietnam's army could carry
3:26
the fight on its own. For President Nguyen
3:28
Van Thieu in Saigon, the stakes were equally
3:31
high. His regime had to show the South
3:34
Vietnamese people and the world that
3:37
ARVN was no longer dependent on American
3:40
ground troops. The plan was bold and
3:42
risky. South Vietnamese forces would
3:44
cross into Laos, a country officially
3:47
neutral, but heavily infiltrated by the
3:49
North Vietnamese army. the mission. Cut
3:52
the trail, destroy PAN supply bases, and
3:55
[ __ ] enemy logistics. There was one
3:58
catch. By US law, American ground troops
4:01
could not cross into Laos. That meant
4:04
the entire ground offensive would rest
4:05
on ARV and shoulders. The United States
4:08
could provide helicopters, artillery,
4:11
air strikes, and logistics, but no
4:14
combat boots on Laotian soil. This
4:16
was the gamble of Operation Lam Son
4:19
719 to test Vietnamization, not in a
4:23
controlled environment, but in one of
4:25
the most hostile and unforgiving
4:26
battlefields of the entire war. If ARVN
4:30
succeeded, it would prove that Nixon's
4:32
strategy was viable and South Vietnam
4:34
could defend itself. If it failed, the
4:37
entire foundation of Vietnamization
4:39
would collapse right in front of the
4:42
world. On paper, Operation Lambs 719 had
4:46
a clear set of objectives. At its core,
4:49
it was designed to strike directly at
4:51
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the lifeline of
4:54
North Vietnam's war machine. For years,
4:57
this hidden highway of men and munitions
4:59
had frustrated the United States.
5:01
Despite the most intense bombing
5:03
campaign in history, the trail continued
5:05
to function, absorbing punishment,
5:08
rerouting through new paths, and
5:10
funneling more fighters into the south.
5:12
Cutting it was the dream of every
5:14
American commander. Now that mission
5:16
fell to South Vietnam. The plan called
5:19
for 20,000 ARVN troops to cross into
5:22
southern Laos along Route 9. Their
5:24
mission One destroy enemy supply depots
5:27
and logistics hubs that fed the trail.
5:30
Two, seize and hold key sections of the
5:33
route, severing North Vietnam's ability
5:35
to reinforce its forces in the south.
5:38
Third, prove ARVN's offensive
5:41
capability, demonstrating that
5:42
Vietnamization was not just theory, but
5:45
reality. The US role would be massive,
5:48
but limited. Over 600 helicopters, from
5:51
slick Hueies to heavy lift Chinooks and
5:54
deadly Cobra gunships would provide air
5:57
mobility. American artillery batteries
6:00
near the border would offer constant
6:01
fire support. B-52 bombers and fighter
6:05
bombers would saturate the battlefield,
6:07
but there would be no American infantry
6:09
on the ground in Laos. By law, this was
6:11
ARVN's fight alone. For President Thieu,
6:14
the stakes were personal. A victory in
6:16
Laos would show his people that South
6:18
Vietnam's army was no longer dependent
6:20
on American ground forces. For Nixon,
6:23
the stakes were global. A successful
6:26
Lambson 719 would prove to the American
6:29
public and to the world that
6:31
Vietnamization was working and US
6:33
withdrawal could continue without fear
6:35
of collapse. But these objectives came
6:37
with dangerous assumptions. The planners
6:40
believed ARVN could move quickly, strike
6:42
hard and withdraw before North
6:44
Vietnamese forces could react in
6:46
strength. They assumed the Pavian would
6:48
not commit major forces deep in Laos,
6:51
and they trusted that air power could
6:53
compensate for ARVN's weaknesses. They
6:56
were wrong. The planners of Operation
6:58
Lambs 719 envisioned a swift, aggressive
7:02
strike, but the forces assembled on both
7:05
sides reveal why the operation was
7:07
destined for bloodshed. Army of the
7:10
Republic of Vietnam. The ground assault
7:12
into Laos would be carried out entirely
7:14
by ARVN.
7:16
Roughly 20,000 soldiers were assigned to
7:18
the mission, drawn from some of South
7:21
Vietnam's best formations. The First
7:23
Infantry Division, seasoned from battles
7:26
in northern provinces. The Airborne
7:28
Division, elite paratroopers known for
7:30
discipline and mobility. The Marine
7:33
Division, among the toughest units ARVN
7:36
possessed, the First Armored Brigade
7:38
with American supplied M41 tanks and
7:42
M113 armored personnel carriers. Several
7:45
Ranger groups, light infantry
7:47
specialists in counterinsurgency.
7:50
On paper, this was South Vietnam's
7:52
finest. But beneath the surface,
7:54
problems lurked. ARVN's leadership was
7:57
riddled with political appointments.
7:59
Many officers lacked combat initiative,
8:01
and morale was shaky, especially when
8:04
facing an enemy on foreign soil. United
8:07
States support. While no American ground
8:10
troops could cross into Laos, US support
8:12
was immense. Over 600 helicopters from
8:15
the 101st Airborne and other aviation
8:18
units would lift, supply, and cover ARVN
8:21
troops. Gunships like the AH1 Cobra
8:24
prowled the skies while Hueies fied
8:26
soldiers into landing zones under fire.
8:29
Artillery batteries along the border
8:31
pounded suspected enemy positions. Above
8:34
it all, the thunder of B-52 bombers
8:36
delivered carpet strikes while F4
8:39
Phantoms and A1 Skyraiders swooped low
8:41
to strafe. American logistics kept the
8:44
offensive alive and American air crews
8:47
took staggering risks to sustain it.
8:49
People's Army of Vietnam facing ARVN
8:52
were 40,000 to 60,000 North Vietnamese
8:55
troops, many already dug in across
8:57
southern Laos. These were no guerillas.
9:00
They were regular soldiers hardened by
9:02
years of fighting. The PAVVN deployed
9:05
entire divisions. The 304th and 308th
9:09
divisions veterans of major battles. The
9:12
320th division tasked with blocking
9:15
route 9. The second division positioned
9:19
deeper along the trail. They were backed
9:21
by Soviet supplied tanks, T-54s, PT76s,
9:26
Long range artillery, and most
9:28
dangerously dense anti-aircraft networks
9:31
of 23 mm and 37 mm guns surface to-air
9:35
missiles for US pilots. Laos became a
9:37
killing ground. clashing strategies.
9:42
ARVN's plan, drive quickly along Route
9:45
9, set up fire bases, destroy supply
9:48
caches, and withdraw before the PAVN
9:50
could organize. PAVN's counter plan,
9:54
lure ARVN deeper into Laos, stretch
9:57
their supply lines, then unleash
10:00
overwhelming counterattacks with
10:01
artillery, armor, and ambushes. It was a
10:05
contest between mobility and fire power
10:07
versus discipline and preparation. The
10:10
South Vietnamese hoped to demonstrate
10:12
independence. The North Vietnamese
10:14
sought to prove the opposite. The
10:16
battlefield was set and what unfolded
10:18
would test not only the strength of
10:20
armies, but the very idea of
10:22
Vietnamization itself. Phase one,
10:26
crossing into Laos. At dawn on February
10:29
8th, the operation began. ARVN armored
10:32
columns rolled west along Route 9, the
10:35
only real highway slicing toward Laos.
10:37
Behind them, waves of American
10:39
helicopters lifted airborne troops
10:41
toward hastily prepared landing zones.
10:44
The plan was ambitious. Establish fire
10:46
bases inside Laos, secure Route 9, and
10:49
drive deeper to sever the Ho Chi Minh
10:51
Trail. For a brief moment, everything
10:54
seemed to go smoothly. Fire bases were
10:57
established along the border, supply
10:59
lines extended, and ARVN commanders
11:02
reported early successes. But the deeper
11:05
ARVN moved, the more resistance
11:07
stiffened. Phase two, the PAVN counter
11:12
moves. The North Vietnamese had been
11:14
waiting. For months, they had
11:16
anticipated just such an invasion, and
11:18
their response was swift. By
11:20
Mid. February, entire PAVN divisions
11:23
began closing in on the advancing ARVN
11:25
columns. Tanks rumbled through jungle
11:28
tracks, artillery rained down, and
11:31
ambushes erupted along the highway. The
11:33
skies turned into a battlefield. US
11:36
helicopters, essential for mobility and
11:38
resupply, flew into a storm of
11:40
anti-aircraft fire. Entire platoon were
11:44
pinned down as gunships darted low,
11:46
exchanging rockets with hidden enemy
11:48
batteries. Helicopter after helicopter
11:50
spiraled out of the sky, hit by
11:52
withering flack. Phase three. Deep into
11:56
the trap, ARVN airborne and Ranger units
11:59
pushed farther west, establishing
12:01
outposts like Firebase 31 and Firebase
12:04
30 deep inside Laos. But these positions
12:07
were precarious. Isolated under constant
12:10
bombardment, they quickly became magnets
12:13
for PAVN assaults. Firebase 31 became the
12:16
scene of a nightmare. Surrounded by
12:18
superior enemy forces, its defenders
12:21
endured relentless artillery and
12:22
infantry assaults. Requests for
12:25
reinforcement went unanswered.
12:27
Helicopters could not land under such
12:28
intense fire. Finally, PAVN tanks
12:31
rolled in. Overrun, the survivors broke
12:34
and fled. The fall of Firebase 31 was a
12:36
devastating psychological blow. Phase 4,
12:40
the battle for the skies. If ARVN was to
12:43
survive, American helicopters had to
12:46
keep flying. Pilots of the 101st
12:48
Airborne Marine squadrons and Army
12:51
aviation units carried out one of the
12:53
most dangerous missions of the war. They
12:55
flew constant resupply and evacuation
12:58
sorties into hot LZ's where enemy guns
13:01
waited. The cost was staggering. In just
13:04
6 weeks, over 100 helicopters were
13:06
destroyed and more than 600 damaged.
13:09
Pilots joked grimly that Lamson 719
13:13
stood for Laos, sum of none. For those
13:16
who flew, it was no joke. Casualties
13:19
mounted daily. Phase five, the turning
13:22
point. By late February, ARVN's advance
13:26
had stalled. The PAVN poured more
13:28
divisions into Laos, overwhelming South
13:31
Vietnamese units. Supply lines back to
13:33
Khe sanh were choked by ambushes. ARVN
13:37
commanders began to realize the truth.
13:39
They were outnumbered, outgunned, and
13:41
running out of time. President Thieu,
13:43
fearing disaster, ordered a withdrawal.
13:46
But retreat under fire was no easy task.
13:49
Entire units had to fight their way back
13:51
along Route 9, harried every step by PAVN
13:54
artillery, tanks, and infantry. Phase
13:57
six, the chaotic withdrawal. March 1971.
14:02
The withdrawal quickly devolved into
14:03
chaos. Some ARVN units broke under
14:06
pressure, abandoning equipment and
14:08
fleeing toward the border. Others fought
14:11
desperately to hold positions long
14:13
enough for helicopters to extract
14:14
survivors. The scenes were harrowing.
14:17
Helicopters overloaded with panicked
14:19
soldiers barely lifted off. Bullets
14:21
tearing through their fuselages. On the
14:24
ground, ARVN infantry clung to skids,
14:26
begging not to be left behind. American
14:29
pilots risked everything, returning
14:31
again and again to pluck men from
14:33
collapsing fire bases. Firebase Lolo,
14:36
Firebase Delta, and others fell one by
14:39
one. Each evacuation turned into a
14:42
battle of survival. In one infamous
14:44
incident, dozens of ARVN soldiers clung
14:47
to a helicopter until it crashed, unable
14:50
to lift the weight. Phase seven, back
14:53
across the border. By early March, the
14:56
survivors straggled back into South
14:58
Vietnam. The invasion had lasted barely
15:00
6 weeks. The cost was catastrophic. ARVN
15:04
lost thousands of men, much of its
15:06
armor, and the illusion of strength. The
15:08
Ho chi Minh trail remained intact,
15:11
bloodied, but unbroken for the North
15:13
Vietnamese. Lamson 719 was a triumph.
15:16
They had not only defended their
15:18
lifeline, but humiliated the ARVN in
15:21
front of the world. the human face of
15:24
the battle. What made Lam Son 719
15:27
unforgettable were the images. Film
15:30
footage of ARVN soldiers clinging to
15:32
helicopter skids, helicopters bursting
15:35
into flames midair, and shattered units
15:38
limping back across the border told a
15:40
story no press release could hide. US
15:43
advisers describe scenes of panic, units
15:46
refusing to advance, officers abandoning
15:49
positions, entire battalions collapsing
15:52
under fire. For many Americans, this
15:54
raised the question, if South Vietnam's
15:57
best troops could not hold against the
15:59
North Vietnamese in Laos, how could they
16:02
ever stand alone? Operation Lamson 619
16:06
had begun as a test of Vietnamization.
16:08
It ended as its funeral. ARVN's
16:11
weaknesses, poor leadership, fragile
16:14
morale, and dependence on US air power,
16:17
were laid bare for all to see. What was
16:20
supposed to be a bold demonstration of
16:21
independence had instead become a
16:23
sobering reminder. South Vietnam could
16:27
not win this war without America's boots
16:29
on the ground. Every battle has its
16:32
price. For Operation Lam Son 719, the
16:36
cost was staggering. By the end of the
16:38
operation, ARVN had suffered an
16:40
estimated 7,000 casualties, killed,
16:43
wounded, or missing. Entire battalions
16:46
were shattered, and many of South
16:48
Vietnam's best trained units returned as
16:50
broken shells of their former selves.
16:52
The first armored brigade lost dozens of
16:54
tanks and armored vehicles. Airborne and
16:57
Ranger battalions, once elite strike
16:59
forces, were decimated. Worse than the
17:02
numbers was the psychological toll.
17:05
Morale collapsed. Soldiers had been
17:07
ordered to prove their independence, but
17:09
many returned humiliated, convinced they
17:12
could not stand without US ground troops
17:14
beside them. Although no US infantry
17:17
fought in Laos, the Americans paid
17:19
heavily in the skies. More than 100
17:21
helicopters were destroyed and over 600
17:24
damaged. The casualty count included
17:27
over 100 killed and several hundred
17:29
wounded, mostly air crews. For aviation
17:32
units, Lam son 719 was one of the
17:35
deadliest campaigns of the war.
17:37
Estimates of PAVN losses vary wildly,
17:41
ranging from 8,000 to 13,000 casualties.
17:44
But the key fact remains, despite their
17:47
losses, the North Vietnamese achieved
17:49
their objective. The Ho chi Minh trail not
17:52
only survived, it continued to function
17:54
as the artery of their war effort.
17:57
Strategically, Lam Son 719 was a
18:00
failure. ARVN did not cut the trail, did
18:03
not destroy PAVN bases, and did not prove
18:06
Vietnamization worked. Instead, the
18:08
operation exposed ARVN's weaknesses.
18:11
Poor leadership, fragile morale, and
18:14
heavy reliance on American firepower.
18:17
For the United States, the results were
18:19
equally grim. Nixon had hoped for a
18:22
political victory to justify continued
18:24
withdrawal. Instead, the images of
18:26
burning helicopters and fleeing soldiers
18:29
told a different story. one of chaos and
18:32
defeat for the North Vietnamese. Lam son
18:35
719 was a triumph. They had stood
18:38
toe-to-toe with South Vietnam's best
18:40
troops, backed by American air power,
18:42
and forced them into retreat. It was
18:45
proof that victory was only a matter of
18:47
time. When the dust settled over Laos,
18:50
Operation Laman 719 was already being
18:52
judged, not just on the battlefield, but
18:55
in the political arena. And the verdicts
18:57
could not have been more divided.
19:00
President Nguyen Van Thieu tried
19:02
desperately to frame the operation as a
19:04
success. In speeches, he boasted that
19:07
ARVN had inflicted massive casualties on
19:09
the enemy, destroyed supply bases, and
19:12
proven it could conduct large-scale
19:14
operations without American infantry.
19:17
Official reports from Saigon emphasized
19:19
the high body counts of North Vietnamese
19:21
soldiers and the destruction of supply
19:23
depots. But within ARVN ranks, the mood
19:26
was far darker. Soldiers who returned
19:29
spoke of chaos, poor leadership, and
19:31
near disaster. Many officers had shown
19:34
little initiative under fire, waiting
19:36
for orders that never came. Troops had
19:39
panicked during the withdrawal, with
19:41
some abandoning positions and equipment.
19:43
The supposed success looked hollow to
19:45
those who had survived the ordeal. For
19:48
President Nixon, Lam son, 719, was
19:51
supposed to be the proof that
19:52
Vietnamization worked. a propaganda
19:55
victory to show Americans that their
19:56
allies could stand on their own.
19:58
Instead, the images told a different
20:00
story. Television footage of ARVN troops
20:03
clinging desperately to helicopter
20:05
skids, of abandoned vehicles littering
20:07
Route 9, and of shattered battalions
20:10
limping back across the border
20:12
contradicted the official line.
20:14
Journalists described the operation as a
20:16
fiasco. Even sympathetic commentators
20:19
admitted that South Vietnam had failed
20:21
to achieve its goals. In Congress,
20:24
critics of the war seized on Lam son 719
20:27
as evidence that Vietnamization was
20:29
doomed. If ARVN's best units with
20:32
massive US air support could not succeed
20:35
in Laos, how could they ever defend
20:37
their own country without American
20:39
combat troops? For the North Vietnamese,
20:42
Lam Son 719 was celebrated as a major
20:45
victory. Propaganda broadcast proclaimed
20:48
that the puppet army of South Vietnam
20:51
had been crushed. The People's Army of
20:53
Vietnam had defended the Ho Chi Minh
20:55
Trail and inflicted staggering losses on
20:58
their enemies. Strategically, the PAVN
21:01
emerged stronger. Their supply lines
21:03
through Laos remained intact and their
21:05
morale soared. They had proven that even
21:08
against ARVN's best troops in
21:10
overwhelming US air power, they could
21:12
stand firm. The consequences rippled far
21:15
beyond the battlefield. For the United
21:18
States, Lambson 719 accelerated the
21:20
sense of futility. Nixon pressed ahead
21:23
with troop withdrawals, but with growing
21:25
doubts about whether South Vietnam could
21:27
ever survive alone. For South Vietnam,
21:30
the operations shattered confidence.
21:32
Many ARVN soldiers no longer trusted
21:35
their commanders or their own ability to
21:37
fight. For the North Vietnamese, Lam Son
21:41
719 confirmed what they had long
21:43
believed. Time was on their side. If
21:46
ARVN could collapse in six weeks in
21:48
Laos, what would happen when the
21:50
Americans were gone for good? History is
21:53
often shaped less by what leaders claim
21:55
and more by what the world sees? And
21:58
what the world saw in Operation Lam son
22:01
719 was not strength. It was collapse.
22:04
For South Vietnam, the operation was a
22:06
crushing blow to morale and credibility.
22:09
Lam son 719 had been intended as a
22:12
showcase of ARVN's ability to wage
22:15
independent war. Instead, it revealed a
22:17
force plagued by fragile leadership,
22:20
poor coordination, and limited
22:22
endurance. These were South Vietnam's
22:24
best troops, airborne, marines, Rangers,
22:27
and armored brigades, and they had
22:29
faltered when asked to lead. If the
22:32
elite units could not succeed, what hope
22:34
did the regular infantry divisions have?
22:37
For the United States, Lamson 719 struck
22:40
at the very heart of Nixon's
22:42
Vietnamization policy. The entire
22:44
premise was that South Vietnam could
22:46
defend itself with US support limited to
22:48
the skies, but the operation proved
22:50
otherwise. Despite overwhelming American
22:53
air power, ARVN could not hold ground
22:56
without US combat boots alongside them.
22:58
To many observers in Washington, Lam
23:00
Son 719 was the clearest evidence yet
23:03
that South Vietnam could not survive
23:05
once American forces fully withdrew. For
23:08
North Vietnam, the operation was
23:10
confirmation of strategy. The PAVN had
23:13
absorbed massive losses, but had held
23:15
firm. More importantly, they had
23:17
humiliated their enemy in front of the
23:19
global stage. The Ho chi Minh trail
23:21
continued to flow with men and supplies,
23:23
unbroken and unstoppable. The lesson was
23:26
clear. If ARVN could not destroy the
23:28
trail with American support, they never
23:30
would. In the long view, historians
23:32
often describe Lam Son 719 as the
23:36
beginning of the end for South Vietnam.
23:38
It did not end the war overnight, but it
23:41
stripped away illusions. From that point
23:43
forward, the US and Saigon both knew,
23:46
whether they admitted it or not, that
23:47
Vietnamization was built on sand. The
23:50
legacy of Lam Son 719 is not just a
23:53
military defeat, but a symbol of the
23:55
limits of training, technology, and air
23:58
power when the fighting spirit of an
24:00
army is uncertain. It was a test South
24:02
Vietnam could not pass, and its failure
24:05
set the stage for the final collapse
24:07
just four years later. Operation Lam Son
24:10
719 was supposed to be the turning
24:13
point. It was meant to prove that South
24:15
Vietnam's army could carry the fight
24:17
into enemy territory. that Nixon's
24:20
strategy of Vietnamization was working
24:22
and that the war could be won without
24:24
American boots on the ground. But
24:26
instead, it proved the opposite. ARVN's
24:29
best troops had been thrown into Laos
24:31
with overwhelming US air support at
24:33
their back and they had faltered. Fire
24:36
bases collapsed, helicopters fell in
24:38
flames, and retreat turned into chaos.
24:41
The Ho chi Minh trail remained intact, a
24:44
symbol of North Vietnam's resilience.
24:47
For South Vietnam, the psychological
24:49
damage was devastating. For the United
24:51
States, it was a bitter lesson that no
24:53
amount of air power could make up for
24:55
weak allies on the ground. And for North
24:57
Vietnam, it was proof that time and
24:59
Will power were on their side. Lam Son
25:02
719 wasn't just a failed operation. It
25:05
was the moment the world saw that
25:07
Vietnamization was an illusion. What do
25:09
you think? Was Lamson 719 doomed from
25:12
the start, or could it have worked under
25:14
different leadership and planning? Let
25:17
me know in the comments.
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