20191018 TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971 14
***** Trong tài liệu nầy chúng tôi có kèm theo
một số tài liệu bằng Anh Ngữ bên dưới chứng minh việc đồng minh Hoa
Kỳ lên kế hoạch tiêu diệt quân lực miền Nam để dọn đường rút quân,
phủi tay sạch sẽ đối với một đồng minh nhỏ bé vùng Đông Nam Á Châu.
TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971,
(14) NHỮNG SAI LẦM KHÓ HIỂU
TỬ CHIẾN HẠ LÀO 1971, (14) NHỮNG SAI LẦM
KHÓ HIỂU
*(Trích sách “Gải Mã Những Bí Ẩn của Chiến Tranh Việt Nam của Bùi
Anh Trinh)
Những sai lầm giống như ấu trỉ
(1). Hành quân cấp quân đoàn mà
không có kiểm chứng tin tình báo:
Khi một người sĩ quan thảo một lệnh hành quân
cấp đại đơn vị (cấp sư đoàn trở lên), bắt buộc ông ta phải biết chắc chắn lực
lượng địch trong khu vực hành quân là bao nhiêu, bố trí như thế nào.
Không thể nào mở một cuộc hành quân cấp quân đoàn mà tình hình địch chỉ là một
ẩn số.
Đối với bất cứ quân đội của nước nào, một vị
tướng thảo ra lệnh hành quân cấp quân đoàn mà không cho kiểm chứng tình hình
địch thì viên tướng thảo ra cuộc hành quân đó phải ra tòa án binh. Nhưng đằng
này trận Hạ Lào không ai chịu nhận mình là tác giả của lệnh hành quân…!?
(2). Không nghĩ tới lực lượng địch
là cấp quân đoàn:
Quyết định đưa quân vào Hạ Lào với 2 Sư đoàn
chứng tỏ người thảo lệnh hành quân không nghĩ tới trường hợp địch có thể có mặt
tại Hạ Lào là 3 sư đoàn. Nếu nghĩ rằng quân địch có thể là 3 sư đoàn thì
bắt buộc lực lượng tấn công phải là 9 sư đoàn. Đây là nguyên tắc sơ đẳng
của sách vở quân sự, lực lượng tấn công bắt buộc phải gấp 3 lực lượng phòng
thủ.
Trong khi đó lệnh hành quân Lam Sơn 719 bị gói
gọn trong 3 sư đoàn (2 sư đoàn hành quân và 1 sư đoàn trừ bị). Và khi biết
rằng lực lượng địch là 5 sư đoàn bộ binh (35.000 người) thì người chỉ huy trận
đánh vẫn nhắm mắt coi như địch chỉ có 7.000 quân…!?
(3). Không dự trù trường hợp địch
tăng quân:
Ngoài ước tính quân số địch là 7.000, người soạn
thảo lệnh hành quân Lam Sơn 719 cũng dự trù Bắc Việt sẽ điều 2 sư đoàn đang
hoạt động tại vùng Bắc vĩ tuyến 17 đến Hạ Lào (trong vòng 14 ngày). Nhưng
phần thi hành kế hoạch của lệnh hành quân không có kế hoạch đối phó với 2 sư
đoàn tăng cường này, hay những sư đoàn khác ở các vùng gần đó…!?
Nếu có đặt ra giả định quân địch tăng
cường lên trên cấp quân đoàn thì bắt buộc phải có kế hoạch đối phó bằng cách
tăng quân gấp bội, nếu không thì phải rút quân về.
(4) Không có mũi tấn công thứ hai
để chia quân địch
Tướng Thiệu cho biết khi duyệt kế hoạch hành
quân Lam Sơn 719 ông có đề nghị một mũi đánh nhứ gần Vinh để cầm chân quân CSVN
tại đây, nhưng “Mỹ không chấp thuận” (The Palace File, bản
dịch của Cung Thúc Tiến và Nguyễn Cao Đàm, trang 75).
Đây là đề nghị đúng bài bản của sách vở.
Khi tấn công một mục tiêu nào thì cũng phải có ít nhất là 2 mũi tấn công, còn
tấn công 1 mũi là tối kỵ, chỉ sử dụng trong trường hợp không còn cách nào
khác. Các ông tướng ngồi ở Ngũ Giác Đài phải biết nguyên tắc chiến thuật
sơ đẳng này, thế nhưng họ đã không làm.
Họ viện lý do làm như vậy là Hoa Kỳ chủ động leo
thang chiến tranh trở lại, Hà Nội có cớ chấm dứt hòa đàm Paris. Nhưng lý
do của này không đúng, bởi vì ý của Tướng Thiệu là chỉ cần đánh lạc hướng (đánh
nhứ, động tác giả) để buộc địch phải chia quân ra đối phó, không cần phải thực
sự đổ bộ. Hơn nữa, mới trước đó 2 tháng, vào tháng 11 năm 1970 một đơn vị
Biệt kích Hoa Kỳ đổ bộ xuống trại tù binh Sơn Tây thì Quốc hội Mỹ đâu có nói gì
đâu?
(5). Không nghĩ tới trường hợp trực
thăng tê liệt do súng cao xạ
Thực tế cho thấy tại Hạ Lào quân CSVN có tới 19
tiểu đoàn phòng không (tương đương 2 sư đoàn) với 575 súng phòng không các
loại. Nhưng người soạn thảo lệnh hành quân Lam Sơn 719 không hề có kế
hoạch dự trù trong trường hợp trực thăng bị tê liệt thì phải làm sao.
Người lính chỉ cầm súng đối mặt với địch quân
khi họ biết có ống tiếp huyết nối đằng sau lưng: Gạo cơm, nước uống và đạn dược
ở ngay đằng sau lưng họ. Nhưng một khi biết được gạo không có, nước uống
không có và tản thương không có thì tất nhiên họ sẽ bỏ cuộc chiến đấu để đi tìm
cái sống cho cá nhân, hay cái sống cho binh sĩ dưới quyền…!!
(6). Không dự trù trường hợp địch có
xe tăng
Trận Làng Vei năm 1968 và trận Ben Hét năm 1969
cho thấy tại khu vực Hạ Lào có bố trí lực lượng tăng của CSVN. Và riêng
trận Làng Vei cho thấy 100 khẩu súng chống tăng M.72 (được dùng cho bộ binh) vô
hiệu lực. Thế nhưng đoàn quân VNCH được tung sang Lào mà không có trang
bị vũ khí chống tăng…!?
Và cũng vì không có trang bị vũ khí chống tăng
cho nên mục “tình hình” của lệnh hành quân Lam Sơn 719 không hề đề cập tới khả
năng địch có thể có xe tăng tại Hạ Lào. Trong khi trên thực tế quân CSVN
có tới 1 trung đoàn Tăng (88 chiếc). Do đó khi xe tăng của CSVN càn tới
đâu thì quân VNCH chạy dài tới đó.
(7). Không dự trù trường hợp địch có
sư đoàn pháo và loại pháo nòng dài 130 ly
Mục tình hình địch của Lệnh hành quân không đề
cập tới việc quân CSVN có đơn vị Pháo binh trên cấp tiểu đoàn hoặc loại pháo
hạng nặng. Trong khi trên thực tế quân CSVN có tới 2 sư đoàn pháo tại Hạ
Lào, và có cả pháo nòng dài 130 ly.
Súng đại bác nòng dài 130 ly của CSVN bắn xa tới
27 cây số, trong khi đó súng đại bác 105 ly của VNCH chỉ bắn xa 10 cây số, và
súng 155 ly nòng ngắn của VNCH chỉ bắn được 15 cây số. Do đó
mỗi khi bị pháo, các đơn vị pháo binh VNCH tại các căn cứ hỏa lực chỉ biết chịu
trận chứ không biết làm gì hơn. Kết quả là lần lượt các khẩu pháo tại các
căn cứ bị hủy diệt…!!
(8). Không bảo mật ý đồ hành quân:
Ngày 15-12, trước khi khởi sự 1 tháng rưỡi, Thủ
tướng Lào công bố cho báo chí rằng Vương Quốc Lào phản đối việc quân đội VNCH
hành quân trên đất Lào. Và đến ngày 22-1, tức là trước cuộc hành quân nửa tháng
thì Thủ tướng Lào lại công bố rõ ràng hơn, nhưng do Đại sứ Mỹ tại Lào xúi:
“Với sự thuyết phục của Tổng thống Nixon (Trong buổi họp ngày 18-1-1971), Ngoại trưởng Rogers lưỡng lự đồng ý. Sau đó ông chỉ thị
cho Đại sứ McMurtrie Godley ở Vạn Tượng cố vấn cho Souvana Phouma lên tiếng về
HQLS 719. Phouma lên tiếng trước dư luận …. Và cuối cùng, ông hy vọng
QLVNCH sẽ… rời đất Lào trong một, hai tuần” (Nguyễn Kỳ Phong, bài viết “Hành
quân Lam Sơn 719, nguồn gốc và khuyết điểm”).
(9) Không cho cố vấn Mỹ hành quân:
Cho tới 7 giờ sáng ngày đoàn quân vượt biên giới
sang đất Lào thì toàn bộ các cố vấn Mỹ nhận được lệnh ở lại bên này biên
giới. Lâu nay các các cố vấn đi theo các đơn vị hành quân để gọi phi cơ
hay pháo binh Mỹ. Như vậy trên thực tế các đơn vị VNCH hoạt động trên đất
địch mà không có sự yểm trợ của phi cơ chiến đấu hay
pháo binh.
Người lái máy bay thả bom và người bắn pháo là
người Mỹ thì bắt buộc người điều chỉnh phi pháo tại mặt trận bắt buộc phải là
người Mỹ. Pháo binh tính toán quay nòng súng và phi cơ tính toán sà xuống
mục tiêu trong vòng vài tíc tắc nên không thể chờ thông dịch, nhiều khi chỉ vấp
váp một con số hay ú ớ một vài giây thì có thể bom rơi đạn nổ ngay vào quân ta
chứ không vào quân địch.
(10). Hành động khó hiểu của Đại
Tướng Abrams:
Tướng Abrams là người trách nhiệm chỉ huy tổng quát
cuộc hành quân. Thế nhưng trong 1 tuần sau cùng của cuộc chiến,
nghĩa là những ngày chiến trận ác liệt nhất, thì ông Tổng chỉ huy lại đi thăm
gia đình tại Thái Lan, sau đó trở về lại uống rượu suốt ngày. Cái gì
khiến cho Tướng Abrams đã có hành động không xứng đáng là một ông Tướng tư
lệnh?
Ngoài ra các cuộn băng ghi âm các cuộc họp của
MACV (Bộ tư lệnh quân đội Hoa Kỳ và Đồng minh tại Việt Nam) được đưa ra công
chúng nhưng riêng những cuộng băng ghi âm trong hai tuần 14
và 18 có liên quan đến cuộc hành quân sang Lào lại không được đưa ra.
Có cái gì bí ẩn đằng sau các cuộn băng đó?
(11) Câu nói khó hiểu của Tướng Cao
Văn Viên:
Trong quyển sách “Cuộc triệt thoái Tây Nguyên
1975” của nhà báo Thiếu tá Phạm Huấn, trang 162, có kể lại một câu nói của tướng
Phú với tác giả trong lúc cả hai chờ bay vào Tchepone vào sáng ngày 8-3-1971
: “Tướng Phú tiết lộ với tôi (Huấn) : – Sáng nay chờ tin tức Trung đoàn vào Tchepone, Đại tướng
Viên đã nói rằng, nếu hồng phúc nhà tôi (Phú) lớn, chỉ cần 1 người lính của Sư đoàn 1 trở về, tôi đã trở
thành …anh hùng” (???!!!).
Tại sao sau khi chiếm được Tchepone thì sẽ không
còn người lính nào trở về? Và tại sao chỉ cần 1 người trở về thì Tướng
Phú trở thành anh hùng? Câu này chỉ có Tướng Cao Văn Viên mới trả lời
được. Nhưng cho tới sau này, sau 10 năm định cư tại Hoa Kỳ ông vẫn không
dám đối mặt với cựu ký giả quân đội Phạm Huấn. Phạm Huấn đã nhiều lần xin
gặp mặt ông để phỏng vấn nhưng lần nào ông cũng từ chối.
(12) Báo chí Mỹ mạt sát quân đội VNCH hèn nhát
Khi cuộc hành quân bị khựng lại vì các pilot Mỹ
từ chối bay thì phát ngôn nhân quân đội Mỹ vội vàng đổ cho là tại thời tiết
xấu. Nhưng báo chí Mỹ lại biến thành tin quân đội VNCH hèn nhát.
Còn báo chí Việt Nam thì im thin thít, không dám đưa tin sự thật là pilot Mỹ từ
chối bay (sic). Kết quả chỉ làm cho địch lên tinh thần và phe ta xuống tinh
thần. Không ai hiểu nổi thái độ của báo chí Mỹ.
BÙI ANH TRINH
*** Bình luận bổ túc:
(1). Hành quân cấp quân đoàn mà không có kiểm chứng
tin tình báo:
Không thể có tin tình báo chính xác vì tất cả
những lực lượng nhảy toán như Lôi Hổ, Delta, Viễn Thám hay tình báo
Phòng 7 của Việt Nam chỉ có thể thực hiện được dưới sự yểm trợ
của không quân Hoa Kỳ vì tài liệu không ảnh đều từ không quân Hoa Kỳ
cung cấp. Khi kế hoạch hành quân do chính tham mưu trưởng liên quân Hoa
Kỳ đưa ra và chính tổng thống Hoa Kỳ ra lệnh tiến hành vì họ muống
rút quân nhanh để phủi tay và nhất là dưới cái lổ mũi lỏ của
Kissinger thì khó có thể tìm ra manh mối vì mọi thứ đều quyết định
từ Ngũ Giác Đài. Ngoài ra quân Việt Nam không thể hành quân ra khỏi
vùng đã ấn định của phóng đồ hành quân vì có thể bị ăn bomb hay
pháo của Hoa Kỳ.
Đây là một nổi nhục cho một nhược tiểu lệ
thuộc vào quân viện ngoại bang. Câu nói dưới đây của tiến sĩ giấy
Kissinger đã cho chúng ta hiểu kế hoạch của ông ta là tiêu hủy lực
lượng hùng hậu của quân lực VNCH bằng mọi cách, mọi phương tiện mà
hoa Kỳ có sẳn. Trang 22/540.
*** Kissinger emphasized that the
administration must remain united: “All our weaker friends need is for
something to make them fall off and they will start trying to undermine the
operation.”
(2). Không nghĩ tới lực lượng địch là cấp quân đoàn:
Trang 22/540.
Như đã biết, những tin tức tình báo đều do Hoa
Kỳ cung cấp vì thế quân đội miền Nam đã lâm vào thế hạ phong một khi
đồng minh đang tìm đường tháo chạy. Tổng tham mưu liên quân Hoa Kỳ đã
biết việc quân số của CSBV tại khu vực hành quân vượt trội hơn VNCH
gấp 6-7 lần nhưng mọi việc đều được ém nhẹm.
*** In fact, the ARVN had run into a
superior North Vietnamese force fighting on a battlefield that the enemy had
carefully prepared.
(3). Không dự trù trường hợp địch tăng quân:
Có thể đã dự trù nhưng quân số và khí cụ của
miền Nam có giới hạn. Điều nầy đã thấy rỏ là chỉ có hai Liên Đoàn
TQLC làm lực lượng trừ bị mà thôi còn những sư đoàn khác đang thi
hành nhiệm vụ an ninh diện địa. Nên nhớ lúc bấy giờ tất cả những
cố vấn Hoa Kỳ đều ở lại bên trong biên giới Việt Nam. Chỉ có không
quân là yểm trợ cho cuộc hành quân nầy mà thôi. Riêng pháo binh Hoa Kỳ
chỉ yểm trợ trong phạm vi 15 KM dọc theo biên giới Việt Lào.
Trang 23/540.
Tin tình báo Hoa Kỳ, cho đến ngày VNCH tiến quân
vào Hạ lào, vẩn cho biết là chỉ có 25, 000 quân của CSBV trong vùng
tức là tương đương với lực lượng quân VNCH đang tiến vào. Điều nầy cho
thấy Hoa Kỳ đã quyết định đưa đoàn quân VNCH vào cái bẩy mà cả hai
CSBV và đồng minh Hoa Kỳ giăng ra chờ đợi quân miền Nam.
*** By 8 February 1971, when the ARVN
crossed the Laotian border, the North Vietnamese, by their own account, had
massed some 60,000 troops in the Route 9-Southern Laos front. They included
five main force divisions, two separate regiments, eight artillery regiments,
three engineer regiments, three tank battalions, six anti-aircraft regiments,
and eight sapper battalions, plus logistic and transportation units—according
to North Vietnamese historians “our army’s greatest concentration of
combined-arms forces . . . up to that point.” In and within easy reach of the
operational area, Group 559 had accumulated supplies sufficient to support the
force in combat for as long as four or five months.
(4) Không có mũi tấn công thứ hai để chia quân địch
Tổng Thống Thiệu đã có đề nghị mở một cuộc
hành quân quấy rối khác nhưng phía Hoa Kỳ hoàn toàn từ chối yểm
trợ. Một sơ xót khác mà miền Nam không để ý là các phi vụ dọn bãi
của B-52 dọc theo QL-9 đã không được không quân Hoa Kỳ thực hiện, có
lẻ lệnh từ tổng tham mưu liên quân Hoa Kỳ! Vì nếu có những phi vụ
nầy thì những dàn phòng không của CSBV đã hoàn toàn bị hủy diệt và
như thế cả phi cơ lẩn quân lực VNCH không bị tổn thất trầm trọng như
thế.
(5). Không nghĩ tới trường hợp trực thăng tê liệt do
súng cao xạ
Có thể đã có ước lượng về lực lượng phòng
không nhưng phía Hoa Kỳ đã cố ý làm lơ cho những phi vụ B-52 dọn bãi
và đây là hệ quả của việc những phi công Hoa Kỳ từ chối những phi
vụ được định trước sau khi mấy chục chiếc trực thăng của Hoa Kỳ đã
bị bắn rơi khi bay vào vùng hành quân.
(6). Không dự trù trường hợp địch có xe tăng
Qua những tài liệu từ phòng tổng tham mưu liên
quân Hoa Kỳ tiết lộ đã cho chúng ta hiểu rằng việc trang bị súng
diệt tank là không thể nào xảy ra vì kế hoạch của Hoa Kỳ là phủi
tay, nghỉa là quân miền Nam phải thua và bị tiêu hủy trong trận Lam Son
719 và quyết định nầy là ý định của tiến sĩ giấy Kissinger.
(7). Không dự trù trường hợp địch có sư đoàn pháo và loại
pháo nòng dài 130 ly.
Tin tình báo đã hoàn toàn bị ém nhẹm từ phía
Hoa Kỳ mặc dù Hoa Kỳ biết rõ quân số của CSBV trong vùng.
(8). Không bảo mật ý đồ hành quân:
Chính Hoa Kỳ đã tiết lộ bí mật hành quân khi
cho đại sứ Hoa Kỳ tại Lào thông báo cho thủ tướng Lào biết cuộc
hành quân nầy trước một tháng.
Trang 20/540.
*** In
Vientiane, Ambassador McMurtrie Godley told Souvanna of the forthcoming
incursion. Souvanna replied that he would have to protest publicly and would
expect the ARVN to withdraw within a week or two. Otherwise, he feared that the
Chinese would act in north Laos. Why, he asked, could not the operation occur
in the tri-border areas and the highlands south of Route 110?9
Trang 21/540. Tổng thống Nixon bí mật bật đèn
xanh cho truyền thông Hoa Kỳ chúi mũi và khai thác triệt để vào mặt
trận Hạ Lào trước khi quân VNCH vượt biên giới tiến vào Hạ Lào.
*** President Nixon wanted the thrust
presented to the media not as an invasion but as a raid into the Laotian
sanctuaries, so that there could be no perception of defeat.
(9) Không cho cố vấn Mỹ hành quân:
Lệnh từ tổng tham mưu trưởng liên quân Hoa Kỳ
không cho cố vấn Mỷ theo đoàn quân Việt sang Lào.
(10). Hành động khó hiểu của Đại Tướng Abrams:
Có lẻ ông ta bị lương tâm cắn rức vì chính ông
ta là người hiểu rỏ quân miền Nam đã bị bỏ rơi và sẽ bị tiêu diệt
nên đề nghị hủy bỏ cuộc hành quân nầy. Đề nghị nầy đã làm tiến sĩ
giấy Kissinger nổi giận. Đoạn đối thoại dưới đây cho chúng ta thấy
việc cắt đứt tiếp tế cho quân lực VNCH là mục tiêu chính của
Kissinger và không màng gì đến chuyện "body count-đếm xác"
của lính VNCH trên chiến trường Hạ Lào. Đây có lẻ là lý do mà tướng
Abrams đã không màng gì đến cuộc chiến trong những tuần cuối của
cuộc tiến quân.
Trang 21/540
*** In what struck Dr. Kissinger as a
petulant response, General Abrams recommended canceling the Laotian operation
and opposed substituting ones elsewhere because they would have no more than
nuisance value. There was no point, Abrams added, in continuing preparations
for Phase I, and he intended to cancel them on 28 January. Admiral McCain
concurred.
Trang 22/540.
*** Kissinger asked whether General Abrams
recognized that stopping the flow of supplies was the main objective, and that
the “body count” mattered less. The Chairman assured him that Abrams knew this.
(11) Câu nói khó hiểu của Tướng Cao Văn Viên:
Qua những tài liệu bạch hóa từ Ngủ Giác Đài
gần đây cho chúng ta hiểu rỏ là tướng Cao Văn Viên đã biết sự nguy
hiểm, lành ít dữ nhiều cho phía quân lục VNCH nhưng ở vị thế của ông
ta không làm khác hơn được.
Dưới đây là tài liệu bằng Anh Ngữ chứng minh
những bình luận trên. Từ trang 22 cho tới trang 37 của tài liệu dài
540 trang.
Trang 20/540
tion; and covert operations against North Vietnam.
President Nixon stated that the objective of these operations was “an enduring
South Vietnam.” Admiral Moorer added that “the operation must succeed and,
therefore, we should take such risks as are necessary.” Nixon replied, “Let it
succeed with a minimum low-key operation as far as US forces are concerned.”
Nixon asked for Secretary Laird’s opinion of the Laotian operation. Laird
replied, “Let’s take a crack at it.” The President then approved the Chup
operation but called for further study of Tchepone.7
On 4 January 1971, Admiral Moorer formally asked
Secretary Laird to approve the Laotian operation. He stressed that, since US
troop strength and air assets would decrease, “this may be the last opportunity
available to the RVNAF for a cross-border, dry season operation” into the
Tchepone logistics hub. Laird and Moorer visited South Vietnam on 9–12 January.
General Abrams emphasized to them that the South Vietnamese had become “very
different people” from what they were before their lunge into Cambodia.
President Thieu told Laird and Moorer that, in December, he had disregarded his
commanders’ advice and sent troops into Cambodia, where they thwarted a
communist drive to isolate the capital of Phnom Penh. Admiral Moorer then flew
to Hue where he reviewed operational aspects of the Laotian plan with Lieutenant
General Huang Xuan Lam, who would be commanding the Tchepone thrust, and Lieutenant General James W. Sutherland,
USA, Commanding General, XXIV Corps. Lam had served as Commanding General, I
Corps, since 1966. His loyalty to President Thieu was plain—quelling a Buddhist
uprising had been his first task—but he had never commanded a major offensive
operation.8
In Washington, on 18 January, a MACV team briefed the
JCS and other senior officials on General Abrams’ plan for Laos. General Westmoreland
raised no objection.
Next day, at a meeting of the Washington Special
Actions Group, Admiral Moorer, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, and
the Director of Central Intelligence voted in favor of the Laotian operation.
However, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson objected that an incursion
could alienate Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and lead to a north–south
partitioning of Laos.
*** In Vientiane, Ambassador McMurtrie
Godley told Souvanna of the forthcoming incursion. Souvanna replied that he
would have to protest publicly and would expect the ARVN to withdraw within a
week or two. Otherwise, he feared that the Chinese would act
in north Laos. Why, he asked, could not the
operation occur in the tri-border areas and the highlands south of Route 110?9
Some last-minute doubts surfaced in Washington. The
Chairman asked General Westmoreland to tailor his “Hand in Glove” plan in order
to conduct the Laotian operation farther south, if the President so desired.
On 26 January, Admiral Moorer passed along some
queries to McCain and Abrams. Could the ARVN conduct its thrust without US
helicopter support? What was the latest date on which Phase II, the actual entry
into Laos, could be cancelled? President Nixon wanted to know what could be
done in northern Cambodia if the Tchepone thrust was cancelled.
Trang 21/540
Which, the President asked, was preferable: a northern
Cambodia operation or nothing at all?10
In what struck Dr. Kissinger as a petulant response,
General Abrams recommended canceling the Laotian operation and opposed
substituting ones elsewhere because they would have no more than nuisance
value. There was no point, Abrams added, in continuing preparations for Phase
I, and he intended to cancel them on 28 January. Admiral McCain concurred. The
Chairman replied that the obstacle was primarily political, and told them to
resubmit views based “on military considerations alone.” Abrams answered by
giving the Laotian operation his “unqualified support”; McCain called it “an
exceptional opportunity to inflict the maximum damage against enemy personnel,
materiel, and psychological pressure.”
On the afternoon of 27 January, after canvassing his
advisers again, President Nixon ordered that all actions connected with Phase I
of the Laotian operation proceed. A decision on Phase II, which Moorer told him
could be cancelled on 48 hours’ notice, was postponed.11
Phase I, designated DEWEY CANYON II, began at 0001
local time on 30 January, as US troops maneuvered to secure western Quang Tri
province. An assault airstrip became operational at Khe Sanh by 3 February;
Route 9 was repaired and cleared to the Laotian border by 5 February. Behind
this cover, the better part of two South Vietnamese divisions massed at Khe
Sanh in preparation for the crossborder attack. Meantime, at Secretary Laird’s
request, Admiral Moorer reviewed alternatives to occupying Tchepone and
reported that none could substitute for it “in terms of anticipated results and
effects on the enemy.” The White House, however, was intensely concerned about
the parlous state of congressional and public support for the war.
*** President Nixon wanted the thrust
presented to the media not as an invasion but as a raid into the Laotian
sanctuaries, so that there could be no perception of defeat. On
3 February, Admiral Moorer called General Frederick C. Weyand, USA, Deputy
COMUSMACV, to say that “the pressure back here is up to explosive proportions
in terms of congressional pressure, media pressure, etc., but I am standing
solid on this operation.” Weyand commented that he thought this would be “the
real turning point of the war.” Moorer agreed, saying that was why he was
“driving so hard.”12
*** On 4 February, President Nixon
authorized Phase II. Secretary Laird approved an execute
message that would terminate operating authorities on 5 April, thereby limiting
the Tchepone operation to six to eight weeks. Admiral Moorer promptly told Brigadier
General Haig that he had “implored” Secretaries Laird and William P. Rogers not
to impose a termination date and tell Congress about it, as the administration had
done during the Cambodian incursion. The White House at once agreed that 5 April
would not be treated as a deadline. *** “If we get a
bloody nose,” Dr. Kissinger told the WSAG, “we will get out early—on the other
hand, if things go well we will stay.”13
Trang 22/540
Advance Becomes Consolidation
Phase II opened on 8 February. The Vietnamese name,
LAM SON 719, was given to operations in Laos.14 The ARVN Airborne Division,
with the 1st Armored Brigade attached, moved along Route 9 to seize A Loui,
which was to serve as the launching point for the final assault on Tchepone.
The ARVN 1st Infantry Division, advancing in tandem with the Airborne Division
south of Route 9, protected the main force’s left flank; ARVN Rangers on the
north guarded its right flank. On 10 February, *** the Chairman
informed Dr. Kissinger that General Abrams was “very pleased” with progress
thus far but did not want the operation held to a strict timetable. Kissinger emphasized that the administration must remain
united: “All our weaker friends need is for something to make them fall off and
they will start trying to undermine the operation.” Two days later, Moorer
reported that things were going satisfactorily but hard fighting would begin
soon. Kissinger asked whether General Abrams recognized
that stopping the flow of supplies was the main objective, and that the “body
count” mattered less. The Chairman assured him that Abrams knew this. The ARVN was moving deliberately,
Moorer added, and establishing positions so that units would be in a strong
posture as they moved westward across the panhandle.15 ***
In fact, the ARVN had run into a superior North Vietnamese force fighting on a
battlefield that the enemy had carefully prepared. Since the Cambodian
incursions, the Politburo in Hanoi had anticipated additional cross-border
offensives during the
1970–1971 Laotian dry season. The North Vietnamese
leaders viewed the LAM SON 719 area, which they called the “Route 9-Southern
Laos Area,” as a likely theater for such attacks. Accordingly, in midsummer
1970, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)
General Staff began drawing up combat plans, deploying
forces, and directing preparation of the battlefield. The enemy secretly
shifted a main force division from Quang Nam Province in South Vietnam to the
Route 9 front and established a provisional corps headquarters to control that
division and several from North Vietnam in largescale conventional combat. As
the troops assembled, Group 559, the command that operated, maintained, and
defended the Ho Chi Minh Trail, prepared its own units for combat, constructed
fortifications, built additional roads for truck movement of supplies, and set
up depots and a medical evacuation network.
Trang 23/540
The North Vietnamese had massed this combat power for
a larger purpose than simply defending their critical supply route. They saw
and were determined to seize an opportunity to fight a decisive battle on
advantageous terms, destroy a large portion of Saigon’s army, and thoroughly
disrupt and discredit Vietnamization.
Indicating the importance Hanoi assigned to the
campaign, *** Colonel General Van Tien Dung,
Deputy Chairman of the Politburo’s Central Military Party Committee and Chief
of the General Staff, journeyed to the front to oversee operations.
On 31 January, in an address to the troops on the
Route 9-Southern Laos front, the Communist Party Central Committee made clear
the operation’s objectives:
“The coming engagement will be a strategically
decisive battle. We will fight not only to retain control of the strategic
transportation corridor, but also to annihilate a number of units of the
enemy’s strategic reserve forces, to . . . deal a significant defeat to a
portion of their “Vietnamization” plot, to advance our resistance effort to
liberate South Vietnam and defend North Vietnam, to gloriously fulfill *** our international duty, and to hone our main force
troops in the fires of combat. Our Army must certainly win this battle.”16
What the allies had envisioned as a search-and-destroy
operation similar to those in Cambodia turned into an intense combined arms
conventional battle for which the ARVN was poorly prepared. From the beginning,
the South Vietnamese met heavy resistance along Route 9 and in the flanking
landing zones, where massed antiaircraft guns and artillery inflicted heavy
losses in men and helicopters. As the battle developed, the ARVN firebases,
especially those north of Route 9, came under attack by North Vietnamese
infantry supported by armor and heavy long-range artillery. The enemy pushed
the ARVN rangers and airborne troops off four key hilltops, inflicting heavy
losses in personnel and equipment. At one position, the enemy overran and
captured the commander and staff of the airborne division’s 3d Brigade.
American fighter-bombers, B–52s, and helicopter gunships took a heavy toll of
the North Vietnamese,
but the enemy continued to press the attack.17
On 13 February, as the speed and violence of the North
Vietnamese response were becoming apparent, President Thieu halted the advance
for three to five days, ostensibly to consolidate positions and destroy
captured supplies. General Vien told Abrams that he hoped the ARVN would reach
the high ground leading to Tchepone by 21 February. Admiral Moorer, on 17
February, reviewed matters with the Director, Joint Staff, Lieutenant General
John W. Vogt, USAF. The North Vietnamese were moving reinforcements and had
massed around 25,000 troops in the area, which was about the number that
intelligence had forecast. Vogt reminded the Chairman that General Abrams had
said he would welcome North Vietnamese reinforcements, because he would then be
able to strike at them.18
Meanwhile, on 11 February, Admiral Moorer authorized
an increase in the monthly level of tactical air sorties, so long as FY 1971
funding levels were not exceeded. A problem arose because the North Vietnamese
had established troop
Trang 24/540
concentrations and antiaircraft defenses in a location
north of Tchepone outside the areas authorized for B–52 strikes. General
Abrams, considering bombing to be “essential,” requested appropriate authority
from CINCPAC and Ambassador Godley.
Six camps for Laotian POWs were located in this area,
and Abrams asked that the operating restriction around them be reduced from
3,000 to 1,500 meters. Ambassador Godley refused, citing “the potentially
severe political repercussions associated with destruction of POW camps.”
General Abrams, strongly backed by CINCPAC, turned to the Chairman for support.
The Director of Central Intelligence reported little indication that the POW
camps were still occupied. Admiral Moorer, Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers
all favored the requested bombing without restriction.
Ambassador Godley gave way and, on 20 February,
CINCPAC approved bombing in that area for the duration of LAM SON 719.
Concurrently, General Abrams asked for immediate action to permit 40 B–52
sorties daily through May, and more if the situation
warranted it. LAM SON 719, he predicted, could become
“one of the most decisive operations of the Southeast Asia conflict.” Admiral
McCain concurred, pointing out that heavy troop concentrations would present
ideal targets for saturation bombing.
The Chairman authorized this surge on 21 February.19
Even as the fighting in Laos intensified, General Abrams held to a consistently
optimistic line in his situation reports while acknowledging the emerging
difficulties.
Officials in Washington, however, became increasingly
concerned and pressed for more timely and accurate information on the
operation. On 19 February, after an ARVN Ranger battalion had been driven off a
firebase in a bloody combat, Admiral Moorer called General Abrams, who reported
that the North Vietnamese “have gone all out for a real fight . . . and it is
going to be a tough time over the next several days or maybe weeks.” Dr.
Kissinger telephoned the Chairman to ask when the ARVN would move forward.
Moorer answered, “When they get logistics and the combat situation in hand.”20
*** On 22 February, President Thieu told
General Abrams that Phase III should begin in about three days. Once the
Tchepone area had been cleaned out, Thieu said that he favored withdrawing over
Route 922 through Base Area 611. When Abrams’ message relaying this information
reached Washington, Dr. Kissinger told Moorer that he interpreted it to mean
that the ARVN would go in, spend a little time, and then pull right out. Why,
Kissinger asked, were 10,000 ARVN reserves uncommitted? He hoped Abrams “did
not entertain any thoughts of getting out of there because he has to stay in
until April.” Perhaps prompted by Brigadier General Haig, Kissinger remarked
that ARVN units north of Route 9 had dug in, which would allow the North
Vietnamese to attack one firebase at a time.
Moorer wrote afterward: “I would like to explain to
Kissinger that we are establishing a good solid logistics base,” and would move
forward when that task was done. President Nixon called the Chairman to ask for
his evaluation. “It is tough going but we are coming along all right,” Moorer
responded. Nixon said that the
Trang 25/540
ARVN “must continue to take whatever casualties they
have to in order to hold their ground and stay in there because that is all we
need.”21
Early on 23 February, General Westmoreland called the
Chairman to say that Dr. Kissinger wanted to talk with him.22 Westmoreland
expressed to Moorer his “basic concern that the objective may be more ambitious
than the troops can achieve.” At the White House, Westmoreland gave Kissinger
his view that targeting Tchepone with less than two divisions was too ambitious.
Back when he was
COMUSMACV, Westmoreland continued, he had concluded
that four US divisions would be needed to cut the Trail. He now recommended,
instead, “hit-and-run raids out of Khe Sanh to cut the trails at various
points.” Westmoreland then returned to
the Pentagon and debriefed Moorer, who replied that “a
mediocre commander in the field can do much better than an expert in Washington
and that we should leave the operational commanders alone.”23
At a JCS meeting on 24 February, while Admiral Moorer
was away, General Westmoreland told the Service chiefs that he considered LAM
SON 719 to be “a very high risk operation.” His conclusions were that the
operation had not gone according to plan, surprise was lost, resistance had
proved greater than expected, the ARVN was attacking on a narrow rather than a
broad front, and that Tchepone itself was open and flat, so that the
surrounding high ground must be occupied.
As to the Airborne Division, which had buckled under
the initial North Vietnamese attacks, Westmoreland stated that the Commanding
General “is not a fighter” and that the troops were not accustomed to
conducting sustained operations.
Ordinarily, they were employed on brief forays, often
involving intensive combat, then pulled out of action for rest and
rehabilitation. Hence, the Army Chief of Staff declared, “The airborne troops
will die easily. . . If they are defeated it will be a tremendous setback for Thieu.”24
Early next morning, Admiral Moorer called General
Chapman to ask about the previous day’s JCS meeting. Chapman replied that, when
Westmoreland was speaking, “he was astounded and that all he could do was sit
there and scowl.” A message from General Abrams arrived, conveying Thieu’s new
plan. Two Marine brigades would replace the airborne and ranger units; two
regiments of the 1st Division would advance northwest. “At the
conclusion of these operations,” ARVN units would withdraw along Routes 9 and
922 back into South Vietnam. Abrams judged this plan “basically sound.” He
believed that, when carried out, it “will have positioned the Vietnamese forces
firmly astride the enemy system.”25
That afternoon the Chairman met with Dr. Kissinger,
who brought up General Westmoreland’s criticisms. Moorer retorted that
Westmoreland had made no objection when MACV briefers presented the plan on 18
December, that he had concurred in it when polled by Secretary Laird, and that
he had never before said anything about the weaknesses of the Airborne
Division’s commander and troops.
Moorer next explained the new plan to the President
and “made the point that this should be considered an area and that Tchepone as
a point had really little, if any,
Trang 26/540
significance.” Nixon seemed pleased by the plan and
encouraged by the prospect of 6,000 ARVN reserves being committed.26
On 26 February, Admiral Moorer advised Secretary Laird
that he rated the new plan “militarily sound”:
“I am particularly gratified and impressed by the
flexibility and adaptability of the RVN forces . . . The modified plan exploits
the enemy’s decision to engage in large unit actions which makes him more
vulnerable to both air and ground attacks. It also provides an opportunity for
additional ARVN units to gain battlefield experience, particularly in the area
of unit leadership.”
That evening, Admiral Moorer reviewed matters with
Rear Admiral R. C. Robinson, the Chairman’s liaison officer with the NSC Staff.
Robinson told him that Brigadier General Haig did not understand why more ARVN
troops were not being committed to LAM SON 719. Moorer observed: “this is the moment
of truth for South Vietnam and that they should be thinking in terms of
committing whatever . . . is necessary to ensure success.”27
At this “moment of truth,” Admiral Moorer had to
choose between the appraisals of General Abrams and General Westmoreland. Two
factors determined the Chairman’s choice. First, like many military men, he was
convinced that civilians’ penchant for micro-management and half-measures had
badly crippled the war effort during 1965–68, hence his remark that a mediocre
field commander could do much better than an expert in Washington. For much of
LAM SON 719, Moorer discounted the criticisms of Dr. Kissinger and Brigadier
General Haig. Instead, he accepted and doggedly defended General Abrams’
optimistic appreciations.
Second, entirely apart from that issue, Moorer did not
hold Westmoreland in high regard.28 He was at odds with Westmoreland over
budget priorities and revision of the Unified Command Plan. Westmoreland’s
criticisms, coming in mid-operation, struck Moorer and evidently General
Chapman as a belated effort at self-justification.
Their reaction was unfortunate, because hindsight
shows that Westmoreland had identified ARVN weaknesses that eluded the field
commanders.
“Bugging Out?”
On 1 March, General Abrams cabled Washington an
assurance: “. . . [I]t is clear to me that President Thieu and General Vien are
determined to fight these two hard battles [at Tchepone and Chup]. They realize
their casualties will be high but they will take it and fight the battle to
win.” President Nixon asked whether he still believed that the ARVN were
fighting well. The Chairman replied “unequivocally that they were.” That evening,
however, Rear Admiral Robinson told Admiral Moorer that the White House
remained concerned about the small weight of ARVN effort compared to the forces
available, the drastic compression of the ARVN front,
Trang 27/540
and the lack of positive tone about
what would happen next. Dr. Kissinger communicated to Ambassador Bunker his
concern about the constant changes of plan:
“Since receiving information on
these various conceptual approaches, events on the ground have not confirmed
our ability to accomplish them. . . .
An additional factor which concerns
me greatly is the limited ARVN strength which has been involved in this
operation at a time when the enemy has obviously committed his full resources.
. . .
We will do our best to hold the
fort. But we must know what we are up against. There is no chance to keep panic
from setting in if we are constantly outstripped by events.”29
The ARVN advance resumed on 3
March. Next morning, General Abrams advised Admiral Moorer: “I think we are
going to get done what we set out to get done.” He described Lieutenant General
Lam as “tough, determined, careful and his spirits are good today.” Abrams
rated the ARVN 1st Division as “solid from top to bottom.” As to the Chup
operation, where Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh had taken command after the
aggressive Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri died in a helicopter crash, Abrams
expected to see substantial accomplishments and called Minh an officer “whose
credentials are in excellent order.” President Nixon, at a press conference
that evening, quoted General Abrams’ evaluation that “the South Vietnamese by
themselves can hack it and they can give a better account of themselves even
than the North Vietnamese units.”30
By 6 March, Dr. Kissinger wrote
later, the South Vietnamese were close enough to Tchepone “to sustain the claim
of having captured it.” Two days later, General Abrams cabled the Chairman that
“[m]orale and confidence of the ARVN Commanders has risen appreciably during
the last three or four days and I believe they would willingly accept almost any
mission assigned.” However, he continued, there was a “general feeling” among
ARVN commanders “that their mission has been accomplished and it is now time to
withdraw. They do not concede that there is still much to be done.” Early on 9
March, Abrams reported that President Thieu talked about pulling out of Laos
completely by 5 April, allegedly from fear that US air support would end on
that date. After contacting Secretary Laird and Dr. Kissinger, the Chairman
informed Abrams that authorities would be extended. Moorer also urged Abrams to
impress upon President Thieu that this was the RVNAF’s last chance to make a
dramatic impression upon the North Vietnamese. The White House wondered whether
Thieu had seized upon a pretext to justify a quick pullout.
Accordingly, Kissinger sent
Ambassador Bunker a cable that ended as follows:
“We have not gone through all of
this agony just for the few favorable headlines achieved as a result of recent
successes and would hope that President Thieu would view the situation from the
same perspective.”31
Although some US officials were not
willing to recognize it, the “turning point” already had been passed. On 11
March, Dr. Kissinger told Admiral Moorer that the President wanted the ARVN
still to be in Laos when he announced the next round
Trang 28/540
of US troop withdrawals on 7 April.
Kissinger said that he did not mind the ARVN moving out of Tchepone as long as
the southward flow of men and materiel was stopped. Moorer replied that the
major roads would remain cut until “deep into April. We have the initiative
now.” Next day, Abrams reported that President Thieu planned to stay in Laos by
rotating units and temporarily withdrawing some of them. Abrams and Bunker
judged this plan militarily sound and suited to preserving a good public image
after the operation ended. A skeptical Dr. Kissinger observed to the Chairman
that the ARVN had found few supply caches near Tchepone and that the North
Vietnamese had just completed an addition to the Ho Chi Minh Trail that
bypassed the battle zone.32
The North Vietnamese by now had
massed five divisions with perhaps 45,000 troops—more than twice the ARVN force
in Laos—for counterattacks.
On 14–15 March, they drove the
South Vietnamese out of Fire Support Base LOLO, three miles south of Route 9.
At Secretary Laird’s staff meeting on 15 March, General Westmoreland asserted
that ARVN tactics were bad and criticized the spiking and
abandoning of artillery pieces at
LOLO.33 “In general,” Moorer recorded, “he badmouthed the whole LAM SON 719
operation.” Next day, Admiral Moorer reassured President Nixon that “things
were going pretty well” and the ARVN were carrying out the plan to move units
down to Route 914. Moorer asserted that enemy movements through the general
area of LAM SON 719 had been “severely disrupted,” and that ARVN alleged by the
American media to have “fled” were merely moving to higher ground. Moorer later
telephoned Lieutenant General Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Chief of Staff, Pacific
Command. Corcoran said that he was “beginning to doubt the ARVN were really
down on Route 914 in strength. . . . ”34
On 17 March, General Abrams
reported that Lieutenant General Lam did not intend to terminate Phase III
until 10 or 15 April, when Phase IV would begin. Lam’s plans, however, provided
neither for continuing the interdiction of Route 914 nor for moving eastward
through Base Area 611. Dr. Kissinger called Moorer to say that he did not
understand Abrams’ report and wanted to know how long the ARVN would stay in
the strategically important positions—Route 914 and the intersection of Routes
99 and 92. Moorer simply repeated that, on 15 April, Lam would end Phase III
and start Phase IV, concentrating primarily in Base Area 611. But the Chairman
evidently had misgivings. That evening, in a telephone conversation with
Lieutenant General Corcoran, Moorer said it looked as though the ARVN had abandoned
the plan to attack Muong Nong in Base Area 611. Further, the Chairman suspected
that the South Vietnamese had suffered many more casualties than they had
reported. Corcoran agreed on both counts, commenting that high casualties probably
accounted for Thieu’s change of plan. Moorer sent Abrams a cable cautioning:
“the redeployment of ARVN forces as
outlined . . . could fuel to the current pessimistic press reports claiming a
rout of Vietnamese units from Laos. . .We run the risk of losing most of our
high-level political support for prosecuting LAM SON
Trang 29/540
719 to a successful conclusion and
of undermining widespread confidence in the success of Vietnamization to
date.”35
President Nixon spoke angrily to
Brigadier General Haig about relieving General Abrams and sent Haig to Vietnam
for a first-hand appraisal. Early on 18 March, Admiral Moorer called Abrams to
ask for his assessment of the tactical situation. Abrams advised that
withdrawals were “proceeding in an orderly fashion.” The Chairman observed that
Thieu seemed “to be bobtailing this operation,” and wondered whether he was
unwilling to take more risks for political reasons. A Vietnamese presidential election
was slated for September, and a lengthy casualty list would alienate voters. Abrams
said that he would talk with Thieu and report back.36
The Chairman next telephoned Dr.
Kissinger, who had nothing good to say about LAM SON 719. The ARVN, Kissinger
noted, were not replacing units supposedly being “rotated” out of Laos. They
were off Route 914, “strung along like sausage” on Route 9, and definitely were
not headed for Base Area 611. Kissinger’s conclusion:
“. . . it certainly looks to him
like they are ‘bugging out’.” Admiral Moorer then conferred with the President
and Dr. Kissinger at the White House. Nixon said that if the press created the
impression that the ARVN withdrawal was really a rout, then Thieu’s standing in
South Vietnam and around the world would suffer.
The problem, the President
stressed, lay in maintaining a position with Congress and the public that did
not require continual changes.37
On the morning of 19 March, General
Abrams informed the Chairman that President Thieu expected to complete an
orderly, well-executed withdrawal between 5 and 8 April. Before then, Thieu
wanted to carry out a raid against either the depot at Muong Nong or the
junction of Routes 914, 92, and 921. Abrams also reported that General Weyand
had met with Lieutenant General Lam and reviewed fire support plans for
covering the retreat: “The support is really lined up and they should be able
to pull it off in good shape.” Lam was planning an accelerated withdrawal, but
Weyand claimed that Thieu would not let him do it. Admiral Moorer relayed Abrams’
report to the President. Nixon asked whether the Muong Nong raid would occur in
April; Moorer replied that it would. The Chairman agreed with the President “that
the real field of battle was in the public affairs arena.”38
Later that morning, Admiral Moorer
had another tense conversation with Dr. Kissinger. Moorer related that the ARVN
“have a real solid plan for providing full fire support during withdrawals.
Kissinger replied that they have had full solid plans for the past six weeks
but none of them have been executed.” What “sticks in his craw,” Kissinger
continued, “is that when they took Tchepone they should have told us what they
wanted to do. Instead, they got us babbling about the wrong things and now it
looks like a defeat. . . . ” He “frankly” did not believe they would execute
the raid on Muong Nong. Kissinger read a cable just received from Brigadier
General Haig in Saigon, stating
that “in his judgment the ARVN have lost their stomach for Laos and the problem
isn’t to keep them in but rather to influence them to pull out in an orderly
fashion.”39
Trang 30/540
The ARVN withdrawal, conducted
mainly along Route 9, ran from 17 until 24 March. A North Vietnamese ambush on
19 March littered the road with wrecked vehicles. Artillery pieces were
abandoned, and a good many men had to make their way on foot to landing zones
for evacuation.40
American media carried pictures of
ARVN soldiers clinging to the skids of US helicopters.
On 23 March, Admiral Moorer
reviewed the situation with Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, USA, Director, J–3,
and Lieutenant General Richard T. Knowles, USA, Assistant to the Chairman.
Both officers recently had
completed tours in Vietnam. General Zais related that Dr. Kissinger had asked
him the previous day whether ARVN morale was shattered.
Zais replied that it had not been;
some units performed splendidly. The Chairman told Zais that he was troubled by
General Westmoreland’s adverse comments about the Airborne Division’s
commander. “It seems to me that they fought well,” Moorer
recorded. “Both Knowles and Zais
agreed in my assessment.”41
LAM SON 719 ended on a sour note.
Generals Lam and Sutherland agreed upon a plan for two battalions to assault
Muong Nong and remain there for several days.
The US contribution would consist
of B–52s, gunships, troop-carrying helicopters, and 24-hour coverage by forward
air controllers. President Nixon called the operation “vital if we are to end
LAM SON 719 on an upbeat note and give the South Vietnamese a credible image as
a continuous threat to the enemy.” But the raid, slated for 28 March, was
cancelled because heavy antiaircraft fire prevented tactical air strikes from
clearing the area. When Admiral Moorer passed along this news, Dr. Kissinger’s
reaction was blunt: “. . . our tigers can’t go through with it.” Moorer said that
they would try again against other targets. Kissinger replied: “we don’t want
to look ridiculous and land in some uninhabited area or on a mountaintop.”
Moorer assured him that they would only do something useful.
During 31 March–1 April, ARVN
raiders occupied Cua Viet in Base Area 611; they reported 85 enemy killed by
air, one killed in action, and a moderate amount of supplies destroyed.42
By this time, too, the Chup
operation was petering out. President Thieu promised to replace one
particularly dilatory colonel but delayed doing so.43
In retrospect, the “moment of
truth” had revealed the Saigon government’s shortcomings. President Thieu’s
performance during LAM SON 719 resembled President Ngo Dinh Diem’s policy of
preserving politically dependable units and declaring phantom victories,
although in Thieu’s case caution perhaps was justified considering the
unexpected strength of the opposition in Laos. Perhaps LAM SON 719 gave South
Vietnam a year’s respite. Probably, though, this display of the RVNAF’s
weakness emboldened Hanoi to bid for victory in 1972. Hanoi’s official history
declared in retrospect that the “Route 9-Southern Laos victory” marked “a
new level of maturity for our army
and was a concrete demonstration . . . that our army and people were strong
enough to militarily defeat the ‘Vietnamization’ strategy of the American
imperialists.”44
Trang 35/540
Policy and Strategy, 1971–
Early 1972
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not
seek to intensify military operations in South Vietnam during 1971 and early
1972. The United States was withdrawing from that Southeast Asian country, and
the removal of US forces, which had begun in mid- 1969 and increased in 1970,
accelerated during 1971 and the early months of 1972.
At the start of 1971, more than 335,000
US troops remained in South Vietnam. During the course of the year, the United
States took approximately 177,000 men out of Vietnam; by mid-year, US forces no
longer participated in major ground combat operations; and when the enemy
launched his April 1972 offensive, US strength stood at less than 100,000 men.
Although the United States was steadily reducing its commitment in South
Vietnam, there were constant pressures for greater reductions in force and
activity levels. From within the government came demands for faster withdrawals
in order to reduce expenditures, and public and Congressional critics of the war wanted expedited
reduction of the US troop commitment in Vietnam.
As a consequence, the Joint Chiefs
gave considerable attention to determining the size and schedules of the
redeployment increments and to reconciling requirements, particularly air
sortie rates, with available resources. Perhaps because of the pressure for
larger and faster US withdrawals, the President and his advisers conducted
assessments and reviews during 1971 and early 1972 of US policy and strategy in
South Vietnam and the situations in Cambodia and Laos. The Chiefs, of course,
participated in these efforts.
Trang 36/540
A Vietnam Review,
April–July 1971
United States policy toward Vietnam
remained unchanged in 1971, President Nixon told the Congress in his foreign
policy report on 25 February 1971. The “one irreducible objective” was “the
opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political
future without outside interference.” To accomplish this purpose, the United
States would continue to pursue a negotiated settlement.
But, failing in that, the United
States would transfer combat operations to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
and withdraw US troops.1
To implement this policy, the
Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), trained and
prepared the South Vietnamese forces for the combat mission while continuing to
exert as much pressure as possible on the enemy with existing resources. These
resources had declined dramatically by the beginning of 1971 and the South
Vietnamese had taken over a large share of the ground war as US units were
increasingly restricted to support and air operations.
On 7 April 1971, President Nixon
announced another reduction in US strength. Citing the LAM SON 719 operation,
he claimed that Vietnamization was succeeding.
Consequently, the United States
would remove 100,000 additional troops between 1May and 1 December 1971,
reducing US strength to 184,000. “The American involvement in Vietnam is coming
to an end,” the President said. “The day the South Vietnamese can take over
their own defense is in sight.” Although the President did not publicly state
it, all US ground personnel would be out of offensive combat operations by the
summer and the United States would no longer have a combat reserve in South
Vietnam. The United States had retained air and ground reserves in Vietnam to
assist the Vietnamese against an attack or in an offensive of their own. By December,
however, the Vietnamese would be more nearly on their own.2
In addition to the accelerated
withdrawal of forces, budget considerations affected US strategy and operations
in South Vietnam in 1971. On 21 April 1971, the Secretary gave the Chairman and
the Military Departments the planning guidance for the FY 1973–1977 Defense
program,3 including planning assumptions for South East Asia:
Trang 37/540
Shortly before the Secretary issued
budget guidance, he had asked for a review of military strategy for Vietnam. On
12 April 1971, he noted that, since the last JCS assessment of this matter in
July of the previous year, a number of major developments and trends had become
evident: the sharp reduction of US forces, with a further reduction announced
by the President; the sustained improvement of the RVNAF and its recent
successful operation in Laos; the continuing decline in the size and
effectiveness of enemy forces and the reduced level of combat; and the economic,
political, and pacification progress in South Vietnam. Accordingly, the Secretary
wanted the Joint Chiefs to assess US strategy in light of these changes.
Although the review would focus on
mid-1971 through mid-1973, he instructed the JCS not to ignore the longer term.
It was important, he told them, to consider fully the constraints on US
operations. The costs of any proposed strategy must be within
available resources, and proposals
for the RVNAF should not require significant added financial or manpower
resources.4
The President at the same time
wanted a complete assessment of the situation in South Vietnam covering the
period through 1972. On 15 April 1971, Dr. Kissinger initiated a National
Security Council (NSC) review of Vietnam, tasking the Vietnam Special Studies
Group (VSSG) and its member agencies to prepare a number of preliminary
studies. Included were an estimate of possible enemy strategies, to be prepared
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and development of alternative RVNAF
improvement packages, the responsibility of the Department of Defense.5
Kissinger’s tasking included
several studies on political and economic matters in Vietnam and Southeast
Asia, including a projection of economic stabilization prospects for the area,
an assessment of possible regional cooperation, and an analysis of the
political situation in South Vietnam.6
The Senior Review Group (SRG)
considered several of the preliminary studies on 27 April, including the CIA
paper on enemy options and probable strategy choices. The Agency foresaw the
following options: continued protracted war; a major offensive in Military
Region 1, in Military Region 2, or in Cambodia; simultaneous offensives in both
Military Regions 1 and 2; simultaneous offensives in Military Region 1 and
Cambodia; or a major offensive throughout South Vietnam and in Cambodia. Agency
analysts believed that all options, except the last, were possible during the
1971–1972 dry season (October 1971 through May 1972). Summing up, the CIA
foresaw “progressively higher levels of combat over the next 12-18 months,”
probably focused upon MR 1, which was close to enemy supply lines, and MR 2,
where the balance of forces was favorable to the enemy. By the early part of
the next dry season (October–December 1971), North Vietnam could support an
offensive in either region. By the middle of the season, the enemy would be able
also to support an offensive in Cambodia or a simultaneous offensive in MRs1and
2. By June 1972, MR 1 and the highlands of MR 2 were the “most likely area for offensive
action.”7
No comments:
Post a Comment