Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20241222 CDTL LBJ MemJCS McNamara D331

In the Oval Office on August 3, 1972, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells President Richard Nixon that there’s a 50-50 chance of reaching a settlement with North Vietnam.

That deal would give Nixon a “decent interval,” a face-saving delay of a year or two between his final withdrawal of American troops and the Communists’ final takeover of South Vietnam. “We’ve got to find some formula that holds the thing together [for] a year or two, after which — after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, by January ’74 no one will give a damn.”

August 3, 1972

Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger

Conversation: 760-006

Having established a framework for an armistice and the departure a American troops from Vietnam, President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger discussed the future trajectory of the war. Most importantly, they wanted to secure a “decent interval” between the removal of those troops, Nixon’s reelection in 1972 and the expected fall of Saigon. At this point in the conversation, Kissinger had just told Nixon they had a 50/50 chance of reaching a settlement with North Vietnam.

President Nixon: Now, let’s look at that just a moment again, think about it some more, but… let’s be perfectly… cold-blooded about it. If you look at it from the standpoint of our game… with the Soviets and the Chinese, from the standpoint of running this country… I think we could take, in my view, almost anything, frankly, that we can force on Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Almost anything. I just come down to that. You know what I mean?

President Nixon: Because I have a feeling we would not be doing, like I feel about the Israel, I feel that in the long run we’re probably not doing them an in – a disfavor due to the fact that I feel that the North Vietnamese are so badly hurt that the South Vietnamese are probably going to do fairly well. [Kissinger attempts to interject.] But also due to the fact-because I look at the tide of history out there-South Vietnam probably is never going to survive anyway. I’m just being perfectly candid. I-

Henry A. Kissinger: In the pull-out area-

President Nixon: [Unclear] we’ve got to be – if we can get certain guarantees so that they aren’t… as you know, looking at the foreign policy process, though, I mean, you’ve got to be-we also have to realize, Henry, that winning an election is terribly important.

It’s terribly important this year. But can we have a viable foreign policy if a year from now or two years from now, North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam? That’s the real question.

Kissinger: If a year or two years from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it’s the result of South Vietnamese incompetence.

Kissinger: If we now sell out in such a way that, say, within a three-to four-month period, we have pushed President Thieu over the brink-we-ourselves-I think, there is going to be -even the Chinese won’t like that. I mean, they’ll pay verbal-verbally, they’ll like it.

President Nixon: But it’ll worry them.

Kissinger: But it will worry everybody. And domestically in the long run it won’t help us all that much because our opponents will say we should’ve done it three years ago.

President Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: So we’ve got to find formula that holds the thing together a year or two, after which-after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, this October, by January 74 no one will give a damn.

President Nixon: Yeah, having in mind the fact that, you know, as we all know, the-the analogy-comparison [to] Algeria is not on-I not at all for us. But on the other hand, nobody gives a goddamn about what happened to Algeria-

Kissinger: Mm-hmm.

President Nixon: -after they got out. [chuckling] You know what I mean? But Vietnam, I must say… Jesus, they’ve fought so long, dying, and now… I don’t know.

End of excerpt.

Miller Center

University of Virginia

https://millercenter.org/

“Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger on 3 August 1972,” Conversation 760-006, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Huges] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014-). URL:https://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006748

https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0

https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/nixon-kissinger-and-the-decent-interval

https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0

Duong Van (“Big”) Minh,

Major General, (after November 4, 1963, Lieutenant General), ARVN, Military Adviser to President Diem until November 1, 1963; thereafter Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary Council; President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Vietnam after November 4, 1963

“South Vietnamese Communists Sought Negotiated End

After the fall of Hue, that was discarded as unnecessary. Then the second possibility was considered, to insist on replacing Mr. Thieu with a personality of the “third force” who had been in contact with the Provincial Revolutionary Government, such as Gen. Duong Van Minh, and negotiating a government with him.

https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/12/archives/south-vietnamese-communists-sought-negotiated-end.html”

Chou En lai Kissinger July 9 1971 MemCon D139

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139

PM Chou: We don’t believe in the elections in South Vietnam. It is a different situation, There are August elections and October elections and you help Thieu. Have you discussed this situation with Mr. Minh?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, on this trip.

PM Chou: They want you to get rid of the government.

Dr. Kissinger: They can’t ask us both to withdraw and get rid of the government of Vietnam. To do both of these is impossible.

PM Chou: We have not exchanged views at this point. We have always thought on this matter that we cannot interfere in these affairs. If you withdraw and they want to continue the civil war, none of us should interfere. The situation has been created over a long time.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139

July 12 1972 Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho

Zhou Enlai: Is Duong Van Minh ^[2] acceptable?

Le Duc Tho: This is a complicated problem. Duong Van Minh is not totally pro-American. Yet, the tripartite government is very provisional.

Le Duc Tho: Duong Van Minh is exactly like this. But the important thing is how to make the US accept the principle of the establishment of a tripartite government. And further discussion on dividing positions and power should be held after this.

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-le-duc-tho

Discover the Truth at:

http://www.theblackvault.com

https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/

Tài liệu Chu Ân Lai yêu cầu Hoa Kỳ loại bỏ Tổng Thống Nguyễn Văn Thiệu củng như dùng Dương Văn Minh để lật đổ hai nền Đệ I và Đệ II VNCH.

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/search?search_api_fulltext=&items_per_page=100&sort_bef_combine=created_DESC&f%5B0%5D=people%3A84942&fo%5B0%5D=84942

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-le-duc-tho

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/89367/download

Trong Lòng Địch 1/25- Soạn giả Trần Trung Quân

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvSsjeUtQsk&t=180s

Trong Lòng Địch 2/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=937Vt16PRr4

Trong Lòng Địch 3/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyARO-RnhIA

Trong Lòng Địch 4/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBg-lqoNfVg

Trong Lòng Địch 5/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51Hy7SXn1Cc

Trong Lòng Địch 6/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUXsAh74dzs

Trong Lòng Địch 7/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLUxVAewbSM

Trong Lòng Địch 8/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15uYFnpoDkc

Trong Lòng Địch 9/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPu0sznLtW4

Trong Lòng Địch 10/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oq32GnqzacQ

Trong Lòng Địch 11/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CL2Bw2_zoM

Trong Lòng Địch 12/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8Gq6URsSWA

Trong Lòng Địch 13/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6R69Y-w5yak

Trong Lòng Địch 14/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgL2Wbs9kFQ

Trong Lòng Địch 15/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_6VIzUel70

Trong Lòng Địch 16/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tieKDqkLYEc

Trong Lòng Địch 17/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpuPhZUR3Nc

Trong Lòng Địch 18/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBbRi_gm3C0

Trong Lòng Địch 19/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-5SmLIHmGI

Trong Lòng Địch 20/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7xE0wqxK3A

Trong Lòng Địch 21/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMiwWlLoC9A

Trong Lòng Địch 23/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4th3Jm1rSsI

Trong Lòng Địch 24/25

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYLEGOoHOaQ

Trong Lòng Địch 25/25 HẾT

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TH9uvNutoM8

20.10.24 SỰ THẬT CHƯA TỪNG ĐƯỢC TIẾT LỘ VỀ CÁI CHẾT CỦA GIÁO CHỦ ĐỨC HUỲNH PHÚ SỔ

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyP_90HMvuQ

13.11.24 TỔNG THỐNG THIỆU: NHỮNG LỜI TÂM SỰ DUY NHẤT - NẶNG TRĨU NGHÌN CÂN NHỚ NƯỚC NON

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciez84tVOUM

ĐÀ NẴNG NĂM 1966 biến cố và hồi ký của tôi | Hồi Ký Miền Nam VN

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Obw-UeN6DKE&t=4332s

Letter From M Lyall Breckon to Miller

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d338

Washington, December 2, 1963.

Dear Bob:

We were intrigued, in your interesting memorandum of a conversation with [less than 1 line not declassified], November 17,2 at [less than 1 line not declassified] statement that friends of his had seen papers indicating the late Brother Nhu had reached an advanced point in negotiations with the DRV and that terms had been set under which Ho Chi Minh would be President of reunified Viet-Nam, and Nhu Vice President. Both for the historical record and as an indication of how eager the DRV was for a negotiated settlement, it would be [Page 652] interesting to have further details or even copies of such papers. Do you think it would be feasible to pursue the matter, either with [less than 1 line not declassified] or through CAS channels? It seems curious that the Generals have not made public the proof they say they have (“Big” Minh to the Ambassador November 30, Embtel 1093, for example3) of Nhu’s dealings with the North, as further justification for the coup.

From various references I gather [less than 1 line not declassified] interests have taken a strong political turn. Please remember us to him and [less than 1 line not declassified].

Incidentally, on the subject of the ancien regime, you might be interested to know the New York Times yesterday published two pictures of the bodies of Diem and Nhu. They were radiophotos, however, and scarcely recognizable.

Claire joins me in sending our best regards to you, Kaity, and the children. We hope you survived the change of government without trauma. Our own chagrin at leaving two months too early is still very much alive.4

Yours very truly,

M. Lyall Breckon

Thư của Breckon, M. Lyall gửi cho Miller

Washington, ngày 2 tháng 12 năm 1963.

Bob thân mến:

Chúng tôi rất thích thú, trong bản ghi nhớ thú vị của anh về cuộc trò chuyện với [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật], ngày 17 tháng 11 tại [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật] tuyên bố rằng bạn bè của ông ấy đã thấy các giấy tờ cho thấy ông Nhu đã đạt đến một điểm tiến triển trong các cuộc đàm phán với DRV và các điều khoản đã được đặt ra theo đó Hồ Chí Minh sẽ là Tổng Thống của Việt Nam thống nhất và Nhu là Phó Tổng Thống. Cả hai ghi vào hồ sơ như một dấu hiệu cho thấy DRV rất muốn cuộc đàm phán được giải quyết ổn thỏa, sẽ rất thú vị [Trang 652] khi có thêm thông tin chi tiết hoặc thậm chí có cả bản sao các giấy tờ như vậy. Anh có nghĩ rằng có thể theo đuổi vấn đề này, thông qua [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật] hoặc thông qua các kênh CAS không? Có vẻ lạ là các Tướng lĩnh không công bố bằng chứng mà họ nói là họ có ("Big" Minh gửi Đại sứ ngày 30 tháng 11, Embtel 1093, chẳng hạn) về các ứng phó của Nhu với miền Bắc, như một lý do biện minh thêm cho cuộc đảo chính.

Từ nhiều tài liệu tham khảo khác nhau, tôi thu thập được [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật] lợi ích đã có một bước ngoặt chính trị mạnh mẽ. Xin hãy nhớ chúng tôi đến với ông ấy và [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật].

Một cách ngẫu nhiên, về chủ đề chế độ cũ, bạn nên lưu tâm đến bản tin tờ New York Times ngày hôm qua đã công bố hai bức ảnh chụp thi thể của Diệm và Nhu. Ảnh được chụp bằng máy ngoại tuyến X tuy nhiên khó thể nhận ra.

Claire cùng tôi gửi lời chào trân trọng nhất đến bạn, Kaity và các con. Chúng tôi hy vọng bạn đã vượt qua được sự thay đổi của chính phủ mà không bị tổn thương. Nỗi buồn của chúng tôi khi phải rời đi sớm hơn hai tháng vẫn còn rất lớn.

Trân trọng,

M. Lyall Breckon

Gulf of Tonkin

https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/Gulf-of-Tonkin/

Senate Stories Chairman J William Fulbright and the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution

https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/senate-stories/chairman-fulbright-and-the-tonkin-gulf-resolution.htm

Johnson, Lyndon B., (Lyndon Baines Johnson)

Vice President until November 22, 1963; thereafter President

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Lyndon_B._Johnson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_B._Johnson

https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/lyndon-b-johnson-jewish/

https://www.biography.com/political-figures/lyndon-b-johnson

https://masonrytoday.com/index.php?new_month=1&new_day=22&new_year=2019

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/t/tonkin-gulf-crisis/tonkin-gulf-incidents-of-2-4-aug-1964/uss-maddox-report-of-tonkin-gulf-action-of-4-aug-1964.html

https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/gulf-of-tonkin-incident/

https://img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AA1busNe.img?w=800&h=415&q=60&m=2&f=jpg

https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/maddox.jpg

https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/north-vietnam/

https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/lyndon-johnson/

https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/johnsontonkinaddress-e1673228089140.jpg

https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution-1964/

https://socratic.org/questions/what-happened-to-the-uss-maddox-in-the-gulf-of-tonkin#:~:text=Supposedly%2C%20the%20USS%20Maddox%20was%20attacked%2C%20although%20realistically%2C,over%20to%20Vietnam%20to%20start%20the%20Vietnam%20war.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d33

https://history.state.gov/search?q=johnson+administration+in+vietnam&within=entire-site&sort-by=relevance

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_B._Johnson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Majority_Leader

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Minority_Leader

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Majority_Whip

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives

https://www.lbjlibrary.org/life-and-legacy/the-man-himself/lbjs-ancestors

https://gw.geneanet.org/tdowling?lang=en&n=johnson&p=lyndon+baines

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_of_Lyndon_B._Johnson

GULF OF TONKIN RECORDINGS

https://millercenter.org/gulf-tonkin-recordings

List of presidents of the United States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States

Eisenhower Administration

https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/dwight-d-eisenhower-administration

Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon:… “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”

(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280

Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf

https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html

List of Participants in the Geneva Conference on Indochina

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/ch5subch4

The Geneva Conference on Indochina May 8–July 21, 1954

[Page [396]] [Page 397]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/comp2

Geneva Agreements 20-21 July 1954

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH-LA-VN_540720_GenevaAgreements.pdf

March 10 1956 Election in South Vietnam

Election processes in South Vietnam

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010040-7.pdf

Vietnam’s Un-held 1956 Reunification Elections

https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/020691c4-6762-44f0-903b-390c67a04188/content

PRETENSE TO DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. ROLE IN THE SUBVERSION OF THE VIETNAMESE ELECTION OF 1956

https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2761&context=theses

Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973

http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam.

Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

Gulf of Tonkin

https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/Gulf-of-Tonkin/

Senate Stories Chairman J William Fulbright and the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution

https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/senate-stories/chairman-fulbright-and-the-tonkin-gulf-resolution.htm

Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam

Saturday, December 21, 2024

20241222 CDTL LBJ MemJCS McNamara D331

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