20241223 CDTL LBJ TelEmbinV DepSta D332
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/sources
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/terms
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/persons
IX. Changes in the Government of
South Vietnam, August 11–September 5 (Documents 309–338)
1.
Document 332
Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964
332. Telegram From
the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, August 28, 1964—7 p.m.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d332
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/pg_718
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d332#fnref:1.7.4.4.40.70.8.5
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d332#fnref:1.7.4.4.40.70.12.12
Thân thế (các) nhân vật/
Major General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps;
leader of coup of January 30, 1964; Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam,
February 4–October 30, 1964; thereafter Commander in Chief of Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces; Chairman of the Armed Forces Council after December 18,
1964
Ambassador to South Vietnam from August 26, 1963
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Cabot_Lodge_Jr.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ambassadors_of_the_United_States_to_South_Vietnam
https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/henry-cabot-lodge
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabot_family
Nguyen
Xuan Oanh,
Vietnamese
Minister of Finance and Vice Minister for Economy, February 4–November 4, 1964
Taylor, General Maxwell D.,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell_D._Taylor
https://www.historynet.com/gen-maxwell-taylors-cable/
https://armyhistory.org/general-maxwell-davenport-taylor/
https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Maxwell-Davenport-Taylor
Nguyen
Van Thieu,
President
of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) until April 21, 1975
PHỎNG VẤN VỚI LỊCH SỬ - TỔNG THỐNG
NGUYỄN VĂN THIỆU - Năm 1972
https://www.facebook.com/groups/373876840199844/permalink/1216306329290220/
https://www.facebook.com/groups/373876840199844/
Tổng
thống Thiệu trả lời phỏng vấn năm 1972 (Ms.O Fallaci) - Ep.1
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=67J_48hfPik
Tổng
thống Thiệu trả lời phỏng vấn năm 1972 (Ms.O Fallaci) - Ep.2
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INAfcRW3Prc
Tổng
thống Thiệu trả lời phỏng vấn năm 1972 (Ms.O Fallaci) - Ep.3
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_tOrafUIOY
Phỏng
vấn cố Tổng thống VNCH Nguyễn Văn Thiệu full
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_36BXxpEjw
Tổng
thống Nguyễn Văn Thiệu đáp trả xuất sắc những gì Kissinger đề cập về Vietnam
War | NAMDUONGTV
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrA2OaHueFM&t=1802s
3/29/75 - Evacuation
of Vietnamese Refugees
4/3/75 - Phnom Penh
Evacuation
4/5/75 - Evacuation
of Vietnamese Refugees (1)
4/5/75 - Evacuation
of Vietnamese Refugees (2)
4/5/75 - Evacuation
of Vietnamese Refugees (3)
4/5/75 - Evacuation
of Vietnamese Refugees (4)
4/29/75 - Final
Evacuation of Saigon (1)
4/29/75 - Final Evacuation of Saigon (2)
Dau
Bach Ho1X Feb 11 1975 Thieu
Tôi
Không Chết Đâu | Hồi Ức Miền Nam
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJdQN0DYBvA
Thư Tổng
Thống Thiệu Gửi Tổng Thống Gerald Ford
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2024/03/20240322-cdtl-thu-thieu-gui-gerald-ford.html
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d166
Cambodia
Arms and Ammunition to the Vietnamese Communists
Discover the Truth at:
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/
https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/EOM-2019-00201-highlighted.pdf
Giây
Phút Xé Lòng | Hồi Ức Miền Nam | Hồi Ký Miền Nam
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WVwGiPD8Cs&t=2329
The
Palace File Paperback – January 1, 1989
by
Nguyen Tien Hung (Author), Jerrold L. Schecter (Author)
https://www.amazon.com/Palace-File-Nguyen-Tien-Hung/dp/0060915722
https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/2098486
Khi đồng
minh tháo chạy
Nguyen
Tien Hung
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32865811-khi-ng-minh-th-o-ch-y?ref=nav_sb_noss_l_23
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 1 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDhuGRvfKjw
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 2 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZceUYCf7rqA
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 3 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2ET40EOGno
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 4 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFzsesWm25E
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 5 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2GMhs4DmBI
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 6 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMxfY_QGgwo
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 7 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kvjmvn78kgo
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 8 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sylK7RDtLrc
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 9 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gmF6urvaz0c
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 10 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Ig4PIzMFZM
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 11 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUFtNrT9sRo
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 12 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4KYPScqNMY
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 13 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29lrLqX6vEo
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 14 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j-WAarbW-fo
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 15 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GAo2fXzGBQ
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 16 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4Kb37dchNw
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 17 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DChfJXgR-8
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 18 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCYj9b4Tw6E
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 19 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qm45ygXmqzY
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 20 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvUiF8wVJBg
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 21 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZIZRlk6m4Eg
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 22 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNv27DbdcOI
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 23 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C5qfHEJNu4
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 24 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iyg98DfK31E
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 25 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxcX0dKgKlA
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 26 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adUtaGlDcho
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 27 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-1xxI1OWh8
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 28 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PazkNBf3rGA
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 29 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OpIbsM20p14
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 30 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_ZcLZtx_6M
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 31 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4u5jqW3nbg
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 32 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHHx5wQlabw
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 33 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gpKZuQNdJJU
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 34 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Dễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGesHXnpZkw
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 35 / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6ZOXJyjMTk
Hồ Sơ Mật
Dinh Độc Lập Phần 36 Cuối Cùng / Nguyễn Tiến Hưng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYztC95fn4M
Khi Đồng
Minh Nhảy Vào
https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Nguy%E1%BB%85n-Ti%E1%BA%BFn-H%C6%B0ng/dp/1495148629
Khi Đồng
Minh Tháo Chạy Hardcover – January 1, 2005
https://www.amazon.com/Khi-%C4%90%E1%BB%93ng-Minh-Th%C3%A1o-Ch%E1%BA%A1y/dp/B00GQIWRA6
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/32865811-khi-ng-minh-th-o-ch-y
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 1)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7YpCRv6MlI&t=487s
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vX9-eocj8hQ&t=803s
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6rCp-RnGQ4&t=561s
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 4)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Y1YWYjcYUs
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 5)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cL7LO65oI_k&t=11s
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 6)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BsYcJCD0cwY
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 7)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kclMjgFLtUw&t=371s
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 8)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bsh7jTMF_o
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 9)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NzhsA-ZZQ4Q&t=1265s
HỒI KÝ:
NHỮNG UẤT HẬN TRONG TRẬN CHIẾN MẤT NƯỚC 1975 (Phần 10)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKBXiYNQMbc&t=18s
20241102
Nixon Kissinger and the ‘Decent Interval'
Bỏ
Rơi Hay Phản Bội/ Tác Giả Bùi Anh Trinh/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3Seaq3ymmE
https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0
A
Decent Interval
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xPzs3NZdN4
Richard
Nixon Addresses The "Decent Interval Theory"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Q-H0281kfM
Transcript
In the Oval Office
on August 3, 1972, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells President Richard
Nixon that there’s a 50-50 chance of reaching a settlement with North Vietnam.
That deal would give
Nixon a “decent interval,” a face-saving delay of a year or two between his
final withdrawal of American troops and the Communists’ final takeover of South
Vietnam. “We’ve got to find some formula that holds the thing together [for]
a year or two, after which — after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a
backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, by January ’74 no one will give a
damn.”
August
3, 1972
Richard
M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger
Conversation:
760-006
Having
established a framework for an armistice and the departure a American troops
from Vietnam, President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger
discussed the future trajectory of the war. Most importantly, they wanted to
secure a “decent interval” between the removal of those troops, Nixon’s
reelection in 1972 and the expected fall of Saigon. At this point in the
conversation, Kissinger had just told Nixon they had a 50/50 chance of reaching
a settlement with North Vietnam.
President
Nixon:
Now, let’s look at that just a moment again, think about it some more, but…
let’s be perfectly… cold-blooded about it. If you look at it from the
standpoint of our game… with the Soviets and the Chinese, from the standpoint
of running this country… I think we could take, in my view, almost anything,
frankly, that we can force on Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Almost anything. I just come
down to that. You know what I mean?
President
Nixon:
Because I have a feeling we would not be doing, like I feel about the Israel, I
feel that in the long run we’re probably not doing them an in – a disfavor due
to the fact that I feel that the North Vietnamese are so badly hurt that the
South Vietnamese are probably going to do fairly well. [Kissinger attempts to
interject.] But also due to the fact-because I look at the tide of history out
there-South Vietnam probably is never going to survive anyway. I’m just being
perfectly candid. I-
Henry
A. Kissinger:
In the pull-out area-
President
Nixon:
[Unclear] we’ve got to be – if we can get certain guarantees so that they
aren’t… as you know, looking at the foreign policy process, though, I mean,
you’ve got to be-we also have to realize, Henry, that winning an election is
terribly important.
It’s
terribly important this year. But can we have a viable foreign policy if a year
from now or two years from now, North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam? That’s
the real question.
Kissinger: If a year or two years from now
North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if
it looks as if it’s the result of South Vietnamese incompetence.
Kissinger: If we now sell out in such a way
that, say, within a three-to four-month period, we have pushed President Thieu
over the brink-we-ourselves-I think, there is going to be -even the Chinese
won’t like that. I mean, they’ll pay verbal-verbally, they’ll like it.
President
Nixon:
But it’ll worry them.
Kissinger: But it will worry everybody. And
domestically in the long run it won’t help us all that much because our
opponents will say we should’ve done it three years ago.
President
Nixon:
I know.
Kissinger: So we’ve got to find formula that
holds the thing together a year or two, after which-after a year, Mr.
President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, this October, by
January 74 no one will give a damn.
President
Nixon:
Yeah, having in mind the fact that, you know, as we all know, the-the
analogy-comparison [to] Algeria is not on-I not at all for us. But on the other
hand, nobody gives a goddamn about what happened to Algeria-
Kissinger: Mm-hmm.
President
Nixon:
-after they got out. [chuckling] You know what I mean? But Vietnam, I must say…
Jesus, they’ve fought so long, dying, and now… I don’t know.
End
of excerpt.
Miller
Center
University
of Virginia
“Richard
M. Nixon and Kissinger on 3 August 1972,” Conversation 760-006, Presidential
Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Huges] (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2014-). URL:https://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006748
https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0
https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0
Duong Van (“Big”) Minh,
Major General, (after November 4, 1963,
Lieutenant General), ARVN, Military Adviser to President Diem until November 1,
1963; thereafter Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Revolutionary
Council; President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Vietnam
after November 4, 1963
“South Vietnamese
Communists Sought Negotiated End
After the fall of
Hue, that was discarded as unnecessary. Then the second possibility was
considered, to insist on replacing Mr. Thieu with a personality of the “third force” who had been in
contact with the Provincial Revolutionary Government, such as Gen. Duong Van Minh, and negotiating a government with
him.
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/12/archives/south-vietnamese-communists-sought-negotiated-end.html”
Chou En lai Kissinger July 9 1971 MemCon D139
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139
PM Chou: We don’t believe in the elections in
South Vietnam. It is a different situation, There are August elections and
October elections and you help Thieu. Have you discussed this
situation with Mr. Minh?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, on this trip.
PM Chou: They want you to get rid of the
government.
Dr. Kissinger: They can’t ask us both to withdraw
and get rid of the government of Vietnam. To do both of these is impossible.
PM Chou: We have not exchanged views at this
point. We have always thought on this matter that we cannot interfere in these
affairs. If you withdraw and they want to continue the civil war, none of us
should interfere. The situation has been created over a long time.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139
July 12 1972 Discussion between Zhou Enlai and
Le Duc Tho
Zhou Enlai: Is Duong Van Minh
[2] acceptable?
Le Duc Tho: This is a complicated problem. Duong Van Minh is
not totally pro-American. Yet, the tripartite government is very
provisional.
Le Duc Tho: Duong Van Minh is exactly like this. But the important thing
is how to make the US accept the principle of the establishment of a tripartite
government. And further discussion on dividing positions and power should
be held after this.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-le-duc-tho
Discover the Truth at:
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/
Tài liệu Chu Ân Lai yêu cầu Hoa Kỳ loại bỏ Tổng Thống Nguyễn Văn Thiệu
củng như dùng Dương Văn Minh để lật đổ hai nền Đệ I và Đệ II VNCH.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-le-duc-tho
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/89367/download
Trong Lòng Địch 1/25- Soạn giả Trần
Trung Quân
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvSsjeUtQsk&t=180s
Trong Lòng Địch 2/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=937Vt16PRr4
Trong Lòng Địch 3/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyARO-RnhIA
Trong Lòng Địch 4/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBg-lqoNfVg
Trong Lòng Địch 5/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51Hy7SXn1Cc
Trong Lòng Địch 6/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUXsAh74dzs
Trong Lòng Địch 7/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WLUxVAewbSM
Trong Lòng Địch 8/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15uYFnpoDkc
Trong Lòng Địch 9/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPu0sznLtW4
Trong Lòng Địch 10/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oq32GnqzacQ
Trong Lòng Địch 11/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-CL2Bw2_zoM
Trong Lòng Địch 12/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8Gq6URsSWA
Trong Lòng Địch 13/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6R69Y-w5yak
Trong Lòng Địch 14/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgL2Wbs9kFQ
Trong Lòng Địch 15/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_6VIzUel70
Trong Lòng Địch 16/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tieKDqkLYEc
Trong Lòng Địch 17/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WpuPhZUR3Nc
Trong Lòng Địch 18/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tBbRi_gm3C0
Trong Lòng Địch 19/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-5SmLIHmGI
Trong Lòng Địch 20/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7xE0wqxK3A
Trong Lòng Địch 21/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMiwWlLoC9A
Trong Lòng Địch 23/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4th3Jm1rSsI
Trong Lòng Địch 24/25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYLEGOoHOaQ
Trong Lòng Địch 25/25 HẾT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TH9uvNutoM8
20.10.24 SỰ THẬT CHƯA TỪNG ĐƯỢC TIẾT
LỘ VỀ CÁI CHẾT CỦA GIÁO CHỦ ĐỨC HUỲNH PHÚ SỔ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IyP_90HMvuQ
13.11.24 TỔNG THỐNG THIỆU: NHỮNG LỜI
TÂM SỰ DUY NHẤT - NẶNG TRĨU NGHÌN CÂN NHỚ NƯỚC NON
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ciez84tVOUM
ĐÀ NẴNG NĂM 1966 biến cố và hồi ký của tôi | Hồi
Ký Miền Nam VN
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Obw-UeN6DKE&t=4332s
Letter From M Lyall Breckon to Miller
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d338
Washington, December 2, 1963.
Dear Bob:
We were intrigued,
in your interesting memorandum of a conversation with [less than 1 line not
declassified], November 17,2 at [less than 1
line not declassified] statement that friends of his had
seen papers indicating the late Brother Nhu had reached an advanced point in negotiations with the DRV and
that terms had been set under which Ho Chi Minh would
be President of reunified Viet-Nam, and Nhu Vice President. Both for the historical record and
as an indication of how eager the DRV was for a
negotiated settlement, it would be [Page 652] interesting to have further
details or even copies of such papers. Do
you think it would be feasible to pursue the matter,
either with [less than 1 line not declassified] or through CAS channels? It
seems curious that the Generals have not made public
the proof they say they have (“Big” Minh to
the Ambassador November 30, Embtel 1093, for example3) of Nhu’s dealings
with the North, as further justification for the coup.
From various
references I gather [less than 1 line not declassified] interests have taken a
strong political turn. Please remember us to him and [less than 1 line not
declassified].
Incidentally, on the
subject of the ancien regime, you might be interested to know the New York
Times yesterday published two pictures of the bodies of Diem and Nhu. They were
radiophotos, however, and scarcely recognizable.
Claire joins me in
sending our best regards to you, Kaity, and the children. We hope you survived
the change of government without trauma. Our own chagrin at leaving two months
too early is still very much alive.4
Yours very truly,
M. Lyall Breckon
Thư của Breckon, M.
Lyall gửi cho Miller
Washington, ngày 2
tháng 12 năm 1963.
Bob thân mến:
Chúng tôi rất thích
thú, trong bản ghi nhớ thú vị của anh về cuộc trò chuyện với [ít hơn 1 dòng
không được giải mật], ngày 17 tháng 11 tại [ít
hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật] tuyên bố rằng bạn bè
của ông ấy đã thấy các giấy tờ cho thấy ông Nhu đã đạt đến một điểm tiến triển trong các cuộc đàm
phán với DRV và các điều khoản đã được đặt ra theo đó Hồ Chí Minh
sẽ là Tổng Thống của Việt Nam thống nhất và Nhu là Phó Tổng Thống. Cả hai ghi vào hồ sơ như một dấu hiệu cho thấy DRV
rất muốn cuộc đàm phán được giải quyết ổn thỏa, sẽ rất thú vị [Trang 652] khi
có thêm thông tin chi tiết hoặc thậm chí có cả bản sao các giấy tờ như vậy. Anh
có nghĩ rằng có thể theo đuổi vấn đề này, thông qua [ít hơn 1 dòng không được
giải mật] hoặc thông qua các kênh CAS không? Có vẻ lạ là các Tướng lĩnh không công bố bằng
chứng mà họ nói là họ có ("Big" Minh gửi
Đại sứ ngày 30 tháng 11, Embtel 1093, chẳng hạn) về các ứng phó của Nhu với miền Bắc, như một lý do biện minh thêm cho cuộc đảo chính.
Từ nhiều tài liệu tham khảo khác nhau, tôi thu
thập được [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật] lợi ích đã có một bước ngoặt
chính trị mạnh mẽ. Xin hãy nhớ chúng tôi đến với ông ấy và [ít hơn 1 dòng không
được giải mật].
Một cách ngẫu nhiên, về chủ đề chế độ cũ, bạn
nên lưu tâm đến bản tin tờ New York Times ngày hôm qua đã công bố hai bức ảnh
chụp thi thể của Diệm và Nhu. Ảnh được chụp bằng máy ngoại tuyến X tuy nhiên
khó thể nhận ra.
Claire cùng tôi gửi lời chào trân trọng nhất đến
bạn, Kaity và các con. Chúng tôi hy vọng bạn đã vượt qua được sự thay đổi của
chính phủ mà không bị tổn thương. Nỗi buồn của chúng tôi khi phải rời đi sớm
hơn hai tháng vẫn còn rất lớn.
Trân trọng,
M. Lyall Breckon
Gulf of Tonkin
Senate Stories Chairman J William Fulbright and
the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Tran Thien Khiem,
Lieutenant General, ARVN, Vietnamese Minister
of National Defense, February 4–September 30, 1964
Johnson, Lyndon B., (Lyndon Baines Johnson)
Vice President until November 22, 1963;
thereafter President
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Lyndon_B._Johnson
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_B._Johnson
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/lyndon-b-johnson-jewish/
https://www.biography.com/political-figures/lyndon-b-johnson
https://masonrytoday.com/index.php?new_month=1&new_day=22&new_year=2019
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/gulf-of-tonkin-incident/
https://img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AA1busNe.img?w=800&h=415&q=60&m=2&f=jpg
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/maddox.jpg
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/north-vietnam/
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/lyndon-johnson/
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution-1964/
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d33
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_B._Johnson
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Majority_Leader
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Minority_Leader
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Majority_Whip
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives
https://www.lbjlibrary.org/life-and-legacy/the-man-himself/lbjs-ancestors
https://gw.geneanet.org/tdowling?lang=en&n=johnson&p=lyndon+baines
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_of_Lyndon_B._Johnson
GULF OF TONKIN RECORDINGS
https://millercenter.org/gulf-tonkin-recordings
List of presidents of the United States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States
Eisenhower
Administration
https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/dwight-d-eisenhower-administration
Lesson in Vietnam from
Kissinger to Nixon:… “when we made it “our war” we would not let
the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not
help them fight it.”
(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we
would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,”
we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare
after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political
war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be
faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280
Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A.
Kissinger
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf
https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html
List of Participants
in the Geneva Conference on Indochina
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/ch5subch4
The Geneva
Conference on Indochina May 8–July 21, 1954
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/comp2
Geneva Agreements 20-21 July 1954
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH-LA-VN_540720_GenevaAgreements.pdf
March 10 1956 Election in South Vietnam
Election processes in South Vietnam
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010040-7.pdf
Vietnam’s Un-held 1956 Reunification Elections
https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/020691c4-6762-44f0-903b-390c67a04188/content
PRETENSE TO DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. ROLE IN THE
SUBVERSION OF THE VIETNAMESE ELECTION OF 1956
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2761&context=theses
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring
peace in Viet-Nam.
Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân
Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam =
Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt
Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV
(also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National Liberation Front,
Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of
the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam
NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used
by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed
Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist
movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often
used interchangeably
Paris
Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of
one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the
Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
negotiations.
Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International
Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Seven
Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten
Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point
Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve
Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic
hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam
Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
Gulf of Tonkin
Senate Stories Chairman
J William Fulbright and the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution
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