20250214 CDTL LBJ TelEmbinV DepSta D385
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/sources
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/terms
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/persons
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/comp1
1.
Document 385
Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964
385. Telegram From
the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, October 20, 1964—5 p.m.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d385
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/pg_842
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/pg_843
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d385#fnref:1.7.4.4.48.118.8.5
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d385#fnref:1.7.4.4.48.118.32.2
Thân thế (các) nhân vật/
Chairman of
the Vietnamese High National Council, October 30–November 5, 1964
Nguyen Khanh,
Major
General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps; leader of coup of January 30, 1964; Prime
Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, February 4–October 30, 1964; thereafter
Commander in Chief of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces; Chairman of the Armed
Forces Council after December 18, 1964
Duong
Van (“Big”) Minh,
Major
General, (after November 4, 1963, Lieutenant General), ARVN, Military Adviser
to President Diem until November 1, 1963; thereafter Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Revolutionary Council; President of the Provisional Government
of the Republic of Vietnam after November 4, 1963
“South Vietnamese
Communists Sought Negotiated End
After the fall of Hue, that was discarded as
unnecessary. Then the second possibility was considered, to insist on replacing
Mr. Thieu with a personality of the “third force”
who had been in contact with the Provincial
Revolutionary Government, such as Gen. Duong Van
Minh, and negotiating a government with him.
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/06/12/archives/south-vietnamese-communists-sought-negotiated-end.html”
Chou En
lai Kissinger July 9 1971 MemCon D139
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139
PM Chou: We
don’t believe in the elections in South Vietnam. It is a different situation,
There are August elections and October elections and you help Thieu.
Have you discussed this situation with Mr. Minh?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes,
on this trip.
PM Chou: They
want you to get rid of the government.
Dr. Kissinger: They
can’t ask us both to withdraw and get rid of the government of Vietnam. To do
both of these is impossible.
PM Chou: We
have not exchanged views at this point. We have always thought on this matter
that we cannot interfere in these affairs. If you withdraw and they want to
continue the civil war, none of us should interfere. The situation has been
created over a long time.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d139
July 12
1972 Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho
Zhou Enlai: Is Duong Van Minh [2] acceptable?
Le Duc Tho: This is a
complicated problem. Duong Van Minh is not totally pro-American. Yet, the
tripartite government is very provisional.
Le Duc Tho: Duong Van Minh is
exactly like this. But the important thing is how to make the US accept
the principle of the establishment of a tripartite government. And
further discussion on dividing positions and power should be held after this.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-le-duc-tho
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anatoly-Fyodorovich-Dobrynin
Discover
the Truth at:
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/
Tài liệu
Chu Ân Lai yêu
cầu Hoa Kỳ loại bỏ Tổng Thống Nguyễn Văn Thiệu và dùng Dương Văn Minh để lật
đổ hai nền Đệ I và Đệ II VNCH.
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/discussion-between-zhou-enlai-and-le-duc-tho
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/89367/download
Letter
From M Lyall Breckon to Miller
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d338
Washington, December
2, 1963.
Dear Bob:
We were intrigued, in your interesting memorandum of a
conversation with [less than 1 line not declassified], November 17,2 at [less than 1
line not declassified] statement that friends of his had
seen papers indicating the late Brother Nhu had reached an advanced point in negotiations with the DRV and
that terms had been set under which Ho Chi Minh would
be President of reunified Viet-Nam, and Nhu Vice President. Both for the historical record and
as an indication of how eager the DRV was for a
negotiated settlement, it would be [Page 652] interesting to have further details or even copies
of such papers. Do you think it would be
feasible to pursue the matter, either with [less than 1 line not
declassified] or through CAS channels? It seems curious that the Generals have not made public the proof they say they have (“Big” Minh to the Ambassador November
30, Embtel 1093, for example3) of Nhu’s dealings
with the North, as further justification for the coup.
From various references I gather [less than 1 line not
declassified] interests have taken a strong political turn. Please remember us
to him and [less than 1 line not declassified].
Incidentally, on the subject of the ancien regime, you
might be interested to know the New York Times yesterday published two pictures
of the bodies of Diem and Nhu. They were radiophotos, however, and scarcely
recognizable.
Claire joins me in sending our best regards to you,
Kaity, and the children. We hope you survived the change of government without
trauma. Our own chagrin at leaving two months too early is still very much
alive.4
Yours very truly,
M. Lyall Breckon
Thư của Breckon, M. Lyall gửi cho Miller
Washington, ngày 2 tháng 12 năm 1963.
Bob thân mến:
Chúng tôi rất thích thú, trong bản ghi nhớ thú vị của
anh về cuộc trò chuyện với [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật], ngày 17 tháng 11 tại [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật]
tuyên bố rằng bạn bè của ông ấy đã thấy các giấy tờ cho thấy ông
Nhu đã đạt đến một điểm tiến triển trong các cuộc đàm phán với DRV và
các điều khoản đã được đặt ra theo đó Hồ Chí Minh sẽ là Tổng Thống
của Việt Nam thống nhất và Nhu là Phó Tổng
Thống. Cả hai ghi vào hồ sơ như một dấu hiệu cho thấy DRV
rất muốn cuộc đàm phán được giải quyết ổn thỏa, sẽ rất thú vị [Trang 652] khi
có thêm thông tin chi tiết hoặc thậm chí có cả bản sao các giấy tờ như vậy. Anh
có nghĩ rằng có thể theo đuổi vấn đề này, thông qua [ít hơn 1 dòng không được
giải mật] hoặc thông qua các kênh CAS không? Có vẻ lạ là các
Tướng lĩnh không công bố bằng
chứng mà họ nói là họ có ("Big" Minh gửi Đại sứ ngày 30 tháng 11, Embtel 1093,
chẳng hạn) về các ứng phó của Nhu với miền Bắc, như một lý do biện minh thêm cho cuộc đảo chính.
Từ nhiều
tài liệu tham khảo khác nhau, tôi thu thập được [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải
mật] lợi ích đã có một bước ngoặt chính trị mạnh mẽ. Xin hãy nhớ chúng tôi đến
với ông ấy và [ít hơn 1 dòng không được giải mật].
Một
cách ngẫu nhiên, về chủ đề chế độ cũ, bạn nên lưu tâm đến bản tin tờ New York
Times ngày hôm qua đã công bố hai bức ảnh chụp thi thể của Diệm và Nhu. Ảnh được
chụp bằng máy ngoại tuyến X tuy nhiên khó thể nhận ra.
Claire
cùng tôi gửi lời chào trân trọng nhất đến bạn, Kaity và các con. Chúng tôi hy vọng
bạn đã vượt qua được sự thay đổi của chính phủ mà không bị tổn thương. Nỗi buồn
của chúng tôi khi phải rời đi sớm hơn hai tháng vẫn còn rất lớn.
Trân trọng,
M.
Lyall Breckon
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d338
DƯƠNG
VĂN MINH VÀ NHỮNG BÍ MẬT CHƯA TỪNG TIẾT LỘ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wy16_bGycHw
Nguyen
Luu Vien,
General,
ARVN, Vietnamese Minister of the Interior after November 4 and member of the
Armed Forces Council after December 18, 1964
Phan Khac
Suu,
Chairman of
the Vietnamese High National Council, September 26, 1964; Chief of Staff of the
Republic of Vietnam after October 26, 1964
Taylor,
General Maxwell D.,
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maxwell_D._Taylor
https://www.historynet.com/gen-maxwell-taylors-cable/
https://armyhistory.org/general-maxwell-davenport-taylor/
https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Maxwell-Davenport-Taylor
Johnson, Lyndon B., (Lyndon Baines Johnson)
Vice President until November 22, 1963;
thereafter President
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Lyndon_B._Johnson
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_B._Johnson
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/lyndon-b-johnson-jewish/
https://www.biography.com/political-figures/lyndon-b-johnson
https://masonrytoday.com/index.php?new_month=1&new_day=22&new_year=2019
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/gulf-of-tonkin-incident/
https://img-s-msn-com.akamaized.net/tenant/amp/entityid/AA1busNe.img?w=800&h=415&q=60&m=2&f=jpg
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/maddox.jpg
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/north-vietnam/
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/lyndon-johnson/
https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution-1964/
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d33
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lyndon_B._Johnson
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Majority_Leader
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Minority_Leader
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Majority_Whip
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives
https://www.lbjlibrary.org/life-and-legacy/the-man-himself/lbjs-ancestors
https://gw.geneanet.org/tdowling?lang=en&n=johnson&p=lyndon+baines
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_of_Lyndon_B._Johnson
GULF OF TONKIN RECORDINGS
https://millercenter.org/gulf-tonkin-recordings
Gulf of Tonkin
Senate Stories Chairman J William Fulbright and
the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, September 18
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d356
List of presidents of the United States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States
Eisenhower
Administration
https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/dwight-d-eisenhower-administration
Lesson in Vietnam from
Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let
the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not
help them fight it.”
(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we
would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,”
we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare
after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political
war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be
faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280
Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A.
Kissinger
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf
https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html
List of Participants
in the Geneva Conference on Indochina
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/ch5subch4
The Geneva
Conference on Indochina May 8–July 21, 1954
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/comp2
Geneva Agreements 20-21 July 1954
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH-LA-VN_540720_GenevaAgreements.pdf
March 10 1956 Election in South Vietnam
Election processes in South Vietnam
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010040-7.pdf
Vietnam’s Un-held 1956 Reunification Elections
https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/020691c4-6762-44f0-903b-390c67a04188/content
PRETENSE TO DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. ROLE IN THE
SUBVERSION OF THE VIETNAMESE ELECTION OF 1956
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2761&context=theses
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring
peace in Viet-Nam.
Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân
Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam =
Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt
Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV
(also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National Liberation Front,
Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of
the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam
NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used
by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed
Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist
movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often
used interchangeably
Paris
Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of
one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the
Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
negotiations.
Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International
Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Seven
Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten
Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point
Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve
Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic
hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam
Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
Gulf of Tonkin
Senate Stories Chairman
J William Fulbright and the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Discover the
Truth at:
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/
https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/cia/EOM-2019-00201-highlighted.pdf
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