Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20230805 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem 18

20230805 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem 18

Trong khi Kissinger đang đi đêm với cộng sản giặc Hồ, An Lộc Chiến Sử bắt đầu lúc 03:00 giờ sáng ngày 05 tháng 04 năm 1972, sau 93 ngày chiến đấu chống lại cuộc tấn công của cộng sản giặc Hồ, Quân Lực Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa đã toàn thắng vào ngày 06 tháng 07 năm 1972 và hoàn toàn kiểm soát quận lỵ An Lộc.

Tài liệu trận “An Lộc Chiến Sử” đính kèm ở dưới cuối bài.

Chuyến đi đêm giửa hai phía Kissinger và cộng sản giặc Hồ ngày 15 tháng Chín 1972 trước, qua mười điểm của Kissinger đề nghị, dường như đã có một thỏa thuận giửa hai phía ngoại trừ vấn đề lật đổ thể chế Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa vẩn chưa được giải đáp thỏa đáng.

Qua cuộc gặp gở nầy cộng sản giặc Hồ đặt ra vấn đề: Độc Lập, Thống Nhất, Chủ Quyền tòan vẹn lảnh thổ.

“Independence, Sovereignty, Unity and Territorial Integrity = độc lập, chủ quyền, thống nhất và toàn vẹn l"ãnh thổ”

Đưa hai lực lượng NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng và PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam ra để phân chia phiếu bầu cử nếu có. Thực ra hai lực lượng nầy đều do cộng sản giặc Hồ nặn ra để tạo áp lực cho miền Nam Việt-Nam và gây khó khăng cho Kissinger trong thời gian đàm phán giửa hai phía.

Khi đặt hai lực lượng nầy lên bàn đàm thảo cộng sản giặc Hồ chỉ có một mưu đồ là phải giử lại quân đội cộng sản tại miền Nam vì với lý do nầy Kissinger không thể buộc cộng sản giặc Hồ phải rút quân ra khỏi miền Nam.

Dưới đây là những đòi hỏi của Lê Dức Thọ đặt ra với Kissinger.

***

… “Le Duc Tho: Now let me speak about the content of the settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: Good.

Le Duc Tho: Let me speak about the content of the settlement and then we shall take up question by question to see on which points we have reached agreement and on which points we still differ. And then this afternoon we shall agree on some points and the remaining will be discussed tomorrow so as to reach an agreement.

Before going into the political problem of South Vietnam, the main question of a settlement in the Vietnam problem, we would like to reaffirm the principle of respect for the Vietnam people’s fundamental right, that is the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam. This principle in your 10 points—your 10 points have omitted in connection with this principle the word “unity,” and the formulation is not so concrete. Therefore we propose the following formulation: “The U.S. will respect the independence, the sovereignty, the unity and the territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.” We add . . .

[Page 487]

Dr. Kissinger: That’s what you already had.

Le Duc Tho: “The U.S. will not intervene in any form in the internal affairs of Vietnam, will not use force or the threat of force against both South and North Vietnam.”

Dr. Kissinger: That’s your new Point 1.

Le Duc Tho: Right. Now, regarding the political problem of South Vietnam. Last time you already said that you recognized the reality of South Vietnam, that in South Vietnam there are two administrations, two armies and two main political forces. But in practice, in your document, we see that you avoid to speak of the Provisional Revolutionary Government; you only speak of the National Front for Liberation. In South Vietnam there are actually the PRG and the NLF. These are two different bodies, two organizations of different character. I think that you should not be confused in connection with these two organizations, and you should not deny the role of the PRG. And you should not consider the PRG as like the other political forces in South Vietnam, that is, that the PRG is not a government. This is something that is not correct. You explain that we should not engage in a debate on the denomination, but it is not merely a question of the name, of denomination; this is a question of principle.

As far as we are concerned, we have proposed that these two administrations, these two armies, are equal to each other. That is a concession of ours. Therefore, you should realize that point very clearly and bring about a correct, reasonable and logical solution. In the document to be signed, the official name of each party should be used. That does not mean recognition de jure, or legal recognition of it. The 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos did the same.

Now, regarding the question of election in South Vietnam. You propose to organize a Presidential election and the new President will form a new government, and after the Presidential election then the constitution of Saigon will be amended. So in the main you still maintain that the elections would be organized in the framework of the Saigon Administration, the Saigon institutions. We feel that such elections cannot be genuinely free and democratic which would allow the South Vietnam people to decide themselves their political future. It cannot be considered as a free election aimed at eliminating all unfair advantages of the present Saigon leaders and not giving victory for any political force of South Vietnam as you say.

You said that you will not predetermine the will of the South Vietnam people, but your intention to organize in such a way is to impose on all South Vietnam a political regime in accordance with the Saigon constitution. That is the reason why we are of the view that genuinely free and democratic general elections should elect a constituent [Page 488] assembly, and this constituent assembly will be really representative of the people, and this assembly will work out a constitution and set up the definitive government of South Vietnam. Only such general elections can be genuinely free and democratic, can really insure and fully insure the right to self-determination of the South Vietnam people. On the contrary, if it is decided now that the election will be a Presidential election and the President will form the government, then this would not be in keeping with real democracy.

Now, regarding the respect for the democratic liberties and national concord of South Vietnam. Your proposal deals with this question in a very simple way, inadequate way, and inconcrete. You only speak of the enforcement of democratic liberties. So how do you envisage the meaning, the content of democratic liberties? And as for us, we clearly and concretely define the content of democratic liberties and how to implement democratic liberties and national concord and the broad union of the South Vietnamese people. And I think that we should not deal with this matter in a simple way as you do. This problem is very important for the South Vietnam people, because the South Vietnam people have been living under a dictatorial and a fascistic regime. All their democratic liberties have been ignored. Hatred and enmity among the parties are rife. Therefore, we should define this provision very concretely and very clearly. Only in doing so can we implement these provisions correctly, strictly.

Now regarding the question of administration, power, in South Vietnam during the period from the restoration of peace to the formation of the definitive government of South Vietnam. We would like now to clarify on some main points. You propose the formation of a Committee of National Reconciliation that would have the task to organize and to supervise the new presidential elections. Beside that there is no other task. But you speak that the responsibilities, the task of this Committee of National Reconciliation is a question that can be discussed. But what do you envisage for this task?

If the Committee of National Reconciliation proposed by you has no authority at all, then in the actual situation of South Vietnam where there are two administrations, two armies, two different regions, how can we insure the cessation of hostilities, how can we insure the restoration of democratic liberties, preserve lasting peace and implement national reconciliation and national concord? Which body will have enough authority to implement the political and military provisions of the signed agreement that we have mentioned, as we have envisaged as the task of the Government of National Concord in the proposal we have handed to you? If there is no such authoritative body, the situation of South Vietnam will continue to be chaotic; the two administrations and two armies will continue. Conflict, hatred and enmity instead of [Page 489] being wiped out will increase. The democratic liberties in South Vietnam will not be insured and that will result in the impossibility of preserving lasting peace or the implementation of genuine national concord and bringing about a stable situation to build up South Vietnam reflecting the aspirations and the will for peace, independence, democracy and national reconciliation, as you say.

Therefore, when we propose the formation of a Provisional Government of National Concord with the three components while the two other administrations, the PRG and the Saigon administration, remain in existence, this is a practical feature of the political situation of South Vietnam. And only such an authoritative government, with full power, can moderate these two administrations, and these two armies, and these three political forces. But we are very realistic; we recognize that the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the Saigon Administration will temporarily remain in existence and govern the regions respectively controlled by them during the period from the signing of the overall agreement to the formation of the definitive government of South Vietnam. That is the reason why we propose certain limitations to the internal power of the Provisional Government of National Concord. That power will cover only the implementation of the military and political provisions of the signed agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: What else is there? [The other side discusses in Vietnamese.] Well, I will ask afterward. Please continue.

Le Duc Tho: Now, regarding the question of Nguyen Van Thieu’s resignation, we maintain our proposal that Nguyen Van Thieu will remain immediately after the conclusion of the overall agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Will remain?

Le Duc Tho: Will resign. We don’t know why until now you have not answered this proposal regarding Nguyen Van Thieu’s resignation. In our view the resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu is an important and indispensable question in the settlement of the Vietnam problem in the present political situation. And regarding this question of Nguyen Van Thieu’s resignation, we have made concessions already. It is now time, please, to give a direct answer to this question.

These are the political questions that need our discussion.

Regarding the military questions. Now about the U.S. troop withdrawal: You proposed last time a period of three months; we also proposed a period of 45 days. I think that this period, 45 days, is long enough for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops and other troops from out of South Vietnam. There are not many U.S. ground troops left now. The U.S. air and naval forces can be withdrawn very rapidly. The shorter the period of military troop withdrawals, the sooner the release of U.S. captives. I don’t know why you want to prolong this period to three months; the U.S. proposal is not suitable.

[Page 490]

Now, regarding the question of U.S. military aid to the Saigon Administration, we maintain our point of view that if the U.S. completely ends its involvement it cannot continue to give military aid to the Saigon Administration after the ceasefire. In your 10 points you still maintain this question. That shows that the U.S. still wants to carry on its involvement in South Vietnam contrary to your affirmation that you want to end it.

Last time, you proposed that we should consider the question of military aid, the question of replacement of military weapons, in order to find out a solution, an agreement. We cannot put on the same footing the question of the DRV giving assistance to the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the question of the U.S. giving aid to the Saigon Administration, because the character of these two aids are different. But we take into account your view, and in a desire to come to an agreement we agree to the following. We agree to write down in the document that after the ceasefire, after the enforcement of ceasefire, the two South Vietnamese parties will not accept any military aid, any reinforcement of troops, advisors, military and technical personnel, weapons, munitions and war materiel into South Vietnam. The two South Vietnamese parties will agree at intervals on the replacement of weapons in accordance with the principle of equality.

Now regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam, we maintain our views as have been mentioned in Point 10. The reason why we maintain this point we have expressed to you previously. The settlement of the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam should be made in a spirit of equality and not in a spirit of “fairness” as you proposed. The Provisional Government of National Concord will stimulate, will supervise, the implementation of the agreement between the two South Vietnamese parties regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam, and not the International Commission as you propose.

Regarding the question of ceasefire, last time you said that President Nixon had accepted our stand regarding the question of ceasefire. So we have reached agreement on this question. But why you don’t write this question in the document?

Regarding the word “ceasefire.” Previously, you used the word “standstill ceasefire;” now you use the word “general ceasefire.” What is the reason for that change? In our view, starting from the actual military situation in South Vietnam, we think that a standstill ceasefire is the most realistic way, and this is moreover a question you have agreed to.

Regarding the question of ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, we have repeatedly expressed our views very clearly when we speak of the questions existing between the three Indochinese countries. I will not repeat my statement again.

[Page 491]

Now, regarding the question of the U.S. shouldering the responsibility of healing the war wounds and the economic rehabilitation in the two zones of Vietnam. At the meeting of September 15 I have expressed my views in this connection and given you a document. Last summer you have also spoken about this question. So now please give a concrete answer to this question. I think the U.S. has to shoulder the responsibility in this connection.

As to the signed document, if it is a problem for the United States, if the U.S. finds it difficult, we should find a form of signed documents suitable to the U.S. The U.S. and the DRVN will settle the question of the U.S. contribution to the DRVN; as to the U.S. contribution to South Vietnam, it will be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties with the United States.

Regarding the question of the reunification of Vietnam, we have many points in common, but there remain some differences that need solution. The U.S. is unwilling to mention the principle that Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people is one, the military demarcation line at the 17th parallel as established by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary. We don’t understand why the United States is unwilling to commit to paper the one question that had been decided upon by the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. I have on many occasions expressed our views on this question. You yourself have said that you have no problem to reaffirm the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. Therefore, the U.S. should accept this principle.

Regarding the time for reunification, we think that later the two zones of North and South Vietnam will meet and discuss. We don’t understand why you propose that the timing for the reunification will be decided upon “after a suitable interval following the signing of an overall agreement.” How you propose that—I don’t understand the reason why. I think that this formulation of yours is vague and not necessary.

Regarding the question of international control and supervision, there are three questions on which we still differ. First, the composition of the international commission. In the three countries of the international commission, we propose India. I think that India is a neutral country; therefore this proposal is reasonable. But in order to achieve a quick solution to this problem, we propose that the international commission will be composed of four countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Which?

Le Duc Tho: Each side will propose two countries, and these countries should be agreeable to the other side. So you propose two countries, we propose two countries, and we shall agree upon which country. We shall discuss.

[Page 492]

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Le Duc Tho: Regarding the task of the international commission, we do not accept the U.S. proposal regarding the international control and supervision of the provision of Point 4 on the political problem of South Vietnam, and we do not accept the control and supervision of the international commission on Point 5 regarding the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam. Because these are internal matters of South Vietnam. The international commission cannot interfere in the internal affairs of South Vietnam. But regarding the question of a general election in South Vietnam, we agree to the supervision of the international commission.

We also disagree with you on the international control and supervision of the questions existing between the three Indochinese countries. Because this does not come under the competence of the Vietnam international commission. Moreover, these questions concerning Laos and Cambodia, these questions should be decided by Laos and Cambodia, not only by us. And while carrying out its task, the international commission should respect the independence, the sovereignty of Vietnam and should not interfere in the internal affairs of Vietnam.

Now regarding the international guarantee. The U.S. proposed that there should be international guarantee for the ceasefire. I think it unnecessary because there is already the international commission for control and supervision which is in charge of that question. Previously you did not raise this question; I don’t know why you raise it now.

Regarding the international guarantee for the national rights, the fundamental national rights and the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, this is a question that comes under the competence of Laos and Cambodia. However, we think that after the settlement of the Lao and Cambodian question there may be an international conference for the guarantee for the whole of Indochina. This is our private stand.

Now, regarding the countries participating in the international guarantee and the form of the guarantee, previously the U.S. raised that these countries should be “agreed upon by the parties.” Now you propose “agreed upon by the belligerent parties.” We disagree to the use of the wording “belligerent parties.” We think that our proposal is suitable. We have put forward a list of names of countries participating. We can agree on this at least. We can write down the principle, but I think that we can delay this question until after the signing of the overall agreement. It is up to you to decide.

Now the last question I would like to speak about is the questions existing between the three Indochinese countries. I have expounded our stand during the last four private meetings. To save time I will not repeat it again. However, I want to reaffirm once again that the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem will create favorable conditions [Page 493] for the settlement of the Lao and Cambodian questions. But if you want that we settle the questions existing between the three Indochinese countries at the same time with a settlement of the Vietnam problem, then we should confer with Laos and Cambodia to settle this question. If we adopt this method, then the war will continue and be prolonged in the three Indochinese countries until we settle the problem. So you want it to go quickly, but in fact it is a slow advance.

Therefore, the quickest way is to settle the Vietnam problem before. The sooner the question of Vietnam is settled, it is assured that the Laos and Cambodian questions will be settled too. I have repeatedly told you that the question of war in the three Indochinese countries is closely related to each other. When we settle the Vietnam problem with you there is no reason that we should want the war to continue in the Indochinese countries. This is something very clear, very definite; there is no doubt in it, we can assure you so. We want to know your specific views on this question.

As I have told you from the very beginning, it is time now we should engage in straightforward and forthcoming talks and put forward our proposals to settle the problem. We have proposed a schedule for the negotiation, and a way to conduct negotiations so as to insure the implementation of the schedule. We should settle the questions of the settlement so as to quickly settle the problem. Therefore, we have made an effort to put forward constructive proposals to narrow the differences, so as to rapidly come to agreement. I think you should have also a constructive proposal to respond to our reasonable logical proposals. Only in this way can we achieve significant progress and rapidly achieve agreement and implement the schedule we have agreed upon, and finally to put an end to the war in Vietnam and restore peace in Vietnam, which is beneficial to both sides.

So today I have pointed out the points on which our views still differ. We can examine point by point, particularly the Point 4 regarding the political questions, and then we shall tackle the other points and to see other points of difference and to continue to discuss them tomorrow, so we can narrow our still great differences.

I have finished.” …

***

Trong vấn đề tù binh, cộng sản giặc Hồ chia tù binh ra làm ba khu vực: Việt, Miên, Lào.

Tuy ba nhưng thật ra chỉ là một vì đây là vùng kiểm soát của quân đội cộng sản giặc Hồ dưới dạng “Indochina”.

Đây là xảo thuật đàm phán của cộng sản giặc Hồ dùng tù binh Hoa Kỳ của ba nơi, ba quốc gia khác nhau để buộc Hoa Kỳ phải thỏa thuận ký vào bản hòa ước Paris theo ý cộng sản giặc Hồ muốn.

Đoạn đàm phán dưới đây cho thấy Kissinger hiểu rõ vấn đề tiếp liệu quân trang quân dụng, vỏ khí và binh sĩ của cộng sản giặc Hồ vẩn ồ ạt tuông vào miền Nam, củng hiểu rõ luôn là miền Nam Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa sẽ không còn viện trợ nào nửa, thế nhưng Hoa Kỳ không ngăn trở hay phản đối sự tráo trở phía cộng sản giặc Hồ.

Hoa Kỳ vẩn khăng khăng ngăn trở không cho miền Nam nhận bất cứ một nguồn viện trợ của bất cứ một quốc gia nào khác!

Đây là một bất công tàn nhẩn khi đồng minh muốn tháo chạy.

Quả thật là bạn với Hoa Kỳ rất khó.

***

… “Kissinger: We have not agreed but we have replied.

You have said that the elections should be for a constituent assembly. We have said they should be for the Presidency, as you pointed out, and that the future government should represent all forces in proportion to the votes they receive in the election, and that all forces should be eligible for all branches of government.

We will consider whether the election can be broadened to go beyond the office of the Presidency.

You believe that local areas should be administered throughout by three-segment bodies. We believe that they should be administered by who controls them de facto.

We have extensively discussed what our real differences are. We frankly believe the objective consequence of your position is to guarantee a takeover by your side. Unless you understand this you cannot understand what our concerns are.

According to your proposal, the present government would change its personnel, its policy, and its negotiating delegation. All of this would be done without reciprocity, as an entrance price to negotiations, and while the war was still going on.

After a ceasefire, the South Vietnamese army would be cut off from outside military aid while your side’s forces would continue to receive assistance.

Though I recognize you have answered this today. I made this point before you spoke. But even with respect to this there is this problem. If I understand your proposal there is the right of unlimited supply to North Vietnam.

Le Duc Tho: It is right, because North Vietnam is a sovereign country. It has the right to receive foreign aid from countries, like all other countries. If now the country is prohibited aid to North Vietnam, it is the wrong way to propose a problem and we cannot accept that. North Vietnam has recognized the provisions of the Geneva Agreement prohibiting the establishment of foreign military bases, not joining any military alliance and not accepting the protection of foreign countries.

Kissinger: No, but the problem is not that. It is a 20-year record that makes it clear that we have absolutely no way of knowing what moves from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. You moved over a [Page 499] hundred tanks from North Vietnam through Cambodia to An Loc this year and we had no idea you could do that. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: If now we return to the discussion of this, it will take four years and the discussion will be endless.

Kissinger: I’m just explaining the practical problem. If there is unlimited supply into North Vietnam and North Vietnam can then infiltrate that supply into South Vietnam, then it is a very inequitable solution.” …

***

Qua cuộc đối thoại dưới đây cho thấy Hoa Kỳ đã biết việc cộng sản giặc Hồ đưa tanks từ Cambodia sang trong mặt trận An Lộc thế nhưng Hoa Kỳ đã không tiết lộ, báo cho phía Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa biết trước.

***

… “Kissinger: …What I want to know is has he got any more tanks in An Loc?

Le Duc Tho: There are still tanks and ammunition, but the tanks and the ammunition in the negotiation have their limits, and after a certain moment we can’t give any more tanks and ammunition.” …

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

20230717 Sept 26 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 19

19. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d19

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_470

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_471

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_472