20230802 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P15
Qua chuyến đi đêm nầy cho thấy chính quyền miền Nam
không có một chút quyền gì để quyết định cho tương lai của miền Nam Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa,
mọi việc đều do sự thỏa thuận và quyết định của Kissinger từ phía Hoa Kỳ theo
đòi hỏi của cộng sản giặc Hồ.
Kissinger và Nixon đã buộc ông Thiệu phải từ chức từ
bên sau cánh cửa của tòa bạch ốc.
Tất cả mọi nỗ lực tìm nguồn viện trợ từ các quốc gia
khác của chính quyền miền Nam điều bị khóa.
Ngoại trừ nguồn tài trợ từ phía Trung-cộng.
Thế nhưng ông Thiệu đã từ chối thẳng thừng
lời đề nghị trợ giúp từ phía tòa đại sứ Trung-cộng.
Có lẻ đây là lý do thúc đẩy Trung-cộng đã quyết định
tiến chiếm Hoàng Sa ngày 19 tháng Giêng năm 1974.
Xin độc giả đọc hết tài liệu để thấy sự
nguy khốn của chính quyền miền Nam lúc bấy giờ.
Từ đây chúng ta sẽ hiểu tại sao ông Thiệu đã có những
lệnh bất nhất cho tướng Ngô Quang Trưởng phải bỏ vùng I, rồi lại tái chiếm vùng
I, rồi lại bỏ, kế đến là bỏ vùng II sau cùng là vùng III và cuối cùng cả miền
Nam lọt vào tay cộng sản giặc Hồ với sự tiếp tay của Dương Văn Minh.
Như vậy việc Hoa Kỳ ngưng oanh tạc miền Bắc qua Operation
Linebacker II vào phút cuối Dec. 29 1972 trước khi cộng sản giặc Hồ công
khai đầu hàng là có dụng ý để “phủi tay”?
Cho dù cộng sản giặc Hồ đã tuyên bố đầu hàng qua hệ thống
viễn liên với tòa đại sứ Hoa Kỳ tại Sài-gòn?
Hòa bình trong danh dự!
Operation LINEBACKER May 10, 1972
https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458990/1972-operation-linebacker-i/
Operation Linebacker - Vietnam War
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDgnz__kyQE
https://www.pbs.org/video/operation-linebacker-4q9hkv/
Operation Linebacker II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Linebacker_II
Operation Linebacker II
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxbMPPBc7-M
The Ten Thousand-Day War at Sea: The U.S. Navy in
Vietnam, 1950-1975 » Air Power » Operation Linebacker I & II
An Analysis of Linebacker II Air Campaign
https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/2002_Symposium/2002Papers_files/linebacker.php
HOW OPERATION LINEBACKER II TOOK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
BY SURPRISE
https://www.historynet.com/linebacker-christmas-bombing-vietnam/
https://www.historynet.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Operation-Linebacker-II-map-WINTER-VIEP-23.jpg
Linebacker and Linebacker II (1972)
https://libguides.fau.edu/vietnam-war/us-military-linebacker
https://libguides.fau.edu/vietnam-war/us-military-linebacker
Operation Linebacker II The 11 Day
War
https://www.robertoharder.com/linebacker.html
***
Ngày 1 tháng 9 năm 1972 là ngày bắt đầu rút quân của
Hoa Kỳ cho đến cuối năm 1972, tức ngày 31 tháng 12 năm 1972 là ngày cuối cùng
lính Mỹ phải rút khỏi Việt-Nam!
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one
side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
20230718 Auf 1 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 16
16. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d16
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_324
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_325
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_326
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_327
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_328
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_329
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_330
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_331
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_332
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_333
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_334
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_335
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_336
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_337
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_338
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_339
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_340
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_341
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_342
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_343
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_344
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_345
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_346
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_347
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_348
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_349
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_350
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_351
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_352
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_353
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_354
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_355
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_356
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_357
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_358
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_359
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_360
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_361
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_362
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_363
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_364
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_365
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_366
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_367
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_368
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_369
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_370
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_371
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_372
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_373
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_374
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v08/d225
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d16#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.13.8.2
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