20230806 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P19
Ở điểm khởi đầu buổi hợp, Lê Đức Thọ đã tố cáo láo với
Kissinger rằng chính quyền ông Thiệu đã giết cán bộ cộng sản trong tù, tuy nhiên
Thọ không đưa ra được bằng chứng nào.
…
“Le Duc Tho: Before we begin our talks I would like to raise one
question. I have just received the information that at present the Nguyen
Van Thieu administration is killing our military and political cadres in
jail. I would like to request you to use your influence so that the
Nguyen Van Thieu administration stop these cruel actions. Because
these actions are detrimental to your side later. I would like to raise this
question.” …
Dưới đây là sự đối đáp giửa Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ:
… “Dr. Kissinger: Are you finished? Mr. Special Adviser, I am not
familiar with these charges. If prisoners are being killed, it is totally
against United States policy. I will look into it as soon as I return to
Washington. If it is taking place, which I do not know, we will
use all our influence to stop it. You and we are now making a serious
effort to end the war, and we will oppose anything that is against the spirit
of what we are trying to do. But I must look into it.
Le Duc Tho: From our experience we know that when we
are approaching a settlement our enemies try always to kill our cadres and
leaders. Therefore I would like to draw your attention on this question.
…
Dr. Kissinger: I agree. One final point with respect to the first issue the
Special Adviser raised with me, about the killing of cadres. I have
assured him that we will use our best efforts to insure that this will not be
done. But we have captured some instructions that were given to some of your
people, which say that [reading from TDCS
314/06832–72],” all hamlet tyrants, particularly hamlet
chiefs, pacification cadres, people’s self-defense forces team leaders,
phung-hoang personnel”—I don’t know what they are—“and policemen should
be eliminated.”
Le Duc Tho: I am not aware of such instructions. But I
would like to tell you here that the war is now going on; what
happens on the battlefield we can’t control. But here I would like to
raise the question about military and civilian prisoners in jail, and they
should not be terrorized or killed.
Dr. Kissinger: I have assured the Special Adviser that we will use all our
influence to prevent the killing of prisoners, and I think he should use
all his influence that the same happens on your side. We don’t make it
conditional; we will use our influence anyway.”
Đoạn đối đáp trên của Kissinger đưa ra chứng cứ từ tài liệu của cộng sản [reading
from TDCS 314/06832–72] cho thấy lệnh của cộng sản từ bộ chính trị (TDCS
314/06832–72) tàn sát: “tất cả các ấp chiến lược củ, đặc biệt là trưởng
ấp, cán bộ bình định, đội trưởng đội nhân dân tự vệ, nhân viên Phụng-Hoàng và
cảnh sát nên bị loại bỏ.”
Điều nầy nói lên hiệu quả của chính sách các ấp chiến lược củ của Đệ-Nhất
Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa do Tổng Thống Ngô Đình Diệm xây dựng đã ngăn chận được bước
tiến xâm lăng của cộng sản giặc Hồ, nhưng lại bị Hoa Kỳ âm thầm ra lệnh phá bỏ.
Qua chuyến đi đêm nầy dẩn đến việc Kissinger dùng tướng
Haig làm áp lực với tổng thống Thiệu củng như hứa hẹn bằng sự cam kết ủng
hộ ông Thiệu để bản ký kết hòa bình có thể thực hiện được, nhưng sau đó Hoa Kỳ
sẽ cắt đứt củng như xóa bỏ những cam kết bằng vụ án Watergate, xù, xóa sổ.
Miền Nam sụp đổ.
Lưu ý! Đây là lời phát biểu của Kissinger đại
diện cho Hoa Kỳ.
Bao gồm cả Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa.
“The United States acknowledges the provisions of the Final
Declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954
in regard to respect for the sovereignty, the independence, the unity
and the territorial integrity of the Indochinese states.”
Như thế nào là: “general ceasefire” =/= “standstill
ceasefire”?
Kissinger: “general ceasefire.”
Lê Đức Thọ: “standstill
ceasefire”
Standstill ceasefire của
Lê Đức Thọ là vẩn giử quân đội của cộng sản giặc Hồ tại miền Nam Việt-Nam.
General ceasefire của Kissinger là: (This is our definition of “general ceasefire.”
And we have added another phrase about removal of mines; that we will remove
the mines laid in the ports, harbors and waterways, etc.)
“The forces of the parties will remain in place pending implementation of
the withdrawal provisions and principles of the overall agreement.
“Lực lượng của các bên sẽ giữ nguyên vị trí trong khi chờ thực hiện các
điều khoản và nguyên tắc rút quân về sự thỏa thuận của hai bên.
“Pending implementation of the political provisions of the overall
agreement, neither side will seek to extend its areas of control.
“Trong khi chờ thực hiện các điều khoản chính trị sự thỏa thuận của đôi bên,
không bên nào sẽ tìm cách mở rộng các khu vực kiểm soát của mình.
“The civilian population will continue to work and reside in the areas
where they are located until the parties agree on the modalities for
implementation of the principle of freedom of residence and movement.”
“Dân thường sẽ tiếp tục làm việc và cư trú tại các khu vực họ sinh sống
cho đến khi các bên đồng ý về các phương thức thực hiện nguyên tắc tự do cư trú
và đi lại.”
Cuộc Trốn Thoát Từ Nhà Tù Cộng Sản: Câu Chuyện của Ông
Phạm Quang Trình | Lịch Sử Qua Chuyện Kể |VHM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7PQnX7s0jUE
Nuôi Con Sơ Sinh Trong Trại Tù “Cải Tạo” - Câu Chuyện
của Bà Lê Thị Xuân | Lịch Sử Qua Chuyện Kể
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jdl-b3n-MHE
ĐỖ MƯỜI - NGƯỜI GÂY ĐAU THƯƠNG, MẤT MÁT CHO NGƯỜI DÂN
MIỀN NAM CẢ VẬT CHẤT LẪN TINH THẦN SAU 1975
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwYMHl6HXCo
Chết Tập Thể Trong Trại Tù Cải Tạo (bài của cựu tù
nhân CT Chế Văn Thức) **KHÔNG CẦM ĐƯỢC NƯỚC MẮT*
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiuwRuVCNJY
Câu Chuyện Của Một Người Tù "Cải Tạo" (Tác
giả: Vĩnh Khanh) @tieuthuyethay99
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QJq5uXwj0w
Cựu Bác Sĩ VNCH Nguyễn Công Trứ Sống Sót Trong Trại Tù
Cộng Sản - Lịch Sử Qua Chuyện Kể | VHM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9hoRttcBdM
Phát hiện chấn động: Văn kiện Đảng xác nhận Nguyễn Ái
Quốc qua đời năm 1932, vậy Hồ Chí Minh là ai?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6Bxs3kfh9w
30 tháng 4: Chuyện những sĩ quan VNCH ‘tuẫn tiết’ khi
Sài Gòn thất thủ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVYSIis4opQ
Cong San Viet Nam Offensive Instruction
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/print/2059849
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
20230717 Sept 27 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 20
20. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d20
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_509
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_510
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_511
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_512
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_513
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_514
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_515
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_516
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_517
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_518
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_519
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_520
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_521
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_522
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_523
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_524
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_525
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_526
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_527
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_528
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_529
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_530
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_531
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_532
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_533
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_534
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_535
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_536
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_537
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_538
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_539
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_540
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_541
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_542
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v08/d267
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