Wednesday, August 16, 2023

20230817 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P30a

20230817 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P30a

 

Cuộc đàm phán lần nầy đã không thành công và Kissinger đã hoản lại một tuần lễ cho một cuộc đàm phán khác vào ngày 4 tháng 12 năm 1972. Lý do tại sao sẽ được bạch hóa trong những tài liệu kế tiếp giửa phái đoàn Hoa Kỳ và Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa.

Lá thư của Nixon gửi Kissinger cho biết là Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa phải chấp nhận sự đàm phán định đoạt từ phía Hoa Kỳ nếu muốn Hoa Kỳ vẩn ủng hộ miền Nam một khi cộng sản giặc Hồ phản bội lời hứa.

“Kissinger, Haig, and Ambassador William Sullivan, a new and senior member of the U.S. negotiating team, met with the South Vietnamese diplomats on the evening of November 25. Kissinger read to them a message from President Nixon in which Nixon said that the October 8 agreement, with improvements added since, was the best the United States and South Vietnam would get and that if South Vietnam wished U.S. support in the future in the event North Vietnam violated the agreement, the South Vietnamese had to accept the less than perfect agreement. There was no chance at all, given the diminishing support in the U.S. Congress for the war, that he could continue the war; if South Vietnam wished to continue, it was on its own. After discussing the message with the South Vietnamese diplomats, joined at the meeting by Thieu’s special assistant from Saigon, Nguyen Phu Duc, Kissinger told the South Vietnamese they had to accept the cease-fire and the agreement he had negotiated, assuming he could get the North Vietnamese back to this point. “Your choice,” he said, “is to join with us or destroy yourselves. These are facts.” Ambassador Sullivan added: “If you had driven out the North Vietnamese you would, of course, be in a different position in a ceasefire.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 125

Tổng Thống thiệu không khoan nhượng điều nầy.

Watergate scandal June 17 1972

https://www.britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal

Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973

http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***  

20230717 Nov 25 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 31

Watergate scandal June 17 1972

https://www.britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal

31. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch5

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d31

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_911

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_912

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_913

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_914

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_915

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_916

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_917

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_918

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_919

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_920

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d126

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d31#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.25.8.2


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