20230817 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P30a
Cuộc đàm phán lần nầy đã không thành công và Kissinger
đã hoản lại một tuần lễ cho một cuộc đàm phán khác vào ngày 4 tháng 12 năm
1972. Lý do tại sao sẽ được bạch hóa trong những tài liệu kế tiếp giửa phái
đoàn Hoa Kỳ và Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa.
Lá thư của Nixon gửi Kissinger cho biết là Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa
phải chấp nhận sự đàm phán định đoạt từ phía Hoa Kỳ nếu muốn Hoa Kỳ vẩn ủng hộ
miền Nam một khi cộng sản giặc Hồ phản bội lời hứa.
“Kissinger, Haig, and Ambassador William Sullivan, a new and senior
member of the U.S. negotiating team, met with the South Vietnamese diplomats
on the evening of November 25. Kissinger
read to them a message from President Nixon in which Nixon
said that the October 8 agreement, with
improvements added since, was the best the United States and South Vietnam
would get and that if South Vietnam wished U.S.
support in the future in the event North Vietnam violated the agreement, the
South Vietnamese had to accept the less than perfect agreement.
There was no chance at all, given the diminishing support in the U.S. Congress
for the war, that he could continue the war; if
South Vietnam wished to continue, it was on its own. After
discussing the message with the South Vietnamese diplomats, joined at the
meeting by Thieu’s special assistant from Saigon, Nguyen Phu Duc,
Kissinger told the South Vietnamese they had
to accept the cease-fire and the agreement he had negotiated,
assuming he could get the North Vietnamese back to this point. “Your choice,” he said, “is to join with us or destroy yourselves. These are facts.” Ambassador
Sullivan added: “If you had driven out the North Vietnamese you would, of
course, be in a different position in a ceasefire.” (Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 125”
Tổng Thống thiệu không khoan nhượng điều nầy.
Watergate scandal June 17 1972
https://www.britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in
Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
20230717 Nov 25 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 31
Watergate scandal June 17 1972
https://www.britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal
31. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch5
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d31
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_911
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_912
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_913
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_914
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_915
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_916
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_917
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_918
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_919
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_920
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d126
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d31#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.25.8.2
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