Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20230803 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P16

20230803 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P16

Tù binh Việt cộng từ chối được trao trả về phía bắc vĩ tuyến 17

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPKjFjoCN4w

Sự thật về trại tù Phú Quốc và việc Tù binh Bắc Việt từ chối bị giao trả lại miền Bắc (Phần 1)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPAMfWXQVlI

Tù binh Bắc Việt từ chối bị giao trả lại miền Bắc (Phần 2)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhyQhGSyXWk

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 1/ Diễn đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdDbpDHzNoY

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 2/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7-z4_5akI4

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 3/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwhxX05zRtE

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 4/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnJDBbMSN8k

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 5/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9hXB-wJJAJo

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 6/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mdVe9Gqx-SU

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 7/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3xjzwwCPvoo

Tù Binh & Hòa Bình/ Phan Nhật Nam Phần 8 cuối cùng/ Diễn Đọc Thiên Hoàng

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0HiAPLgySg

***

Những điều kiện nằm trong mật ước giửa Kissinger và cộng sản giặc Hồ đều vi phạm sau khi quân Hoa Kỳ rút ra khỏi Việt-Nam.

… “Two, there will be a general cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when this general agreement is signed …”

Như thế rỏ ràng cộng sản giặc Hồ đã xâm chiếm miền Nam sau khi ký hiệp định Paris vào ngày 27 tháng Giêng năm 1973

***

… Dr. Kissinger: [begins reading]:

“Point One, regarding the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam:

“There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. troops, military advisers and military personnel and those of other forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam within four months of the signature of this general agreement. Weapons and war materials belonging to those forces will also be withdrawn and bases under U.S. control will be dismantled.” …

We will give you a text when we are finished.

[He resumes reading.]

“Two, there will be a general cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when this general agreement is signed. The cease-fire will include cessation of United States acts of force against North Vietnam, the [Page 335] mining of North Vietnamese ports and harbors, and an end to all U.S. air and other military activities in South Vietnam. As part of the cease-fire, there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina, and the introduction into Indochina of reinforcements in the form of arms, munitions and other war material will be prohibited. It is understood, however, that war material, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same type and with similar characteristics.” …

“Three, the release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day this general agreement is signed. The release will begin on the same day as troop withdrawals and will be completed when they are completed.

“Fourth, regarding the political problem in South Vietnam:

“The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

“For its part, the United States declares that it respects the South Vietnamese people’s right to self-determination; it will remain completely neutral with respect to the political process in South Vietnam; it will abide by the outcome of any political process shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves; and it is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

“There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam no later than six months from the date of final agreement on the details of a political solution. The election may be held earlier if that is agreed among the parties. This election will be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of final agreement on the details of a political solution. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

“Before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the government, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

“The right of all political forces to participate freely and peacefully in every aspect of the political process will be guaranteed. In addition to the Presidential election, all political forces will be eligible for appointment or election to positions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.

“In keeping with the provisions of Article 14(C) of the 1954 Geneva Accords the Vietnamese parties will undertake to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee democratic liberties.

[Page 336]

“Five, after the new President has been elected, the political forces in South Vietnam will meet with a view to revising the Constitution within one year and agreeing on steps to implement it. [The North Vietnamese take notes busily.]

“Point Six: The details of a political solution based on the principles of Points 4 and 5 above will be negotiated between the South Vietnamese parties within three months of the signature of this general agreement.”

[The North Vietnamese ask for Point Six to be repeated. Dr. Kissinger rereads it. The North Vietnamese confer.]

Dr. Kissinger: There is a dispute on the North Vietnamese delegation!

Xuan Thuy: Only for clarification.

Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you, when I get a dispute going between the Minister and the Special Adviser then we will get a settlement. [They laugh.] But I don’t think it will happen before the American election.

[Resumes reading:]

“Point Seven: Regarding the peaceful reunification of Vietnam: Reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step by peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.”

This text should be somewhat familiar to you.

[He resumes reading.]

“Pending reunification, and in keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, North and South Vietnam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, and from allowing any foreign country to have military bases, troops and military personnel on their soil.

“Pending reunification, North and South Vietnam will develop and maintain close relations in all fields.

“Eight, regarding the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of Indochina:

“The countries of Indochina shall pursue a foreign policy of peace, independence and neutrality, establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social regime, maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, and participate in programs of regional economic cooperation.

“Nine, both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle their own affairs by themselves.

“Ten, the problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other’s affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

[Page 337]

“Eleven, there will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement, including the cease-fire and its provisions, the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians, the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina, and the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

“Twelve, there will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the status of all the countries of Indochina, and lasting peace in the region.

“Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other appropriate purposes.”

Now let me explain what we mean by this plan. Let us look seriously and in good faith at what we have done. We have cast our plan in terms of the Seven-Point Plan and Two-Point Elaboration. We have accepted the basic principles of your proposals, although there are differences with regard to timing and procedure. Let me go through these proposals, point by point.

With respect to Point One, on the military questions:

—Your side has asked for the complete withdrawal of allied forces and their equipment and the dismantling of U.S. bases. We have agreed that we will do this.

—You have asked for an early deadline. We have shortened the timetable for complete withdrawal of our forces to four months. Were we to agree by September 1st, the last American soldier will have left South Vietnam by the end of this year.

With respect to Point Two, on the political questions: You will notice that we have accepted many of its principles and that we have agreed to consider it together with the military questions.

First, on the overall process. Your position as expressed in the Seven Points and the Two-Point Elaboration is that the present government must change and then the new government should develop a new constitutional structure. We accept this general outline as to procedure, and also the two-stage approach it represents. We have made a conscientious effort to leave the decisions to the South Vietnamese people. We solemnly declare that we will abide by the results of the process we are proposing. The only thing we will not do is to prescribe that outcome in Paris. We will not insist on a particular government; but we will not impose it either.

More specifically:

—You have asked that we respect South Vietnamese self-determination and that the political process be free of American interference. We have agreed to this in our readiness to make a series of commitments about the political future of South Vietnam once an agreement is signed.

—We have proposed elections to choose a new President. And we have specified that this election be organized and run by an independent [Page 338] electoral commission made up of all political forces and that it be internationally supervised.

—You have asked that President Thieu resign. He has agreed to do so and we have reason to believe that the deadline for his resignation prior to new elections is flexible.

—You have asked that democratic liberties be guaranteed. We have agreed to your specific point that democratic liberties, as defined in the 1954 Geneva Accords, be assured in South Vietnam. In addition, we have proposed that all forces be eligible for election or appointment to all branches of government and that they participate in every aspect of the political process freely and securely.

—You have asked that a new government of South Vietnam bring about a new constitution. We have agreed that after the new elections the political forces in South Vietnam should meet to revise the Constitution within one year and agree on steps to implement it.

—In addition to the merit of these proposals individually, you will no doubt consider the impact of the publication of this agreement and principles on the political process and on the expectations of the people of South Vietnam.

We have thus addressed every aspect of your political proposals. We have agreed to your basic approach and many of its details. There are some remaining differences to which I will turn in a minute.

With respect to the other points in the [PRG] Seven-Point proposal: We have met every one in substance, and in many instances we have incorporated the specific language.

—Point Three, the disposition of Vietnamese armed forces, is subsumed under our Point Ten.

—Point Four, the reunification of Vietnam and the relations between North and South, is covered by our Point Seven.

—Point Five is covered by our Point Eight.

—Point Six on reparations we cannot accept, but we maintain our position of last summer regarding our willingness to consider a reconstruction program for all of Indochina.

Our other points (nine, ten, and eleven) represent areas of essential agreement last summer when they were based on your nine points.

Finally, we have met your concern that the intent of these proposals could be defeated through delaying tactics in the implementing process by placing a three-month time limit on the negotiation to work out the details of the political process. This time limit would enable us to help guarantee that the intent of these proposals is carried out because our withdrawals would not be completed until a month after these negotiations are completed also. At the same time we could not affect [Page 339] the political process with our forces since they would have left at least five months before the elections.

[The North Vietnamese ask him to repeat.]

This time limit would enable us to guarantee that the intent of these proposals is carried out because our withdrawals would not be completed until a month after the details are agreed to. I will explain this when I speak about understandings. At the same time we could not affect the political process with our forces since they would have left at least five months before the elections.

Let me explain. We agree on these principles; after these principles, it will take three months to work out the details of the process; it will take four months to withdraw all our forces. Our forces will be withdrawn one month after the details are worked out. The elections will be six months after the details are worked out, or five months after the forces are withdrawn. But the elections can be earlier.

Let me point out the new elements in our plan as compared to our January 27th and our May 8th proposals:

[Withdrawals] The deadline for total withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam is reduced to four months, instead of the six months in our Eight-Point proposal. Assuming the final details of a political settlement are worked out within three months of the general agreement and a new election held six months later, all U.S. and allied forces would be out of South Vietnam five months before the elections. This contrasts with our January 25th plan where U.S. withdrawals would be completed by the date of the election.

Prisoners. Unlike the President’s May 8th proposal, prisoner release would take place after the cessation of acts of force and mining against the DRV rather than making these conditional upon completion of prisoner release.

Political Issues. Our political proposals offer major new elements expressly designed to meet concerns that you have expressed in your message of May 18 and at our last meeting.

First, we have reaffirmed that President Thieu and Vice President Huong will resign before the holding of presidential elections. Our new plan deliberately does not specify the time limit. We are prepared to have an understanding with you that we will support an extension of the period beyond the one month provided in our proposal of January 25.

[The North Vietnamese confer.]

Second, the election will take place several months after the last American soldier has left Vietnam, in contrast to our earlier plans.

Third, we have specified that in addition to the Presidential election, all political forces would be eligible for appointment or election [Page 340] to positions in all branches of government—executive, legislative and judicial. No political force will be excluded from participation in any part of the political process, at any level.

Fourth, we have added an explicit statement about guarantees on the rights of all political forces to participate freely and peacefully in the political process. This clause meets your concern that forces aligned with your side, and others opposed to the present Saigon Administration, might be hindered or prevented from political activities.

Fifth, in response to your direct request at our last meeting, we have included a specific reference to Article 14(c) of the Geneva Accord and the guarantee of democratic liberties.

Finally, we have added the provision that after a new President has been elected, the political forces in South Vietnam will meet in order to revise the Constitution within one year and agree to implement it. This accepts the outline of this aspect of your side’s second point elaboration. Thus, your side will not only have the chance for power in the Presidential election; they will also have the opportunity to negotiate with the new government on revisions of the Constitution. The political process, in other words, is extended beyond one office or one event.

These would be formal agreements which we would be prepared to sign. The Special Adviser last time mentioned unsigned agreements as well. I am not sure to what he was referring. But we would be prepared to reach and observe certain private understandings in addition to formal agreements.

First, we would be prepared to use our influence, all our influence, with the Government of South Vietnam to implement the details of this agreement.

Second, as I have indicated, we have reason to believe that President Thieu—as his personal contribution to a guaranteed and lasting peace—might consider the deadline for his resignation negotiable. We envisage, for example, that he might agree to a two-month rather than one-month interval before new elections. In any event, we will support such an understanding with him and Vice President Huong. Let me remind you that last summer you said that President Thieu’s resignation was the only real requirement for a settlement, after which all other problems could be solved easily. If this was a serious proposal, the opportunity now exists.

Le Duc Tho: We proposed the immediate resignation, and now you advance it two months.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you proposed we reach a private understanding.

Mr. Special Adviser, there will undoubtedly be minor provisions that you will not agree with. Could you defer your comments until the end? [They nod yes.]

[Page 341]

Third, in conjunction with an overall agreement, we are willing to make certain understandings with regard to the future levels of U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam.

Fourth, as I have pointed out, we will be prepared to reaffirm privately to your major allies every agreement and understanding we make with you. Thus if we were to violate any agreements, we would be breaking faith not only with you but also with countries whose relations are very important to us.

Fifth, we are prepared to listen seriously to any proposals you may wish to make with regard to further understandings.

Our proposals are a deliberate, conscientious attempt to give the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to shape their own future. We have structured them within the framework your side has put forward. But we have refused to impose a particular solution. We cannot so weaken the political forces opposed to the NLF that the resulting political process will be a sham. We will cooperate honestly in constructing a truly free political process. We will not participate in a thinly veiled subterfuge for imposing one particular solution.

I tell you solemnly that we will carry out these agreements without any afterthought to undo its unfolding. We are prepared to live with its consequences. We have proposed a plan that irrevocably removes the American military presence, stops the conflict and the suffering, and lays out a concrete political process to give the people of South Vietnam a free choice, and a deadline to achieve it. This plan would be guaranteed by our agreement with you; by our commitment to your major allies; by other international forces; and by the geopolitical realities of the 1970s.

The need on both sides for a peaceful resolution has never been clearer. Recent events have demonstrated that no one can “win everything” on the other fronts of this conflict either. We have no wish to impose a military solution and no illusion that it could be purchased cheaply. We have no intention of inflicting needless destruction. We do not want to humiliate you. We consider your independence an essential element of long-term Southeast Asian policy. We are ready to take risks to terminate the fighting now, end our involvement, and set the stage for political competition among the Vietnamese alone.

We have made our basic decision to settle this conflict if you will meet us part way.

You have a similar decision to make. You can join us now in a serious effort to reach a negotiated settlement that takes account of both sides’ concerns. This requires concrete proposals and movement from both sides, and a willingness to leave some matters to a political evolution.

[Page 342]

Your other choice would be to wait upon events, listening to what we have to say without budging from your essential positions. You would thus be hoping for one of two things to happen: Either we accept all of your demands, which will not happen, or a new President is elected in November who will accept all of your demands.

The waiting course would be a serious mistake. You should not be misled by temporary Congressional votes—as you know, they do not address political questions at all.

As for looking towards our elections. You will make your own judgment about the prospects of the opposition. I will not discuss our domestic politics with you. It is clear, however, that if our election turns into a national referendum on Vietnam, you will be gambling for high stakes. This Administration’s position can only be greatly bolstered by such an outcome.

Over recent years, you often have decided to wait, and the objective result has been a worsening of your overall position. Even if the opposition were to win, could they really execute what they now promise as candidates, or if they attempt it will it make a decisive difference by January 20, 1973? Over time, the South Vietnamese government and military posture will continue to grow stronger, and our influence on any settlement will decrease.

You have often accused us of missing opportunities. But you too have often waited too long. The basic mistake in the summer of 1971 was not this or that agreement, but your basic decision to start the negotiations much too late to influence the election. By July 1971 when we first talked seriously it was much too late. Do not make that same mistake again.

I therefore hope you will give serious consideration to what has been presented. It is not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; we are prepared to hear counterproposals. We have, however, included just about every element that we think can contribute to a fair and open political process for all forces. The only thing we have not done is to guarantee your side’s victory in advance.

I welcome your comments. And I look forward to hearing your own concrete proposals.

Mr. Special Adviser, Mr. Minister, at our last meeting you spoke eloquently about US-Vietnamese cooperation at Viet Bac at the end of World War II and about the prospect of a “new page” in our relations at the end of this war. We share these sentiments. I want to repeat again today that the United States has no greater goal than to end this conflict in a manner that will respect the interests of all parties and will heal the wounds that have been inflicted. Our two countries do not present any long term threat to one another. There is every reason to rekindle the cooperation that existed at the end of a previous war.

[Page 343]

So let us now end this war. Let us both devote our energies today, and in the coming weeks, to find a just settlement that will allow us to turn a new page in relations between our two countries and our two peoples. That is our attitude.

[He hands over U.S. Twelve-Point proposal at Tab A.]

***

Sau khi hiểu rõ 12 điểm của Hoa Kỳ do Kissinger đọc, cộng sản giặc Hồ bắt đầu ra giá đòi Hoa Kỳ phải trả cho miền Bắc cộng sản 4 tỷ 5 dollars thay vì từ 2 đến 2.5 tỷ dollars mà thôi.

***

… “Le Duc Tho: The Vietnamese parties should discuss the timing of it. We don’t propose any specific time. This will come up at the negotiation.

Now, regarding the healing of the wounds of war. I feel that the United States has a responsibility in this question of healing the wounds of war. You previously, Mr. Adviser, raised the question of aid to the whole of Indochina with a sum of $7.5 billion. In our view this amount is no longer satisfactory. Because you have resumed the bombing against Vietnam, you have mined our ports, causing great losses to us. Now we propose $8 billion for the two zones of Vietnam—$4.5 billion for North Vietnam and $3.5 billion for South Vietnam. This sum is not to be reimbursed. For you this sum is not considerable. You have spent [Page 355] hundreds of billions of dollars in the Vietnam war; we have suffered great losses over the past decades—there are two wars of destruction waged by the United States against us. We had been building our country for 10 years when you launched the air war. We had no sooner rehabilitated when you resumed the bombing. Let alone the question of material losses, but the human losses are very great. No sum can redeem human lives. For you this sum is not great.

Five, we both sides have agreed on the principle that there will be international control and supervision as well as international guarantees. We shall go into discussions of the details about the composition of the body, the tasks and organization of the body.

Six, now regarding the cease-fire in Vietnam. After the agreement and the signing of the final agreement on all military and political questions in Vietnam, a standstill cease-fire will take place under international control and supervision.

Seventh, the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos should be respected. The people of each Indochinese country will settle themselves their own internal affairs without foreign interference. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of each other and without interference in each other’s internal affairs.

Regarding the question of prisoners of war throughout Indochina, regarding the question of cease-fire throughout Indochina, we are only competent to settle the question concerning Vietnam. As to the question concerning Cambodia and Laos, this will be settled by the competent parties of Cambodia and Laos. We cannot speak for them. However, we are of the view that the settlement of the Vietnam problem will create a favorable condition for the settlement of problems of your interest. As we have already said, the problems among the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese themselves. But we firmly believe after the solving of the Vietnam problem the problems in other countries can be easily settled. This is the overall solution I propose.

In reviewing the negotiations we have had here, I feel that we have come to agree with each other in principle on a number of questions, although the details still need further discussion. These are the questions on which we have agreed in principle:

First, the U.S. undertakes to withdraw completely all U.S. forces and those of the other countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam, to put an end to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the U.S. undertakes not to return to Vietnam again.” …

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

20230717 Aug 14 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 17 -

17. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d17

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_376

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_377

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_378