20230811 Cong Dong Tham Luan P24
Qua những đàm phán dưới đây của đôi bên cho chúng ta
thấy một số vấn đề như sau:
***
Dr. Kissinger: Only this word, for precision. And we would like to say “against the
waters, etc., of North Vietnam,” rather than “of the DRV.” In English
the Democratic Republic is a government and North Vietnam is a
country.
Một khi Hoa Kỳ xem miền Bắc là một quốc gia thì việc quân đội của cộng
sản giặc Hồ trên lảnh thổ miền Nam là “xâm lược”. Thế nhưng Hoa Kỳ vẩn
làm ngơ chấp nhận.
***
Xuan Thuy: Agreed. And then it reads “The Democratic Republic
of Vietnam and the United States will propose the following parties
to participate in the international conference.”
Đoạn kế, phần đàm phán trên cho thấy cả Hoa Kỳ lẩn cộng sản giặc Hồ không
xem chủ quyền miền Nam là một thực thể của một chính phủ hợp hiến, mà chỉ xem
miền Nam như một “party”, hai bên tự gặp nhau bí mật và sau cùng buộc
Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa ký một hòa bình giả tạo chỉ có lợi cho đôi bên cộng sản giặc
Hồ và Hoa Kỳ mà thôi.
***
Xuan Thuy: Let me speak one last sentence. We have done our
utmost effort. Your trip to Hanoi is proposed by you. We thought it
was your desire to go to Hanoi and to end the war and therefore we were
prepared to accept you. Because normally speaking when two countries are
at war there is no reason to receive you in Hanoi. It is because of a desire to
end the war and restore peace and take into account of your views that we have
decided that.
But your last statement makes it clear that you want to protract these
negotiations. I have come to no other conclusion. So if the war continues
and no peace is restored, it is your responsibility.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, we will end the war and we will end it within the next weeks, I
am certain.
….
Dr. Kissinger: Well, we are making peace because we both desire peace. I
cannot believe that you will refuse to make peace because you insist that we
must settle the war in Hanoi and on the basis of two very important unresolved
issues. We have given you two proposals on how to settle the war
quickly. It is up to you to decide which way we will proceed. On our part we
shall maintain what has been agreed to, but we must go.
Hảy xem bên trên sự xảo quyệt và gian dối của cả đôi bên Kissinger và
Xuân Thủy về dự định chuyến đi Hà Nội của Kissinger.
Hà Nội với thái độ “Em chả! Em chả!”.
Còn Hoa Kỳ với thái độ nhất quyết chạy làng, đâm sau lưng đồng minh miền
Nam.
***
Dr. Kissinger: But I think we recognize that the Special Adviser was correct in his
original draft, so that we should not raise this issue now. I have made a great
concession to you to show my serious intent by withdrawing that sentence.
Xuan Thuy: After receiving your message I informed immediately
Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, and he informed me
that he completely agreed to your ideas. He accepted it.
Dr. Kissinger: I think we better drop this idea. We may have to disappoint the Special
Adviser.
Xuan Thuy: Mr. Le Duc Tho phoned
me to say it is a good idea from Dr. Kissinger, he looks forward very
far.
Dr. Kissinger: From Peking?
Xuan Thuy: Yes, from Peking.
Dr. Kissinger: He must stay in a guest house that has a
telephone! Whenever I am in a guest house they take all the telephones
out. But that is because they never let me outside the grounds where I am
staying. So we drop that sentence, but you will tell Special Adviser Le Duc Tho
that I appreciate his consideration. Tell him he made the sentence too
concrete.
Qua những đối đáp bên trên giửa Kissinger và Xuân Thủy cho thấy
Trung-cộng hoàn toàn đứng bên sau cố vấn việc đàm phán giửa cộng sản giặc Hồ và
Hoa Kỳ.
Bằng chứng là trong lúc cuộc đàm phán đang diễn ra, Lê Đức Thọ sang “làm
khách” tại Peking.
Để tường trình cuộc đàm phán!?
***
For the draft agreement that resulted from this meeting, see Appendix 2. Two days after this meeting, North Vietnam
agreed to the U.S. positions on the two remaining major issues: the replacement
of armaments and the release of imprisoned members and supporters of the
Communist shadow government in the South, Articles 7 and 8. In the first instance, the North Vietnamese agreed
to replacements on a piece-for-piece basis for those items worn out, damaged,
or destroyed; in the second, North Vietnam agreed that the issue would be
settled by the South Vietnamese parties after the cease-fire began. These two
issues settled, the United States informed North Vietnam that “the text of the
agreement can now be considered complete.” (Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 30
and footnote 2 thereto).
Kissinger’s next task was to present the draft agreement to President
Thieu in Saigon and obtain his approval. He flew directly to Saigon
from Paris and began a series of meetings
with Thieu on October 19.
Phần cuối tài liệu được tổng kết cho thấy kế hoạch ép ộng Thiệu ký hiệp
định hòa bình giả tạo đang tiến hành với lịch trình đến Sài-gòn của Kissinger
vào ngày 19 tháng 10 năm 1972.
Quả thật, làm bạn của Hoa Kỳ không phải dễ!
***
20230717 Oct 17 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 25
25. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d25
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_729
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_730
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_731
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_732
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_733
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_734
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_735
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_736
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_737
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_738
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_739
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_740
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_741
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_742
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_743
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_744
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_745
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_746
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_747
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_748
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_749
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_750
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_751
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_752
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_753
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_754
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_755
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_756
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_757
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_758
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_759
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_760
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_761
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_762
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_763
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_764
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_765
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_766
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_767
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_768
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_769
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_770
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_771
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_772
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_773
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_774
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_775
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_776
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_777
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_778
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_779
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_780
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_781
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_782
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_783
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_784
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_785
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_786
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_787
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_788
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_789
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_790
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_791
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_792
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d30fn2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d25#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.43.8.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d25#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.43.1290.5
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
No comments:
Post a Comment