Monday, August 14, 2023

20230815 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P28

20230815 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P28

 

Phần đàm phán nầy vẩn không ra ngoài vấn đề rút quân cộng sản giặc Hồ về miền Bắc.

Một khi hiểu được xảo kế, ngụy biện và dụng ý của Lê Đức Thọ về việc giử quân ở lại miền Nam đã cho thấy rằng chiến thuật “Ấp Chiến Lược” của Tổng Thống Ngô Đình Diệm có rất nhiều hiệu quả ngăn chận cộng sản tiến chiếm miền  Nam.

Rất tiếc là chương trình nầy bị hủy sau năm 1964.

***

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we then have a number of very difficult problems.

Le Duc Tho: Because it is what you are haunted by—this is the implication of the so-called North Vietnamese troops. You know I do not want to have it written in the agreement, but practically speaking, after the end of the war naturally the two sides will reduce their military numbers. This is what we have agreed to, both sides, and now you want to change it.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we don’t want to change it; we simply want to be more specific. Because it is in any event a very difficult problem to tell an ally that a peace is made which leaves a large number of forces that are considered not a part of that country’s forces on its territory. That is already a considerable concession. All we want to say is “return to their native place”. We are not saying where the native place is; we’re just saying they should leave.

Le Duc Tho: Moreover, the troops demobilized may return to their native places or they may live at the place of their choice, because in the democratic liberties has been mentioned freedom of movement, etc.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, after they’re demobilized at their native place they can go wherever they want to.

Le Duc Tho: So you mean that when they are demobilized they are to be bound and escorted to their native place? When they are demobilized the demobilized troops may return to their native place or may live at the place of their choice.

Dr. Kissinger: After they have gone to their native place.

Le Duc Tho: For instance now suppose I am demobilized, I do not want to return to my native place. I want to remain here . . .

……

Dr. Kissinger: No, the idea would be—I don’t know how it’s done in Vietnam. But in our country when a soldier is demobilized he is given orders where to go for his demobilization, and then he is free to go wherever he wants. And we would visualize the same process here.

[Page 883]

Le Duc Tho: In Vietnam when a soldier is demobilized he is asked in what place he wanted to go and then he expresses his views and he will be given a paper to go to that place.

Dr. Kissinger: I think that’s the problem. I think you demobilized about 300,000 men who said they wanted to go south and so you sent them

Le Duc Tho: It is of their own will.” ….

….

Le Duc Tho: They then would demand the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, not if there are none there.

Le Duc Tho: I have told you about that. These are the voluntary troops and these are the children of South Vietnamese regroupees. They have been organized into units and go and fight in South Vietnam. Now these troops are under the command of the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam.

***

Ngoài ra Kissinger luôn luôn treo tờ “giấy bạc mầu xanh” lững lơ trước mặt. 

Dr. Kissinger: So “South and North Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line.” It means you’ve got to come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail again. [Laughter] It means I’ll be haunted again.

Le Duc Tho: Be not worried. After the ceasefire in Vietnam and Laos, according to the explicit provisions of the agreement, both parties shall not introduce troops, armaments, into South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Do not worry.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the Special Advisor is waiting until we have paved the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a part of our reconstruction program for Indochina. [Laughter] And made a four-lane highway out of it. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: It would be a good thing if you construct such a highway, and consumer goods will be transported on it.

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll discuss it in Hanoi. Because we have to know General Giap’s requirements! We don’t want to put it in the wrong place.” …

***

Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973

http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf


20230717 Nov 23 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 29

29. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch5 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d29 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_870

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_871

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_872

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_873

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_874

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_875

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_876

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_877

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_878

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_879

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_880

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_881

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_882

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_883

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_884

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_885

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_886

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_887

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_888

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_889

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_890

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_891

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_892

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_893

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_894

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_895

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_896

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_897

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_898

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_899

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_900

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_901

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_902

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d120 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d29#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.19.8.2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d29#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.19.152.6


***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

 

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