20230828 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P41
Với tài liệu bên dưới cho thấy Hoa Kỳ tiến hành việc kết
thúc chiến tranh qua Paris Pease Accords 1973 cho dù có sự đồng thuận hay không
đồng thuận của Tổng Thống Thiệu.
Nó củng cho thấy một điều khác nửa là vấn đề cộng sản giặc
Hồ đã đầu hàng Hoa Kỳ sau cuộc hành quân dội bomb Operation Linebacker II từ
ngày 18 tháng 12 cho đến 29 tháng 12 năm 1972.
Hoa Kỳ đã dấu đi bức điện văn đầu hàng của cộng sản giặc
Hồ đã gửi cho tòa đại sứ Mỷ tại Sài-gòn.
Và để khỏi phải bồi thường chiến tranh cho phía Hà-nội
củng như sự viện trợ cho miền Nam như đã hứa, với biến cố Watergate xảy ra, quốc
hội Hoa Kỳ buộc Nixon từ chức để xóa sổ nợ công khai trước công chúng thế giới.
42. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d42
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1165
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1166
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1167
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1168
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1169
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1170
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1171
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1172
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1173
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1174
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1175
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1176
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1177
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1178
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1179
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1180
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1181
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1182
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1183
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1184
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1185
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1186
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1187
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1188
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d255
255. Memorandum From the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Paris, January 8,
1973.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d255
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d255#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.53.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d255#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.53.12.4.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d255#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.53.12.4.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d255#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.53.12.22.4
264. Message From Richard T. Kennedy
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Paris1
Washington, January
11, 1973, 1752Z.
Nixon:… “I also totally agree that we must go ahead
with the agreement with Hanoi regardless of whether Thieu goes along or not.
If we cannot deliver [Page
945] Thieu, we then obviously will have the problem of Hanoi’s reaction. In that event, there would be no
Presidential announcement made on Thursday, January 18.
Instead, we would have Haig delay his return so that there would be no
pressure for an announcement until after January 20.
Then, on January 22, I would make an
announcement that we had reached an agreement in principle with the North
Vietnamese and call on Thieu to adhere to it. I have
already told Haig that he is to tell Thieu that we are not going to negotiate
with him but rather that we will proceed and we are presenting this, in effect,
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_945
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.79.8.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.79.16.2
48. Memorandum of Conversation1
Paris, January 23, 1973, 9:35 a.m.–1:20 p.m.
….
“ Between January 13 and January 23, that
is between the final two January Kissinger- Le
Duc Tho meetings before the agreement was signed, Thieu decided
to accept the agreement. See Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973 Documents 320, 322, and 329.
After Kissinger had failed to get Thieu’s agreement in October, Nixon made Haig his chief
emissary to Thieu. In trips to Saigon in November,
December, and January,
Haig delivered increasingly tough messages from Nixon, essentially ultimatums, that signaled
irrevocably the United States’ intention to sign the agreement even if South
Vietnam did not. Furthermore, if South Vietnam did not sign, it
could not depend on future U.S. assistance. In response to this pressure,
Thieu agreed. On December 19, 1972,
however, he perceptively commented to Haig, when the latter delivered
the penultimate ultimatum: “Given the
realities of the situation, what I am being
asked to sign is not a treaty for peace but a treaty for continued U.S. support.”
Haig replied: “I agree with your analysis.” (Haig, Inner Circles,
p. 331)”….
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d48
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1344
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1345
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1346
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1347
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1348
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1349
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1350
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1351
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1352
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1353
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1354
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1355
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1356
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1357
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1358
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1359
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1360
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1361
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1362
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1363
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1364
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1365
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1366
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1367
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d329
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d48#fnref:1.7.4.4.28.23.8.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d48#fnref:1.7.4.4.28.23.230.6
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in
Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North)
Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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