20230812 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P25
Trong phần nầy có hai điều đáng lưu ý.
Điều thứ nhất Kissinger lột mặt nạ Lê Đức Thọ, một tình báo hai mang của cả Trung-cộng và
cộng sản giặc Hồ vừa trở lại từ sau chuyến đi Peking của Lê Đức Thọ trong lúc cuộc đàm phán của hai phía đang
tiến hành.
Phần thứ hai Tổng Thống Thiệu phản đối việc Kissinger
đã chấp nhận để cho quân cộng sản giặc Hồ ở lại miền Nam (từ 140,00 cho đến 300,000 ngàn quân) sau hiệp định
hòa bình Paris 27 tháng Giêng năm 1973.
***
Dr. Kissinger: Well, we also believe it might be good to restore the International
Control Commission to activity in Cambodia. And also we believe that as a
result of this the government in Phnom Penh will be prepared to begin
negotiations with the Khmer Rouge, or whatever they call themselves
now.
Now I have expressed our views on this matter, and also on the dangerous
consequences of the continuation of the war, to the Chinese
Vice Foreign Minister in the United States—in case they have any
visitors to whom they would like to convey our thoughts.
Le Duc Tho: Who will visit Peking?
Dr. Kissinger: Who will visit Peking? Well, there are all
kinds of people living there who talk too. [Laughter] I think the Minister
knows who I mean. I was talking more of permanent guests; not
temporary [Page
821] visitors. And I also explained to him that after some
period of tranquility political negotiations in the general framework look much
more promising, but that a period of tranquility was necessary before this
could take place.
Le Duc Tho: And what did the Vice
Foreign Minister of China reply to you?
Dr. Kissinger: You were just in Peking.
Le Duc Tho: I would like to know what Chiao Kuan-hua said to you.
Dr. Kissinger: My impression always is that when people don’t contradict me,
they agree with me, but they may simply be polite. My impression was
that there was understanding for our position, quite honestly, but I do not
want to speak for the Chinese. What did they tell you? [Laughter]
Le Duc Tho: They said the national fundamental right of each
people should be respected, because of the significance of the problems in each
country comes under the national right of each people. All right.
Dr. Kissinger: I like advice of such precision. [Laughter]
***
Since Kissinger’s last meeting with the North
Vietnamese in Paris on October 17, South
Vietnamese President Thieu had blocked the settlement, rejecting the
agreement negotiated by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho despite Kissinger’s
attempt to persuade Thieu during his (Kissinger’s) October 19–22 visit. Thieu had numerous criticisms of the agreement but central to his
objections was that it did not require North Vietnamese forces in South
Vietnam, estimated to be 140,000–300,000,
to leave the South. Believing it was critical that the United States
and South Vietnam be on the same page regarding the negotiations, President
Nixon directed Kissinger at this next meeting in Paris to present
and argue for the changes Thieu requested. For documentation on Kissinger’s
visit to Saigon and his meetings with Thieu, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October
1972–January 1973, Documents 27
***
Linebacker and Linebacker II
Operation LINEBACKER May 10, 1972
***
20230717 Nov 20 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 26
Ch5
26. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch5
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d26
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_794
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_795
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_796
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_797
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_798
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_799
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_800
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_801
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_802
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_803
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_804
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_805
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_806
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_807
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_808
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_809
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_810
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_811
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_812
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_813
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_814
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_815
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_816
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_817
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_818
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_819
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_820
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_821
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_822
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_823
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_824
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d27
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d29
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d32
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d34
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d36
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d39
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d41
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d44
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d48
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d50
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d52
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d58
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d26#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.9.8.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d26#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.9.28.8
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d26#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.9.118.7
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North)
Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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