20230829 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P42
Trong cuộc đàm phán nầy cho chúng ta thấy chứng cứ cộng
sản giặc Hồ đã mở cửa cho Trung-cộng chiếm quần đảo Hoàng Sa vào ngày 19 tháng
Giêng năm 1974.
Khi đàm phán với Kissinger, Lê Đức Thọ luôn luôn đề cập
và đặt vấn đề khoảng cách 300 nautilus miles của
U.S. Aircraft Carrier tính từ bờ biển Việt-Nam.
Thế nhưng tại sao Trung-cộng lại có thể biết khoảng
cách hở, trống 300 nautilus miles nầy mà tấn công chiếm lấy quần đảo Hoàng Sa của
miền Nam Việt-Nam nếu cộng sản giặc Hồ không tiết lộ ra?
… “Le Duc Tho: There are two questions here. We would like to maintain what you said
to us before regarding the moving of the aircraft carriers to 300 nautical miles from the shores of Vietnam.
Because if you say North Vietnam, 300 miles from
the shores of North Vietnam, then we understand that they will be near
the shores of South Vietnam. Now I think that now that peace is
restored, it is more sensible that U.S. aircraft carriers should be 300 nautical miles from the shores of Vietnam
rather than the shores of North Vietnam. Then if you say only North
Vietnam, then they will be near South Vietnam, then they will make
pressure on South Vietnam. And recently they were located in South
Vietnam but they launched attacks against North Vietnam.
Secondly, we would like to say that the moving of 300
nautical miles from the shores of North Vietnam should include U.S.
aircraft carriers and also a number of U.S. warships associated with
the aircraft carriers. I mean ships which are associated, linked
with the aircraft carriers. Since now peace is restored these ships,
aircraft carrier ships, should be stationed far from the shores of
Vietnam. It is something natural. Except for transit purposes; I agree that
they make transits.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is against every principle of freedom of the seas to accept
any restrictions on the stationing of our forces on the seas. We have never
done this for any country.
Now with relation to ships associated with aircraft carriers, we
have to confine it to aircraft carriers because of the special role they
have played. With respect to ships associated with aircraft carriers, first of all, it is a very difficult matter to define
and secondly they represent no threat.
Le Duc Tho: I have two points to
address here. First, these ships should not be used 300 miles from
the shores of Vietnam because past experience shows that they are
located in the waters of South Vietnam but they launch attacks
against both North and South Vietnam. Therefore, I think that after the
restoration of peace it is something logical that these ships should move
far from the shores of Vietnam. Moreover, if they remain in South
Vietnam they will continue to use pressure against South Vietnam.
As to other ships, we stick to ships associated with the aircraft
carriers. It may be when the aircraft carriers are moved far from
the shores of Vietnam then the other ships will move far from the
shores of Vietnam too, but we want to clarify, to put it clearer too.
This understanding is in the light of the war in Vietnam. If there
had been no war in Vietnam, then this question doesn’t arise at all and
it would be applied like for other countries.” …
Dr. Kissinger: I can consider the distance from the shores of Vietnam, but we can’t
consider restrictions on any other ships except aircraft carriers.
Le Duc Tho: I agree that you will pay attention to the word
“shores of Vietnam.”
Dr. Kissinger: I have to check this with our experts.
Le Duc Tho: [Laughing] It is something very easy to understand.
You need not ask your experts if it is North Vietnam or the whole of Vietnam!
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I have to find out where this 300
miles takes us.
Le Duc Tho: I myself can measure how long is 300 nautical miles and if you move 299 nautical miles I can check it.
20230717 Jan 9 73 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 43
43. Memorandum
of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d43
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1190
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1191
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1192
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1193
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1194
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1195
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1196
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1197
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1198
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1199
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1200
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1201
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1202
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1203
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1204
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1205
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1206
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1207
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1208
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1209
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1210
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1211
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1212
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1213
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1214
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1215
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1216
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1217
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1218
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1219
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1220
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1221
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d256
256. Message From the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Paris, January 9,
1973, 1620Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d256
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_928
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d256#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.57.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d256#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.57.14.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d256#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.57.20.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d256#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.57.30.2
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in
Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi
used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace
Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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