20230817 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P30c
Cuộc đàm phán giửa Kissinger và phái đoàn ngoại giao
Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa (lưu ý: phái đoàn không cần thông dịch viên) vẩn quanh
quẩn trong việc Hoa Kỳ buộc Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa phải chấp thuận sự thương lượng
giửa Hoa Kỳ và cộng sản giặc Hồ.
Trong trường hợp Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa không khoan nhượng
Hoa Kỳ sẽ không thực thi những lời hứa có phản ứng mạnh với cộng sản giặc Hồ
khi họ vi phạm thỏa thuận và miền Nam tự bảo vệ lấy.
“Kissinger: if Saigon is the only roadblock for reaching agreement on this basis they will personally lead the fight when the new Congress reconvenes on January 3 to cut off all
military and economic assistance to Saigon. My evaluation is that
the date of the cut-off would be February 1.
They further believe that under such circumstances we have no choice but to
go it alone and to make a separate deal with North Vietnam for the return of
our POWs and for our withdrawal.” …
“You must tell Thieu that I feel we have now reached
the crossroads. Whether [Either] he trusts me
and signs what I have determined is the best agreement we can get or we have to
go it alone and end our own involvement in the war on the best terms we can get.
….
…. “Nixon: “Tell Thieu that I cannot keep the lid on his
strong supporters in the House and Senate much longer. They are terribly disturbed by what they read and hear out of Saigon.
It is time for us to decide to go forward together
or to go our separate ways. If we go
separate ways, all that we fought for, for so many years, will be lost.
If, on the other hand, he will join us in going
forward together on the course I have laid out we can, over the long pull, win
a very significant victory.
“The third option of our trying to continue to
go forward together on the basis of continuing the war is simply not open. The
door has been slammed shut hard and fast by the longtime supporters of the hard
line in Vietnam in the House and Senate who control the purse strings.”
***
Câu hỏi được đặt ra là trong trường hợp Tổng Thống Thiệu
chấp thuận ký bản hiệp ước đình chiến bất công Paris Peace Accords 1973 liệu
Hoa Kỳ có giử lời hứa bảo vệ miền Nam một khi Nixon phải từ chức vì vụ án
Watergate vào ngày 17 tháng sáu năm 1972 (August 9, 1974 Nixon resigned)?
Vì đây là dịp cho Hoa Kỳ phủi tay xóa nợ.
Watergate scandal June 17 1972
What was the outcome of the Watergate
scandal on the presidency of Richard Nixon?
On August 9, 1974, facing likely impeachment for his role in covering up
the scandal, Nixon became the only U.S. president to resign.
https://www.britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973
125. Memorandum of Conversation1
Paris, November 24,
1972, 7:30–8:45 p.m.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_450
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_451
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_452
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_453
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_454
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_455
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_456
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_457
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_458
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_459
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_460
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d124
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d112fn2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.8.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.14.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.18.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.46.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.70.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.134.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d125#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.201.224.4
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