20230810 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P23
Chuyến đi đêm nầy vẩn là chuyện giá cả mà cả hai phía
vẩn kỳ kèo “bớt một thêm hai”. Trong lúc kỳ kèo, Kissinger “hớ” một
câu mà quý độc giả nên lưu ý, đó là:
“I will also discuss the matter with the President
of the World Bank.”
Nếu chúng ta hiểu President of the World Bank là ai.
Lại “hớ”!
… “Dr. Kissinger: Now supposing the Chinese refuse to withdraw their troops.”
…
Lại “hớ”!
… “Le Duc Tho: Of course we can’t decide
that, but I think you too, you can’t decide that.
Dr. Kissinger: No, but I want to have it understood. Even if the Chinese keep their
troops there you will withdraw your troops.
Le Duc Tho: We shall abide by Article
15(b).
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but Article 15(b) could be
interpreted to say that your troops will be
withdrawn only if all foreign troops are withdrawn.”
***
Trong thời gian chiến tranh câu hỏi được đặt ra cho
Trung Tâm Hành Quân, Phòng 2, Phòng 3, Phòng 7, An Ninh Quân Báo miền Nam là liệu
có quân Trung-cộng trong hàng ngũ bộ đội Bắc Việt hay không? Câu hỏi vẩn còn bỏ
ngỏ chưa xác định.
Hôm nay với câu hỏi “hớ” của Kissinger và câu
trả lời của Lê Đức Thọ bên trên đã xác định rõ ràng không sai lạc là có quân đội
Trung-cộng trong hàng ngũ quân Bắc Việt, có thể ngay cả trong hàng ngũ quân Lào
và quân Campuchia.
Đây là câu trả lời rõ ràng là kể từ khi Vùng I triệt
thoái quân cộng sản Bắc Việt đã ồ ạt tiến vào miền Nam từ 10 đến 15 sư đoàn trong
đó có cả quân đội của Trung-cộng.
So với 6 sư đoàn còn lại của miền Nam.
Khác với hành động “cổng rắn cắn gà nhà” của cộng sản
giặc Hồ, Tổng Thống Thiệu đã thẳng thừng từ chối lời ngỏ ý giúp miền Nam từ tòa
đại sứ Trung-cộng trước ngày 30/04/1975.
Câu hỏi được đặt ra cho cộng sản giặc Hồ là
ai đã buôn dân và ai đã bán nước?
Riêng phần bên dưới là cuộc đối thoại giửa Kissinger
và Nixon sau khi trở về từ cuộc hội đàm Paris.
Xin mời đọc.
“Upon returning to
Washington later the same day (October 12), Kissinger
and Haig went directly to meet with President Nixon in his
hideaway Executive Office Building office. (Haig, Inner Circles, p.
299) Rather than writing a report, Kissinger gave a verbal
account of the meeting. He first told Nixon: “Well, you got three
out of three, Mr. President. It’s well on the way.” Nixon replied: “You
got an agreement? Are you kidding?” Kissinger answered: “No,
I’m not kidding.”
As Kissinger attempted to provide details, the President peppered
him with questions and comments about the settlement, the events leading up to
it, and Nguyen Van Thieu’s agreement. When Kissinger told him
that the agreement represented peace with honor, Nixon stated: “Henry,
let me tell you this: it has to be with honor. But also it has to be
in terms of getting out. We cannot continue to have this cancer eating at
us at home, eating at us abroad. Let me say, if these
bastards [referring to the South Vietnamese leadership] turn
on us, I—I am not beyond [unclear] them. I believe that’s,
that’s what we’re up against.” Nixon then added: “I am not going to
allow the United States to be destroyed in this thing.” (National Archives,
Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Executive Office Building,
Conversation 366–6; transcribed in Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 9)
Haldeman recalled that Nixon “kept interrupting Henry all through
the discussion. He obviously was all cranked up and wasn’t listening to
the details.” The group concluded, according to Haldeman, that “the
real basic problem boils down to the question of whether Thieu can be sold on
it.” (Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, October 12, 1972; quoted in Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 9)
In contrast to Nixon’s and Kissinger’s exuberance, Le Duc Tho reported matter of factly to the Politburo
in Hanoi. After reciting the major points on which he and Kissinger
had agreed toward a settlement, he concluded: “In summary, the goals
that the Politburo set forward have essentially been achieved. Three difficult
issues still remain: replacement of weapons, political prisoners,
and the international commission.” (Message from Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy to the Politburo,
12 October 1972, in Doan
Duc, et al., compilers, Major Events: The Diplomatic Struggle and
International Activities during the Resistance War Against the Americans to
Save the Nation, 1954–1975, volume 4, pp. 343–344)”
***
20230717 Oct 11 12 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum
24
24. Memorandum of Conversation1
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d24
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_638
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_639
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_640
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_641
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_642
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_643
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_644
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_645
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_646
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_647
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_648
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_649
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_650
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_652
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_653
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_654
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_655
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_656
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_657
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_658
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_659
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_660
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_661
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_662
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_663
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_664
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_665
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_666
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_667
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_668
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_669
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_670
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_671
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_672
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_673
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_674
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_677
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_679
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_680
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_684
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_690
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_691
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_692
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_693
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_694
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_695
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_722
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_725
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_726
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_727
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d9
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d24#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.39.8.2
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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