20230831 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P44
Từ các hồ sơ tường trình 261, 263, 264 cho thấy quyết định
của Kissinger và Nixon về vấn đề số phận của miền Nam Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa.
<In Kissinger’s report to Nixon on the day’s meeting, he
noted: “We finished the complete text of the agreement, including the
provisions for signature.” With the final text in hand, Kissinger focused
on obtaining the agreement of South Vietnamese President Thieu: “Our major
problem now, of course, is Saigon. I believe the only way to bring Thieu around will be to tell him flatly that you will
proceed, with or without him. If he balks
and we then initial, there will still be
3 to 4 days between initialing and signing for the pressures to build up.
I have already told Le Duc Tho that we would
have to discuss the situation in this eventuality. In any event, if we
once again delay the initialing or reopen the negotiations, we would not only
jeopardize but certainly lose everything that has been achieved.” ( Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam,
October 1972–January 1973, Document 263)…
… Nixon replied quickly, in full agreement with Kissinger: “I also
totally agree that we must go ahead with the
agreement with Hanoi regardless of whether Thieu goes along or not.
If we cannot deliver Thieu, we then
obviously will have the problem of Hanoi’s reaction. In that event,
there would be no Presidential announcement made on Thursday, January 18. Instead, we would have Haig delay
his return so that there would be no pressure for an announcement until after January 20. Then, on January
22, I would make an announcement that we had reached an agreement
in principle with the North Vietnamese and call on Thieu to adhere to it.
I have already told Haig that he is to tell
Thieu that we are not going to negotiate with him but rather that we will
proceed and we are presenting this, in effect, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”
(Ibid., Document 264)>
Dưới đây là hai phương thức tiến hành việc ký hiệp ước (cho dù Thiệu đồng
ý hay Thiệu không đồng ý) từ hồ sơ 261.
… “Option 1—Thieu agrees
—Friday, January 12, Kissinger
returns to Washington.
—Saturday, January 13, Haig leaves
for Saigon.
—Monday, January 15, announcement of bombing
halt due to progress in Paris.
—Wednesday, January 17, Haig
returns to Washington.
—Thursday p.m., January 18, Presidential
announcement that agreement in principle has been reached between all parties
and that President has directed Dr. Kissinger to proceed Paris on Friday, January 19,
or Monday, January 22, to initial final text.
The announcement should also include a statement on when cease fire would come
into effect.
—Friday, January 19, or Monday, January 22, Kissinger initialing in Paris.
—Friday, January 26, four-party
signature of agreement in Paris.
—ca February 1, trip to Hanoi.
Option 2—Thieu intransigent
—Friday, January 12, Kissinger
returns to Washington.
—Saturday, January 13, Haig leaves
for Saigon.
—Haig extends visit in Saigon to include stops in Phnom
Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok and Seoul.
—Saturday, January 20, or Sunday, January 21, Haig returns to Washington.
—Monday, January 22 or Tuesday, January 23, Presidential television address announcing
agreement between Washington and Hanoi,
and Thieu’s refusal to come along.
261. Message From the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Paris1
Washington, January 11, 1973, 0317Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261
20230717 Jan 11 73 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 45
45. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d45
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1247
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1248
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1249
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1250
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1251
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1252
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1253
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1254
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1255
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1256
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1257
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1258
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1259
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1260
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1261
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1262
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1263
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1264
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1265
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1266
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1267
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1268
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1269
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1270
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1271
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1272
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1273
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1274
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1275
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1276
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d263
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d45#fnref:1.7.4.4.28.15.8.2
263. Message From the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Paris, January 11, 1973,
1735Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d263
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_942
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_943
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d263#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.77.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d263#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.77.16.4.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d263#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.77.16.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d263#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.77.16.12.4
264. Message From Richard T. Kennedy
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Paris1
Washington, January
11, 1973, 1752Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_945
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.79.8.4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d264#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.79.16.2
261. Message From the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) in Paris1
Washington, January
11, 1973, 0317Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_937
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_938
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d258
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d259
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.69.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.69.14.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.69.14.6
262. Message From the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Paris, January 11,
1973, 0828Z.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d261
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.73.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.73.14.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.73.16.4.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d262#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.73.16.12.2
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in
Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt
Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or
Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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