20230807 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P20
Trận tái chiếm cổ thành Quảng Trị năm 1972 đã mang lại
chiến thắng cho miền Nam, tuy nhiên đây lại là một thất bại cho miền Nam tại hội
đàm Paris sau những chuyến đi đêm giửa Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ.
Tái Chiếm Cổ Thành Quảng-Trị Ngày 16-9-72
http://s113345672.onlinehome.us/chiensu/cs-taichiem-cothanhQT.htm
Trong tài liệu “Editorial Note 284” bên dưới cho thấy
sau khi miền Nam thành công trong việc tái chiếm cổ thành Quảng Trị đã khiến
cho bộ chính trị cộng sản giặc Hồ đổi chiến thuật đàm phán ngay trên bàn hội
nghị giửa Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ.
Cộng sản giặc Hồ không đòi hỏi ông Thiệu phải từ chức
nửa mà họ tìm mọi cách để cho Hoa Kỳ rút quân càng sớm càng tốt và cuối cùng kết
quả là quân đội Hoa Kỳ đã rút đi khỏi miền Nam Việt-Nam trong một giai đoạn ngắn
nhất như ý của cộng sản giặc Hồ.
Kết quả là miền Nam sụp đổ khi chiến thuật Việt-Nam
hóa chiến tranh của Hoa Kỳ chưa hoàn tất.
Editorial Note 284
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v08/d284
… “Based on the work of Sub-Committee CP50, Nguyen Co Thach recommended concessions (“loosening
up” the CP50 called it) on the issue of the future structure of the
government in the South. He and the specialists in the Sub-Committee
believed that this was the best way to get the Americans out of Vietnam.
Therefore, as Doan later observed, “we do not
need to demand that the Saigon government be eliminated or that Thieu be forced
to resign. All we needed, he [Thach]
said, was some kind of governmental structure involving national
reconciliation and concord, in accordance with our lowest-level
requirement.” (Ibid., page 140) The Politburo accepted the
recommendations presented by Nguyen Co Thach and
together they became the approach Le Duc Tho was
to follow in Paris.” …
Nếu đọc kỷ tài liệu đính kèm độc giả sẽ thấy Xuân Thủy
tuyên bố hội nghị sẽ kéo ít nhất là ba ngày, nếu cần có thể kéo dài thêm cho đến
khi hai bên thỏa thuận.
… “Xuan Thuy: Last time we have agreed that we would meet for three consecutive
days beginning today. It will depend on our work. We may prolong our
meetings if necessary. Probably we shall keep our agreement.
Dr. Kissinger: It’s agreeable to me. It’s just that our airplane is in Frankfurt. It’s
purely technical. We’re prepared to meet for three days and if necessary even
longer.” …
Và dĩ nhiên sau khi Hoa Kỳ rút quân khỏi miền Nam, quân
cộng sản giặc Hồ vẩn trấn đóng miền Nam cùng lúc với những đơn vị quân cộng sản
giặc Hồ tại Lào và Cambodia vẩn giử nguyên hiện trạng.
Kissinger biết, chính phủ Hoa Kỳ biết, đó là điều bất
lợi cho miền Nam thế nhưng hiệp định Paris vẩn được ký kết.
Bất công và tàn nhẩn khi đồng minh đâm sau lưng mình để
tháo chạy.
Tay đồng minh đã vấy máu đồng bào miền Nam Việt-Nam sau
cuộc tháo chạy vô lương tâm.
Đây là vết nhơ trong lịch sử Hoa Kỳ, vết nhơ sẽ không
bao giờ gột rữa được trước dư luận quốc tế trên thế giới.
Thiet Giap! The Battle of An Loc, April 1972
https://www.army.mil/article/18883/send_me_some_stukas
The Battle for An Loc 5 April-26 June 1972
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA486941.pdf
The Easter Halt
https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0998easter/
***
Có một vấn đề quan trọng khác chúng ta nên lưu ý.
Đó là việc cộng sản giặc Hồ đòi hỏi cho bằng được là lực
lượng hải quân và không quân Hoa Kỳ phải rút hoàn toàn ra khỏi biển Đông Việt-Nam
sau khi ký hiệp định Paris.
Đây có phải là việc cộng sản giặc Hồ đã âm thầm dọn đường
cho Trung-cộng tiến chiếm Hoàng-Sa vào ngày 19 tháng Giêng 1974?
Và đây củng là lý do hải quân Hoa Kỳ từ chối cứu vớt
những thủy thủ của Hải Quân Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa trên chiến hạm HQ-10 rời bỏ tàu
theo lệnh của hạm trưởng Huỳnh Văn Thà khi bị tàu hải quân Trung-cộng bắn chìm?
Cuộc rút quân của Hoa Kỳ từ 16 tháng, rút xuống còn 12
tháng, 6 tháng và sau cùng là 75 ngày!
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
20230717 Oct 8 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 21
21. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d21
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_544
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_545
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_546
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_547
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_548
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_549
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_550
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_551
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_552
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_553
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_554
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_555
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_556
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_557
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_558
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_559
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_560
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_561
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_562
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_563
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_564
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_565
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_566
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_567
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_568
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_569
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_570
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_571
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_572
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_573
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_574
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_575
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_576
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_577
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_578
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_579
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_580
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_581
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_582
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_583
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_584
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v08/d284
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d21#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.31.8.2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d21#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.31.770.4
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