Wednesday, October 15, 2025

20251016 CDTL Lượng Giá Tình Báo Quốc Gia Washington 12 October 1973 D111

20251016 CDTL Lượng Giá Tình Báo Quốc Gia Washington 12 October 1973 D111


111. National Intelligence Estimate 1

Washington, October 12, 1973.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d111

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_449

Washington, October 12, 1973.

NIE 53/14.3–73

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM

Précis

The major judgments in this Estimate are:

A.

Hanoi’s actions are clearly designed to insure that it can again resort to major military action at some point to gain its objectives if other means fail. The chances of the communists gaining power through the political provisions of the Paris agreement are negligible; nor are their prospects good for achieving the GVN’s collapse through a combination of political and clandestine warfare backed up by only moderate military pressure. Hanoi may not have made a final decision as to the timing of a major offensive. It must, however, believe that it will ultimately have to return to the battlefield to seek its objective of reunifying Vietnam. (Paras. 3, 54.)

B.

The current military balance in South Vietnam is only slightly in favor of the GVN; with heavy infiltration and supply movements, it may have shifted to the communists’ advantage by mid-1974. The political balance, however, is clearly in the GVN’s favor and will remain so. (Paras. 6–19, 31–53.)

C.

The forward positioning of communist forces and supplies and the improved road system give Hanoi the capability to kick off a major military campaign with little additional preparation, perhaps less than a month. (Paras. 13–15, 55.)

D.

It is a close choice whether Hanoi will opt for a major military offensive during the current dry season (October 1973–May 1974). In making its decision Hanoi must assess the following factors:

·        —The likelihood and extent of a US response; the positions of Moscow and Peking, particularly the consequences to the North Vietnamese position if they can not be certain of enough material support to cover losses that would accompany prolonged heavy combat; the [Page 449] military balance between its forces and the RVNAF; and the overall political and military situation in the South. (Para. 56.)

·        —The arguments for and against an offensive this dry season are presented in paragraphs 57–64.2

E.

If there is not an offensive this dry season, Hanoi will continue to launch and no doubt accelerate carefully orchestrated significant localized, and limited-objective attacks in various regions of South Vietnam to seize territory and test the GVN’s resolution. (Paras 67–68.)

F.

In the event of a major communist military effort this dry season, however, the communists would initially make substantial territorial gains in MR–1 where they would probably commit their own air assets. If the fighting were prolonged, RVNAF’s continued resistance in MR–1 would be in doubt without renewed US air support. Communist gains in the rest of South Vietnam would be less dramatic, and RVNAF should be able to blunt the communist assault. (Paras. 44, 65–66.)

G.

Beyond this dry season, we believe the odds favoring a major communist offensive will increase significantly in the following dry season. (Para. 76.)

—Over the long run, Hanoi may place greater weight on trends it observes in the South than on the external restraints imposed by Moscow, Peking, and Washington. (Paras. 69–75.)

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]

Google Translated

Washington, ngày 12 tháng 10 năm 1973.

NIE 53/14.3–73

https://documents3.theblackvault.com/viewer/index.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fdocuments2.theblackvault.com%2Fdocuments%2Fcia%2Fvietnam%2FNIE%2FNIE_53_14.3-73.pdf

https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/#google_vignette

Triển vọng ngắn hạn của Việt Nam

Tóm tắt

Những nhận định chính trong Đánh giá này là:

A.

Hành động của Hà Nội rõ ràng được thiết kế để bảo đảm rằng họ có thể lại dùng đến hành động quân sự lớn vào một thời điểm nào đó để đạt được mục tiêu nếu các phương tiện khác thất bại. Khả năng cộng sản giành được quyền lực thông qua các điều khoản chính trị của Hiệp định Paris là rất thấp; và triển vọng của họ trong việc đạt được sự sụp đổ của Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa thông qua sự kết hợp giữa chiến tranh chính trị và chiến tranh bí mật, được hỗ trợ bởi áp lực quân sự vừa phải, cũng không mấy sáng sủa. Hà Nội có thể chưa đưa ra quyết định cuối cùng về thời điểm của một cuộc tấn công lớn. Tuy nhiên, họ phải tin rằng cuối cùng họ sẽ phải quay trở lại chiến trường để theo đuổi mục tiêu thống nhất Việt Nam. (Đoạn 3, 54.)

B.

Cán cân quân sự hiện tại ở miền Nam Việt Nam chỉ hơi nghiêng về phía Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa; với các hoạt động xâm nhập và tiếp tế mạnh mẽ, cán cân này có thể đã chuyển sang lợi thế cho phe cộng sản vào giữa năm 1974. Tuy nhiên, cán cân chính trị rõ ràng đang nghiêng về phía Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa và sẽ tiếp tục như vậy. (Đoạn 6–19, 31–53.)

C.

Việc bố trí lực lượng và tiếp tế của cộng sản ở tuyến đầu cùng với hệ thống đường bộ được cải thiện giúp Hà Nội có khả năng khởi động một chiến dịch quân sự lớn mà không cần chuẩn bị thêm nhiều, có lẽ chỉ chưa đầy một tháng. (Đoạn 13–15, 55.)

D.

Việc Hà Nội có lựa chọn một cuộc tấn công quân sự lớn trong mùa khô hiện tại (tháng 10 năm 1973–tháng 5 năm 1974) hay không là một lựa chọn khó khăn. Khi đưa ra quyết định, Hà Nội phải đánh giá các yếu tố sau:

—Khả năng và mức độ phản ứng của Hoa Kỳ; lập trường của Moskva và Bắc Kinh, đặc biệt là hậu quả đối với vị thế của Bắc Việt nếu họ không thể chắc chắn về đủ hỗ trợ vật chất để bù đắp những tổn thất đi kèm với giao tranh ác liệt kéo dài; [Trang 449] sự cân bằng quân sự giữa lực lượng của họ và Không quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa; và tình hình chính trị và quân sự chung ở miền Nam. (Đoạn 56.)

—Các lập luận ủng hộ và phản đối một cuộc tấn công trong mùa khô này được trình bày trong các đoạn 57–64.

E.

Nếu không có cuộc tấn công nào trong mùa khô này, Hà Nội sẽ tiếp tục phát động và chắc chắn sẽ đẩy nhanh các cuộc tấn công cục bộ, quy mô lớn, có mục tiêu hạn chế, được dàn dựng cẩn thận vào nhiều khu vực khác nhau của Nam Việt Nam để chiếm lãnh thổ và thử thách quyết tâm của Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa. (Đoạn 67–68.)

F.

Tuy nhiên, trong trường hợp cộng sản có một nỗ lực quân sự lớn trong mùa khô này, ban đầu cộng sản sẽ giành được những lợi thế đáng kể về lãnh thổ tại Quân khu 1, nơi họ có thể sẽ triển khai các lực lượng không quân của mình. Nếu giao tranh kéo dài, khả năng kháng cự liên tục của Không quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa tại Quân khu 1 sẽ bị đe dọa nếu không có sự hỗ trợ không quân mới của Hoa Kỳ. Những thắng lợi của cộng sản ở phần còn lại của Nam Việt Nam sẽ ít kịch tính hơn, và Không quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa sẽ có thể làm suy yếu cuộc tấn công của cộng sản. (Đoạn 44, 65–66.)

Sau mùa khô này, chúng tôi tin rằng khả năng xảy ra một cuộc tấn công lớn của cộng sản sẽ tăng lên đáng kể trong mùa khô tiếp theo. (Đoạn 76.)

—Về lâu dài, Hà Nội có thể coi trọng các xu hướng mà họ quan sát được ở miền Nam hơn là các hạn chế bên ngoài do Moskva, Bắc Kinh và Washington áp đặt. (Đoạn 69–75.)

[Phần nội dung ước tính bị lược bỏ ở đây.]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d111

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_449

Thân thế (các) nhân vật/

Clements, William P., Jr.,

Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1973

https://ns.clementspapers.org/about

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https://history.defense.gov/DOD-History/Deputy-Secretaries-of-Defense/Article-View/Article/585224/william-p-clements-jr/

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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d193

https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/clements-william-perry-jr-bill

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Colby, William E

Director of the Far East Division, Operations Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency until August 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB362/index.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_Nobody_Knew

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/former-cia-directors-death-raises-questions-divides-family_n_1130176

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Henry A Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; also Secretary of State from September 21, 1973

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Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”

(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280

Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger

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Discover the Truth at:

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https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/

Korologos, Tom C.,

Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, 1974

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Le Duc Tho,

member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Special Advisor to, and de facto head of, the DRV Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam until 1973; Special Adviser to the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from January 1973

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Lon Nol,

General, Cambodian Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, June 1969; led coup that deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense after March 18, 1970; President of Khmer Republic from 1972 until 1975

Mansfield, Michael J.,

Senator (D–MT), Senate Majority Leader

Democratic Senator from Montana; Majority Leader and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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Admiral, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1, 1974

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Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973; Deputy Secretary of State from February 2, 1973, until May 29, 1974

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Schlesinger, James R.,

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until February 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from February 2 until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975

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Scowcroft, Brent,

General, USAF, Military Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from August 1973 until 1975

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Sihanouk, Prince Norodom,

Norodom Sihanouk,

King of Cambodia to March 1955, thereafter Prince of Cambodia; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, October 1955–January 1956; Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior, March–April 1956; Prime Minister, September–October 1956; Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Plans, and Minister of the Interior, April–July 1957

Cambodian Head of State until March 1970; thereafter, leader of Cambodian Government in exile in Beijing

Prince, Head of State of Cambodia until March 18, 1970; thereafter, leader of the Cambodian government-in-exile in Beijing (GRUNK)

4/11/75 - Phnom Penh Evacuation

 

Stennis, John C.,

Democratic Senator from Mississippi; Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Stennis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_pro_tempore_of_the_United_States_Senate

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mississippi_House_of_Representatives

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Tarr, Curtis W.,

Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs until November 25, 1973

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https://www.state.gov/resources-bureau-of-global-talent-management/#ambassadors

https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/under-secretary-for-arms-control

https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/us/curtis-w-tarr-innovative-leader-of-the-draft-dies-at-88.html

https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/12043.htm

Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Paris 27 January 1973

https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/12/656ccc0d-31ef-42a6-a3e9-ce5ee7d4fc80/publishable_en.pdf

Paris Peace Accords

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Accords

Peace Negotiations and the Paris Agreement

https://edmoise.sites.clemson.edu/paris.html

Text of Declaration by Paris Conference on Vietnam

https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/03/archives/text-of-declaration-by-paris-conference-on-vietnam.html

Vietnam War Bibliography Translation Series

https://edmoise.sites.clemson.edu/trans.html#fbis

Tiểu Đoàn 92 BĐQ Trung Tá Lê Văn Ngôn Với Huyền Thoại Tử Thủ 510 Ngày

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iq-IHTqo4es&t=2908s

20251008 Lê Văn Ngôn Hùng Khí Trời Nam

https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2024/04/20240413-cdtl-hung-khi-troi-nam.html

20230322 Cong Dong Tham Luan Tonle Tchombe

https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2023/03/20230322-cong-dong-tham-luan-tong-le.html

20170722 Lê Văn Ngôn với Tống Lệ Chân

https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2017/07/20170722-le-van-ngon-voi-tong-le-chan.html

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