20251016 CDTL Lượng Giá Tình Báo Quốc Gia Washington 12 October 1973 D111
111. National Intelligence Estimate 1
Washington, October 12, 1973.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d111
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_449
Washington, October 12, 1973.
NIE 53/14.3–73
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAM
Précis
The major judgments in this Estimate are:
A.
Hanoi’s actions are clearly designed to insure that it can again resort to major military action at some point to gain its objectives if other means fail. The chances of the communists gaining power through the political provisions of the Paris agreement are negligible; nor are their prospects good for achieving the GVN’s collapse through a combination of political and clandestine warfare backed up by only moderate military pressure. Hanoi may not have made a final decision as to the timing of a major offensive. It must, however, believe that it will ultimately have to return to the battlefield to seek its objective of reunifying Vietnam. (Paras. 3, 54.)
B.
The current military balance in South Vietnam is only slightly in favor of the GVN; with heavy infiltration and supply movements, it may have shifted to the communists’ advantage by mid-1974. The political balance, however, is clearly in the GVN’s favor and will remain so. (Paras. 6–19, 31–53.)
C.
The forward positioning of communist forces and supplies and the improved road system give Hanoi the capability to kick off a major military campaign with little additional preparation, perhaps less than a month. (Paras. 13–15, 55.)
D.
It is a close choice whether Hanoi will opt for a major military offensive during the current dry season (October 1973–May 1974). In making its decision Hanoi must assess the following factors:
· —The likelihood and extent of a US response; the positions of Moscow and Peking, particularly the consequences to the North Vietnamese position if they can not be certain of enough material support to cover losses that would accompany prolonged heavy combat; the [Page 449] military balance between its forces and the RVNAF; and the overall political and military situation in the South. (Para. 56.)
· —The arguments for and against an offensive this dry season are presented in paragraphs 57–64.2
E.
If there is not an offensive this dry season, Hanoi will continue to launch and no doubt accelerate carefully orchestrated significant localized, and limited-objective attacks in various regions of South Vietnam to seize territory and test the GVN’s resolution. (Paras 67–68.)
F.
In the event of a major communist military effort this dry season, however, the communists would initially make substantial territorial gains in MR–1 where they would probably commit their own air assets. If the fighting were prolonged, RVNAF’s continued resistance in MR–1 would be in doubt without renewed US air support. Communist gains in the rest of South Vietnam would be less dramatic, and RVNAF should be able to blunt the communist assault. (Paras. 44, 65–66.)
G.
Beyond this dry season, we believe the odds favoring a major communist offensive will increase significantly in the following dry season. (Para. 76.)
—Over the long run, Hanoi may place greater weight on trends it observes in the South than on the external restraints imposed by Moscow, Peking, and Washington. (Paras. 69–75.)
[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]
Google Translated
Washington, ngày 12 tháng 10 năm 1973.
NIE 53/14.3–73
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/#google_vignette
Triển vọng ngắn hạn của Việt Nam
Tóm tắt
Những nhận định chính trong Đánh giá này là:
A.
Hành động của Hà Nội rõ ràng được thiết kế để bảo đảm rằng họ có thể lại dùng đến hành động quân sự lớn vào một thời điểm nào đó để đạt được mục tiêu nếu các phương tiện khác thất bại. Khả năng cộng sản giành được quyền lực thông qua các điều khoản chính trị của Hiệp định Paris là rất thấp; và triển vọng của họ trong việc đạt được sự sụp đổ của Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa thông qua sự kết hợp giữa chiến tranh chính trị và chiến tranh bí mật, được hỗ trợ bởi áp lực quân sự vừa phải, cũng không mấy sáng sủa. Hà Nội có thể chưa đưa ra quyết định cuối cùng về thời điểm của một cuộc tấn công lớn. Tuy nhiên, họ phải tin rằng cuối cùng họ sẽ phải quay trở lại chiến trường để theo đuổi mục tiêu thống nhất Việt Nam. (Đoạn 3, 54.)
B.
Cán cân quân sự hiện tại ở miền Nam Việt Nam chỉ hơi nghiêng về phía Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa; với các hoạt động xâm nhập và tiếp tế mạnh mẽ, cán cân này có thể đã chuyển sang lợi thế cho phe cộng sản vào giữa năm 1974. Tuy nhiên, cán cân chính trị rõ ràng đang nghiêng về phía Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa và sẽ tiếp tục như vậy. (Đoạn 6–19, 31–53.)
C.
Việc bố trí lực lượng và tiếp tế của cộng sản ở tuyến đầu cùng với hệ thống đường bộ được cải thiện giúp Hà Nội có khả năng khởi động một chiến dịch quân sự lớn mà không cần chuẩn bị thêm nhiều, có lẽ chỉ chưa đầy một tháng. (Đoạn 13–15, 55.)
D.
Việc Hà Nội có lựa chọn một cuộc tấn công quân sự lớn trong mùa khô hiện tại (tháng 10 năm 1973–tháng 5 năm 1974) hay không là một lựa chọn khó khăn. Khi đưa ra quyết định, Hà Nội phải đánh giá các yếu tố sau:
—Khả năng và mức độ phản ứng của Hoa Kỳ; lập trường của Moskva và Bắc Kinh, đặc biệt là hậu quả đối với vị thế của Bắc Việt nếu họ không thể chắc chắn về đủ hỗ trợ vật chất để bù đắp những tổn thất đi kèm với giao tranh ác liệt kéo dài; [Trang 449] sự cân bằng quân sự giữa lực lượng của họ và Không quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa; và tình hình chính trị và quân sự chung ở miền Nam. (Đoạn 56.)
—Các lập luận ủng hộ và phản đối một cuộc tấn công trong mùa khô này được trình bày trong các đoạn 57–64.
E.
Nếu không có cuộc tấn công nào trong mùa khô này, Hà Nội sẽ tiếp tục phát động và chắc chắn sẽ đẩy nhanh các cuộc tấn công cục bộ, quy mô lớn, có mục tiêu hạn chế, được dàn dựng cẩn thận vào nhiều khu vực khác nhau của Nam Việt Nam để chiếm lãnh thổ và thử thách quyết tâm của Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa. (Đoạn 67–68.)
F.
Tuy nhiên, trong trường hợp cộng sản có một nỗ lực quân sự lớn trong mùa khô này, ban đầu cộng sản sẽ giành được những lợi thế đáng kể về lãnh thổ tại Quân khu 1, nơi họ có thể sẽ triển khai các lực lượng không quân của mình. Nếu giao tranh kéo dài, khả năng kháng cự liên tục của Không quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa tại Quân khu 1 sẽ bị đe dọa nếu không có sự hỗ trợ không quân mới của Hoa Kỳ. Những thắng lợi của cộng sản ở phần còn lại của Nam Việt Nam sẽ ít kịch tính hơn, và Không quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa sẽ có thể làm suy yếu cuộc tấn công của cộng sản. (Đoạn 44, 65–66.)
Sau mùa khô này, chúng tôi tin rằng khả năng xảy ra một cuộc tấn công lớn của cộng sản sẽ tăng lên đáng kể trong mùa khô tiếp theo. (Đoạn 76.)
—Về lâu dài, Hà Nội có thể coi trọng các xu hướng mà họ quan sát được ở miền Nam hơn là các hạn chế bên ngoài do Moskva, Bắc Kinh và Washington áp đặt. (Đoạn 69–75.)
[Phần nội dung ước tính bị lược bỏ ở đây.]
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d111
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_449
Thân thế (các) nhân vật/
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https://ns.clementspapers.org/about
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https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d193
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/clements-william-perry-jr-bill
Director of the Far East Division, Operations Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency until August 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB362/index.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_Nobody_Knew
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/former-cia-directors-death-raises-questions-divides-family_n_1130176
https://vva.org/arts-of-war/documentaries/new-doc-on-the-mysterious-death-of-william-colby/
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https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Colby
Henry A Kissinger
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https://www.theguardian.com/world/bilderberg
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https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#the_aim
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d12
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d13
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d141
https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100324.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger_and_the_Vietnam_War
Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”
(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280
Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf
https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html
“Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger on 3 August 1972,” Conversation 760-006, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Huges] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014-). URL:https://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006748
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https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/aspen-strategy-group/about-asg/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/piab/
https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/bartholomew-sparrow/the-strategist/9781586489632/
http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_1999_1112_scowcroft.pdf
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/politics/brent-scowcroft.html
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-13/scowcroft-model
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Text of Declaration by Paris Conference on Vietnam
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