Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20251015 CDTL Biên Bản Thảo Luận Washington 2 October 1973 D110

20251015 CDTL Biên Bản Thảo Luận Washington 2 October 1973 D110

110. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, October 2, 1973, 1:15–2:55 p.m.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d110

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_447

Washington, October 2, 1973, 1:15–2:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director Central Intelligence
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: The purpose of this meeting is to talk candidly. I will tell you what I plan—I hope you will do likewise. We will use the machinery, but it is useful to exchange views. Anyone here has the option of saying something here only and it won’t go to the State Department. Otherwise, I may tell Rush and you can tell Clements.

Schlesinger: We can’t have people telling Congress how we are handling it.

Kissinger: Maybe you should begin.

Schlesinger: We can move 20–50 thousand tons from Laos. We have MASF there. We are moving forces out and we will discuss ammunition in excess of Lao needs.

There is money in the Air Force to fund F–5As which was cut from the budget. Stennis will get that restored in conference—that is free money. The Thais want OV–10s. The Thais have ammunition. We can swap, but we need a swap arrangement.

Kissinger: I would like to interrupt for a minute. Give Brent a list of any complaints you have about the State Department. One of the utilities of my dual position is to bring this whole thing together. I basically am on your side.

Schlesinger: So we can keep the ammunition flowing a long time but we need facade.

The reason I don’t tell Tarr is that there are things in the law, but if we talk about it, they will be eliminated.

Kissinger: But they have to have money to shoot people up.

Schlesinger: If I can just get through the conference on F–5A, that will help. It should happen in a few days.

[Page 447]

Kissinger: This has been a big item though. If we suddenly go quiet, someone will get to the Congress. Give me a cover story and write me a memo I can show.

Keep discipline in your shop, Tom. How about equipment?

Schlesinger: If we get this Air Force money back, we can handle this.

Moorer: We have a million or so of spares in addition to ammunition.

Kissinger: On the diplomatic side—for you alone—in June I had the Chinese lined up for a 60-day Cambodian ceasefire and settlement. We had a ceasefire in place and a Laos-type government. The Chinese said they would recommend it to Sihanouk when he returned. That is when we passed the bomb halt, and then the Chinese said the situation had changed.

Moorer: The reason the Communists tried to take Phnom Penh before August 15 was they were afraid it would be solved before August 15 and they would be left out. Of course they were dumb in the way they went at it.

Kissinger: Now I will send a message to Le Duc Tho that we are prepared to discuss Cambodia along the lines we discussed in June. I will tell the Chinese that if Sihanouk has anything to say—we won’t use Mansfield—we will listen to what he has to say. We shouldn’t go to the Embassy in Phnom Penh and upset the Cambodians but sit tight. I don’t plan any contact with Sihanouk.

Moorer: I would be wary of dealing with Sihanouk. I am not sure he can deliver.

Kissinger: There is a 90 percent chance I won’t see him.

Colby: Sihanouk can’t deal with the Lon Nol group.

Kissinger: I don’t see a negotiation coming.

Colby: We don’t need it if we can stall along.

The critical factor is the Phnom Penh leadership.

Kissinger: We have no compulsion to get into this negotiation.

Let’s have our next meeting Wednesday. Brent will be the focal point for items to discuss.

Schlesinger: On Cambodian ammunition, there will be no paperwork. It will just be done.

Kissinger: But give me something I can tell Tarr. It is important we get weapons in. Can I count on that being done?

Schlesinger: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indochina.]

Google Translated

Washington, ngày 2 tháng 10 năm 1973, 13:15–14:55

THAM DỰ THẢO LUẬN

Tiến sĩ Henry A. Kissinger, Ngoại trưởng kiêm Trợ lý Tổng thống về An ninh Quốc gia

Tiến sĩ James R. Schlesinger, Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng

William Colby, Giám đốc Cơ quan Tình báo Trung ương

Đô đốc Thomas Moorer, Chủ tịch Hội đồng Tham mưu trưởng Liên quân

Trung tướng Brent Scowcroft, Phụ Tá Tổng thống về An ninh Quốc gia

Kissinger: Mục đích của cuộc họp này là để nói chuyện thẳng thắn. Tôi sẽ cho anh biết kế hoạch của tôi—tôi hy vọng anh cũng sẽ làm như vậy. Chúng ta sẽ sử dụng bộ máy này, nhưng việc trao đổi quan điểm rất hữu ích. Bất kỳ ai ở đây cũng chỉ được phép phát biểu ở đây và nó sẽ không được chuyển đến Bộ Ngoại giao. Nếu không, tôi có thể nói với Rush và anh có thể nói với Clements.

Schlesinger: Chúng ta không thể để người ta nói với Quốc hội về cách chúng ta xử lý vấn đề này.

Kissinger: Có lẽ anh nên bắt đầu.

Schlesinger: Chúng ta có thể chuyển 20-50 nghìn tấn hàng từ Lào. Chúng ta có Lực lượng Đặc nhiệm Không quân (MASF) ở đó. Chúng ta đang chuyển quân ra và chúng ta sẽ thảo luận về lượng đạn dược vượt quá nhu cầu của Lào.

Không quân có ngân sách để tài trợ cho F-5A, vốn đã bị cắt giảm từ ngân sách. Stennis sẽ khôi phục ngân sách đó tại hội nghị—đó là tiền miễn phí. Người Thái muốn có OV-10. Người Thái có đạn dược. Chúng ta có thể trao đổi, nhưng chúng ta cần một thỏa thuận trao đổi.

Kissinger: Tôi muốn ngắt lời anh một chút. Hãy đưa cho Brent danh sách những khiếu nại của anh về Bộ Ngoại giao. Một trong những lợi ích của vị trí kép của tôi là tập hợp toàn bộ vấn đề này lại với nhau. Dĩ nhiên, tôi đứng về phía anh.

Schlesinger: Vậy nên chúng ta có thể duy trì việc trao đổi thông tin trong thời gian dài nhưng chúng ta cần có vỏ bọc.

Lý do tôi không nói với Tarr là vì có những điều nằm trong luật, nhưng nếu chúng ta nói về chúng, chúng sẽ bị loại bỏ.

Kissinger: Nhưng họ phải có tiền mới bắn người được.

Schlesinger: Nếu tôi có thể tổ chức được hội nghị về F-5A thì sẽ rất hữu ích. Nó sẽ diễn ra trong vài ngày tới. [Trang 447]

Kissinger: Tuy nhiên, đây là một vấn đề lớn. Nếu chúng ta đột nhiên im lặng, ai đó sẽ đến Quốc hội. Hãy cho tôi một câu chuyện ngụy trang và viết cho tôi một bản ghi nhớ để tôi có thể trình bày.

Hãy giữ kỷ luật trong cửa hàng của anh, Tom. Còn trang thiết bị thì sao?

Schlesinger: Nếu chúng ta lấy lại được số tiền của Không quân, chúng ta có thể xử lý được.

Moorer: Chúng ta có khoảng một triệu khẩu súng dự phòng ngoài đạn dược.

Kissinger: Về mặt ngoại giao - chỉ riêng anh thôi - hồi tháng Sáu, tôi đã sắp xếp cho Trung Quốc một lệnh ngừng bắn và dàn xếp ở Campuchia trong 60 ngày. Chúng ta đã có một lệnh ngừng bắn và một chính phủ kiểu Lào. Trung Quốc nói rằng họ sẽ đề nghị điều này với Sihanouk khi ông ta trở về. Đó là lúc chúng ta thông qua lệnh ngừng ném bom, và sau đó Trung Quốc nói rằng tình hình đã thay đổi.

Moorer: Lý do Cộng sản cố gắng chiếm Phnom Penh trước ngày 15 tháng 8 là vì họ sợ rằng mọi chuyện sẽ được giải quyết trước ngày 15 tháng 8 và họ sẽ bị bỏ lại phía sau. Tất nhiên là họ đã hành động một cách ngu ngốc.

Kissinger: Bây giờ tôi sẽ gửi một thông điệp tới Lê Đức Thọ rằng chúng tôi đã sẵn sàng thảo luận về Campuchia theo hướng chúng tôi đã thảo luận hồi tháng Sáu. Tôi sẽ nói với phía Trung Quốc rằng nếu Sihanouk có điều gì muốn nói - chúng tôi sẽ không dùng Mansfield - chúng tôi sẽ lắng nghe những gì ông ấy nói. Chúng ta không nên đến Đại sứ quán ở Phnom Penh và làm phật lòng người Campuchia mà hãy ngồi yên. Tôi không có kế hoạch liên lạc với Sihanouk.

Moorer: Tôi sẽ thận trọng khi làm việc với Sihanouk. Tôi không chắc ông ấy có thể thực hiện được.

Kissinger: Có 90% khả năng tôi sẽ không gặp ông ấy.

Colby: Sihanouk không thể đàm phán với nhóm Lon Nol.

Kissinger: Tôi không thấy có cuộc đàm phán nào sắp diễn ra.

Colby: Chúng ta không cần đàm phán nếu có thể trì hoãn. Yếu tố quan trọng là giới lãnh đạo Phnom Penh.

Kissinger: Chúng ta không bắt buộc phải tham gia vào cuộc đàm phán này. Chúng ta sẽ họp vào thứ Tư tới. Brent sẽ là trọng tâm thảo luận các vấn đề.

Schlesinger: Về đạn dược Campuchia, sẽ không có thủ tục giấy tờ nào cả. Mọi việc cứ thế mà làm.

Kissinger: Nhưng hãy cho tôi biết điều gì đó để nói với Tarr. Việc đưa vũ khí vào là quan trọng. Tôi có thể tin tưởng rằng việc đó sẽ được thực hiện không?

Schlesinger: Vâng.

[Bỏ qua phần thảo luận không liên quan đến Đông Dương.]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d110

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_447

Thân thế (các) nhân vật/

Clements, William P., Jr.,

Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1973

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Colby, William E

Director of the Far East Division, Operations Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency

Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency until August 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from September 4, 1973

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB362/index.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Man_Nobody_Knew

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Henry A Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; also Secretary of State from September 21, 1973

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Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”

(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280

Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger

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Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, 1974

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Le Duc Tho,

member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Special Advisor to, and de facto head of, the DRV Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam until 1973; Special Adviser to the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from January 1973

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Lon Nol,

General, Cambodian Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, June 1969; led coup that deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense after March 18, 1970; President of Khmer Republic from 1972 until 1975

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Senator (D–MT), Senate Majority Leader

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Moorer, Thomas H.,

Admiral, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1, 1974

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Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973; Deputy Secretary of State from February 2, 1973, until May 29, 1974

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Schlesinger, James R.,

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until February 1973; Director of Central Intelligence from February 2 until July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975

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General, USAF, Military Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from August 1973 until 1975

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https://dpaa-mil.sites.crmforce.mil/dpaaProfile?id=a0Jt000000sxxIFEAY

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0204/7505562.pdf

https://news.virginia.edu/content/uvas-miller-center-releases-secret-brent-scowcroft-oral-history

https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2020/08/the-quiet-mastermind-how-brent-scowcroft-redefined-the-art-of-grand-strategy

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom,

Norodom Sihanouk,

King of Cambodia to March 1955, thereafter Prince of Cambodia; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, October 1955–January 1956; Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior, March–April 1956; Prime Minister, September–October 1956; Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Plans, and Minister of the Interior, April–July 1957

Cambodian Head of State until March 1970; thereafter, leader of Cambodian Government in exile in Beijing

Prince, Head of State of Cambodia until March 18, 1970; thereafter, leader of the Cambodian government-in-exile in Beijing (GRUNK)

4/11/75 - Phnom Penh Evacuation

Stennis, John C.,

Democratic Senator from Mississippi; Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Stennis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_pro_tempore_of_the_United_States_Senate

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mississippi_House_of_Representatives

https://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/24/obituaries/john-c-stennis-93-longtime-chairman-of-powerful-committees-in-the-senate-dies.html

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-04-24-mn-58241-story.html

https://www.congress.gov/member/john-stennis/S000852