20260208 CDTL GRF 11 April 1975 D227 Điện tín từ Văn phòng liên lạc tại Trung Quốc gửi Bộ Ngoại giao và Đại sứ quán tại Campuchia.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d227
Google Translated
Tài liệu 227
Quan hệ đối ngoại của Hoa Kỳ, 1969–1976, Tập X, Việt Nam, tháng 1 năm 1973 – tháng 7 năm 1975
227. Điện tín từ Văn phòng Liên lạc tại Trung Quốc gửi Bộ Ngoại giao và Đại sứ quán tại Campuchia
Bắc Kinh, ngày 11 tháng 4 năm 1975, 2215Z.
684. Chủ đề: Liên lạc với Sihanouk. Tham chiếu: State 082877.
1. Holdridge đã gặp Phung tại phòng thuê của Malo lúc 6:15 sáng giờ Bắc Kinh (7:15 sáng giờ Phnom Penh) và truyền đạt hai điểm được nêu trong bức điện tham chiếu. Phung rõ ràng rất thất vọng về việc Hoa Kỳ di tản, đặc biệt là khi ông biết rằng Đại sứ Dean cũng sẽ rời đi. Về việc duy trì liên lạc với Sihanouk, ông nói rằng ông sẽ chuyển thông điệp và hy vọng có thể thiết lập một kênh liên lạc nào đó sau này ở Phnom Penh. Trong thời gian chờ đợi, cá nhân ông sẽ tiếp tục đóng vai trò là cầu nối ở Bắc Kinh.
2. Phụng sau đó cho biết ông đã gặp Sihanouk lúc 2 giờ sáng cùng đêm đó để thảo luận về thông điệp mà Holdridge đã chuyển cho ông trước đó. Theo Phụng, Sihanouk nói rằng kế hoạch của Mỹ đã quá trống, và hơn nữa, ông, Hoàng thân, không có quyền kiểm soát Khmer Đỏ. Sihanouk nhận định rằng, sau khi đã tiến gần đến chiến thắng quân sự, Khmer Đỏ sẽ không chấp nhận lệnh ngưng bắn vào lúc này. Sihanouk đã yêu cầu Phụng chuyển câu trả lời này cho Holdridge ngay lập tức, nhưng ông ấy đã không làm vậy vì không muốn làm phiền Malo giữa đêm.
3. Phung nói thêm rằng Sihanouk có lẽ sẽ chưa đến Phnom Penh trong một thời gian nữa, chắc chắn là không phải trong tương lai gần.
Lý do mà Phung đưa ra cho sự chậm trễ này là Sihanouk muốn đánh giá tình hình chung ở Phnom Penh trước khi trở về, nhưng rõ ràng là ảnh hưởng của Hoàng tử đối với Khmer Đỏ rất yếu nên ông phải chờ lời mời của họ, và lời mời đó có thể đến hoặc không, tùy thuộc vào việc họ đánh giá mức độ hữu ích của ông đối với họ.
4. Phung rất lo ngại về khả năng vai trò liên lạc của ông với Hoa Kỳ bị lộ ra ngoài. Ông cho rằng Phnom Penh đầy rẫy gián điệp Khmer Đỏ, và hy vọng rằng vai trò của ông trong những diễn biến gần đây có thể được giữ kín. Chúng tôi ở đây chắc chắn rất thông cảm với ông ấy về điểm này, và yêu cầu rằng nếu có thể làm bất cứ điều gì vào thời điểm muộn này để bảo vệ Phung, thì hãy thực hiện ngay lập tức.
Bush.
1. Nguồn: Thư viện Ford, Cố vấn An ninh Quốc gia, Hồ sơ quốc gia của Tổng thống về Đông Á và Thái Bình Dương, Hộp 15, Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Hoa, Điện tín của Bộ Ngoại giao, Gửi Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao, Nodis (5). Tuyệt mật; Nodis; Khẩn cấp.↩
2. Trong điện tín số 82877 gửi đến Bắc Kinh ngày 11 tháng 4, Kissinger đã chỉ thị cho Bush thông báo cho Phung về việc Mỹ di tản khỏi Phnom Penh. (Ibid., Hộp 14, Cộng hòa Nhân dân Trung Hoa, Điện tín của Bộ Ngoại giao, Từ Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao, Nodis, 6)↩
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/sources
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/terms
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/persons
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/note
Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975
4. Document 227
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975
227. Telegram From the Liaison Office in China to the Department of State and the Embassy in Cambodia1
Beijing, April 11, 1975, 2215Z.
684. Subject: Contact With Sihanouk. Ref: State 082877.2
1.
Holdridge met with Phung in Malo’s apartment at 6:15 a.m. Peking time (7:15 a.m. Phnom Penh time) and conveyed two points contained in reftel. Phung was obviously disappointed over U.S. evacuation, and especially when he ascertained that Ambassador Dean would be leaving as well. As to maintaining communications with Sihanouk, he said he would convey message and hoped something could be set up later in Phnom Penh. In meantime he personally would continue to provide a link in Peking.
2.
Phung then went on to note that he had met with Sihanouk at 2:00 a.m. that same night to discuss the message which Holdridge had provided him with earlier. According to Phung, Sihanouk said that the U.S. plan had come too late, and in addition he, the Prince, had no control over the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk’s judgment was that having come this close to military victory, the Khmer Rouge would not accept a ceasefire now. Phung had been told by Sihanouk to deliver this response to Holdridge immediately, but had not done so out of reluctance to disturb Malo in the middle of the night.
3.
Phung added that Sihanouk would probably not be traveling to Phnom Penh for some time yet, certainly not in the immediate future.
The rationale presented by Phung for the delay was that Sihanouk would want to assess the general situation in Phnom Penh before returning, but it seems evident that the Prince’s influence with the Khmer Rouge is so weak that he must await their invitation, which may or may not be forthcoming depending on their assessment of his usefulness to them.
4.
Phung was greatly concerned about the possibility of his role as a contact with the U.S. leaking out. He claimed that Phnom Penh was filled with Khmer Rouge spies, and hoped that his part in recent developments could be kept quiet. We here certainly sympathize with him on this point, and request that if anything can be done at this late stage to safeguard Phung, it be done so immediately.
Bush
1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 15, People’s Republic of China, State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE, Nodis (5). Secret; Nodis; Flash.↩
2. In telegram 82877 to Beijing, April 11, Kissinger instructed Bush to inform Phung of the American evacuation from Phnom Penh. (Ibid., Box 14, People’s Republic of China, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE, Nodis, 6)↩
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/comp1
Collapse and Evacuation, February 26–July 22, 1975 (Documents 178–283)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/ch3
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d227
Thân thế (các) nhân vật/
Bush George H W.,
Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing from October 21, 1974, until December 7, 1975
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_H._W._Bush
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_Central_Intelligence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_of_the_U.S._Liaison_Office_to_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_National_Committee
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_the_United_Nations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/chiefsofmission/china
https://www.state.gov/biographies-list/
https://www.state.gov/resources-bureau-of-global-talent-management/#ambassadors
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/01/asia/george-h-w-bush-china-intl/index.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ambassadors_of_the_United_States_to_China
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/09usofficials/2009-05/31/content_7956346.htm
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/audiovisual/photos/35
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Vientiane until 1974; U.S. Ambassador to the Khmer Republic from April 3, 1974, until April 1975
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/obituaries/john-gunther-dean-dead.html
https://www.voacambodia.com/a/john-gunther-dean-us-diplomat-haunted-by-cambodia-dies/4956083.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Gunther_Dean
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_India
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Thailand
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Lebanon
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Denmark
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Cambodia
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/dean-john-gunther
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/chiefsofmission/mali
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/chiefsofmission/cambodia
https://www.state.gov/biographies-list/
https://www.state.gov/resources-bureau-of-global-talent-management/#ambassadors
https://kh.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/list-of-u-s-ambassadors-to-cambodia/
Ford, Gerald R.,
Republican Representative from Michigan until October 13, 1973; House Minority Leader until October 13, 1973; Vice President of the United States from October 13, 1973, until August 8, 1974; President of the United States from August 8, 1974
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerald_Ford
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_Minority_Leader
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leader_of_the_House_Republican_Conference
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chair_of_the_House_Republican_Conference
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/gerald-r-ford/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/
https://geraldrfordfoundation.org/gerald-r-ford-biography/
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/grf/timeline.asp
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Gerald_Ford
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/ford_vp_papers.asp
member, National Security Council Operations staff/East Asia until April 1973; co-Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1973 until 1975
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_H._Holdridge
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Indonesia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assistant_Secretary_of_State_for_East_Asian_and_Pacific_Affairs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_the_Republic_of_Singapore
https://www.uscpf.org/v2/johnholdridge.html
https://www.nndb.com/people/033/000127649/
https://www.uscpf.org/v2/holdridgebio.html
Henry A Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; also Secretary of State from September 21, 1973
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/bilderberg-meeting-group-lisbon-kissinger
https://www.theguardian.com/world/bilderberg
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/summary
https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip
https://china.usc.edu/catalog/documents/us-china
http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-47.html
https://china.usc.edu/talking-points-july-22-august-3-2011
https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#meetings
https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#nixon-announcement
https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#chinese-accept
https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#signals
https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#the_aim
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d4
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d12
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d13
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d141
https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100324.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger_and_the_Vietnam_War
Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”
(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280
Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf
https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html
“Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger on 3 August 1972,” Conversation 760-006, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Huges] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014-). URL:https://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006748
https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0
https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0
Discover the Truth at:
https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/
The secret life of Henry Kissinger minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger
https://etan.org/news/kissinger/secret.htm
Henry Kissinger and the Truth About Negotiations In Vietnam
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5fxxKVfX5g
Deputy Chief of Mission of the French Embassy in the People’s Republic of China
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/persons
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom,
Norodom Sihanouk,
King of Cambodia to March 1955, thereafter Prince of Cambodia; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, October 1955–January 1956; Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of the Interior, March–April 1956; Prime Minister, September–October 1956; Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Plans, and Minister of the Interior, April–July 1957
Cambodian Head of State until March 1970; thereafter, leader of Cambodian Government in exile in Beijing
Prince, Head of State of Cambodia until March 18, 1970; thereafter, leader of the Cambodian government-in-exile in Beijing (GRUNK)
4/11/75 - Phnom Penh Evacuation
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Paris 27 January 1973
Paris Peace Accords
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Accords
Peace Negotiations and the Paris Agreement
https://edmoise.sites.clemson.edu/paris.html
Text of Declaration by Paris Conference on Vietnam
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/03/archives/text-of-declaration-by-paris-conference-on-vietnam.html
Vietnam War Bibliography Translation Series
https://edmoise.sites.clemson.edu/trans.html#fbis
1954 1955 Vietnam Operation Passage to Freedom
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam Paris 27 January 1973
20120414 Hải Chiến Hoàng Sa
https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2012/04/20120414-hai-chien-hoang-sa.html
Điều chưa kể sau cuộc hải chiến Hoàng Sa 1974
https://saigonnhonews.com/thoi-su/thay-gi-tren-mang/dieu-chua-ke-sau-cuoc-hai-chien-hoang-sa-1974/
Chuyện Hoàng Sa 45 Năm Trước Chưa Phổ Biến Trên Báo Chí Qua Lời Kể Của Thiếu Tá Phạm Văn Hồng/ Phan Công Phan
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MY7umIVxxvY
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https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2024/11/20241110-cdtl-tuyen-cao-lanh-tho-lanh.html
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https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2019/09/20190910-petition-of-citizens-of.html
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https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2024/12/20241231-ap-ba-chuc-dau-moi-mot-tham-hoa.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hwvXyzo7MjM
http://vietnamsaigon.multiply.com/jou
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iq-IHTqo4es&t=2908s
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https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2024/04/20240413-cdtl-hung-khi-troi-nam.html
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https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2023/03/20230322-cong-dong-tham-luan-tong-le.html
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https://bachvietnhan.blogspot.com/2017/07/20170722-le-van-ngon-voi-tong-le-chan.html
Phi Vụ Cảm Tử Cho Tiền Đồn Tống Lê Chân
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