20230813 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P26
Phần đàm phán nầy cho thấy bộ chính trị cộng sản giặc
Hồ khẳng định không rút 300,000 quân (có thể hơn thế nửa) tương đương với số
quân của Trung-cộng (320,000) đã đem vào Hà-nội vào những năm 1969-1971.
CHINA ADMITS IT SENT
TROOPS TO FIGHT THE U.S. IN VIETNAM
https://www.deseret.com/1989/5/16/18807144/china-admits-it-sent-troops-to-fight-the-u-s-in-vietnam
Đây là lý do Lê Đức Thọ viện dẩn việc không rút quân từ
miền Nam về vì đây không phải là quân cộng sản giặc Hồ, mà là quân của miền Nam
(Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam - Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Cộng hòa Miền Nam Việt Nam).
Câu hỏi được đặt ra ở đây là nếu là quân của Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Cộng hòa Miền Nam Việt Nam thì tại sao Kissinger không đàm phán với Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Cộng hòa Miền Nam Việt Nam mà lại đi đêm đàm phán với cộng sản
giặc Hồ miền Bắc để bán đứng miền Nam?
Tại sao cộng sản giặc Hồ lại
cứ phải dựa vào hiệp định Geneva Accords 1954
để đi đêm đàm phán với Kissinger?
Trong khi đó Việt-Nam đã chia hai tại vỹ tuyến 17 và những
gì xảy ra tại miền Nam phải do miền Nam giải quyết không dính líu vì tới miền
Bắc!
Như thế rõ ràng là cộng sản giặc Hồ đã xâm lăng miền
Nam và Hoa Kỳ đã chấp nhận điều đó để bán đứng miền Nam cho cộng sản giặc Hồ và
Trung-cộng.
***
… “Le Duc Tho: Let me now express my
views. We have carefully read the changes you proposed to the agreement. And
the questions you wanted to have a unilateral understanding, regarding Laos and
Cambodia. At the same time we have considered the schedule you proposed. Today
I would like to speak about three questions:
first, regarding the changes you proposed to the
agreement; second, to the [Page
826] questions on the unilateral understandings you have raised, and third I will express my views on the schedule.
The agreements we have reached so far result from great efforts from our
part and also result from efforts on your part at the beginning. Because of these
efforts we have completed the agreements. Afterward you said on behalf of
the President of the United States that the agreements might be
considered as completed, and in your message you addressed to us in reply to
our message you also acknowledged that the unilateral understandings of ours
have met all your concerns. And you also promised to us that there would be no
substantive changes and no changes of principle. Vice President Agnew
himself in answering to an interview of the Agency ABC on October 29 acknowledged that it be necessary to
clarify a number of questions, but there is no question about the substantive
problems.
But now that we have studied the changes you proposed we realize that
these changes are not changes of detail and technical changes but these are a
number of changes of principle and substantive changes. These are great and
important changes. And we have repeatedly told you that changes of principle
and substantive changes are unacceptable to us.
The first question I would like to raise
now is the role of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the
Republic of South Vietnam - Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Cộng hòa Miền Nam Việt Nam- mentioned in the
agreement. According to your proposed changes, throughout the text of the
agreement there is no mention at all of the role of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of the Government of South Vietnam. In every place you
said only “the parties participating in the Paris conference on Vietnam . . .”
In practice, on the battlefield of South Vietnam, no one can deny the reality
that there are in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, two
regions controlled by the two parties. And in the course of our talks here
with you you yourself on many occasions recognized that there are two administrations,
two armies, two different regions in South Vietnam.
The role played by the PRG on the international scene is also very
great. Not only the PRG has established diplomatic relations with
many countries, but the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, in
which over 60 countries participated, recognized
the PRG as an official member of the Conference instead of the Saigon
Administration.
In the face of this reality, not only of South Vietnam but also on the
international scene, you cannot deny this reality, in reality and practice and
in the text of the agreement, the role played by the PRG.
The second question I would like to raise.
Because of your denial of the role of the PRG you propose a
change to Article 3(b). You proposed that the
Joint Military Commission shall determine “the areas and modalities of
stationing of each party’s forces,” instead of “the [Page
827] areas controlled by each party.” In reality in South Vietnam there are three
categories of regions. First, the regions
controlled by the PRG; second, the regions
controlled by the Saigon Administration; and third, a great number of regions are zones of contention.
Therefore it cannot be mentioned only on the areas and stationings of
each party’s forces. But it should be mentioned about areas controlled by each
party. This is a situation of reality no one can deny.
The third question I would like to raise is
the question Dr. Kissinger often says he was haunted by, that is
the so-called question of withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.
Dr. Kissinger: Did he say “the so-called question” or the “so-called North
Vietnamese forces?”
Le Duc Tho: “So-called North Vietnamese forces.” Because this
is how you call, we have never recognized that.
Over the past four years probably I have spent a great deal of effort
to speak about this question and in records we have probably they are
piling up papers on this question. There are many legitimate reasons for us not to agree to the raising of this question.
The most legitimate reason is that since our country is subject to
aggression, since you have brought troops for this aggression and moreover you
scrapped the 1954 Geneva Agreement,
then we, our entire people, have to stand up against this aggression. Not only the people of North Vietnam but also in South
Vietnam and the people throughout the world approves this as
legitimate. And therefore this is the reason why we can’t accept the so-called question of North Vietnamese
troops in South Vietnam. So there is no reason for raising
this question. Politically, legally speaking, it is so.
What is the reason why you raise this question? On the one hand you want
to weaken the forces of the PRG; on the other hand you strengthen
the forces of the Saigon Administration. You equip them with armaments so
that you may strengthen the forces of the Saigon Administration in order to
annihilate the revolutionary forces of the PRG. Therefore this approach
and this solution to the problem is unfair and illogical. And in order to
settle this question in a fair and reasonable way we have proposed that the two
parties will agree on the reduction of the effectives of each party’s forces
and the demobilization of the troops being reduced. And this solution have been
agreed to by you at our last meeting and this has been written in the
agreement.
Now I would like to speak on the fourth question,
regarding the whole Chapter IV about the Exercise of the South
Vietnamese People’s Right to Self-Determination.
Before coming to that I would like to add these words. Even Vice
President Agnew, whom American press consider to be the hawkish personality
. . .
Dr. Kissinger: I think the Special Advisor is making provisions for 1976 already. [Laughter]
Le Duc Tho: Even Vice President Agnew
himself said that the so-called question of
withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces was not raised by the United States.
Because he said we have shown good will not to demand the formation of a
three-segment Government of National Concord.
Dr. Kissinger: We’ll have to fire his speech writer. [Laughter] That’s what happens
when people are running around outside Washington during a campaign.
Le Duc Tho: So you see that we have legitimate reasons for not
answering this question.” …
Hoa Kỳ im lặng không phản đối cộng sản giặc Hồ vẩn giử
quân tại miền Nam cho dù Tổng Thống Nguyễn Văn Thiệu chống đối về điều khoản nầy.
Không ký.
Theo Kissinger cộng sản giặc Hồ đồng ý thỏa thuận việc
ký kết hiệp ước hòa bình Paris.
***
… “Le Duc Tho made
the following report to the Politburo:
“We criticized Kissinger’s suggested changes to the Agreement and
raised four matters of principle:
“+The Agreement must include the name of the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam along with the names of the other
governments participating in the agreement.
“+The areas controlled by the two sides must be clearly delineated.
“+No withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops.
“+Article IV must mention the South
Vietnamese people’s right to determine their own future.” (Message from Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy to
the Politburo, 21
November 1972, in Doan Duc, et al.,
compilers, Major Events: The Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities
during the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975,
volume 4, p. 350)
On November 22, Kissinger reported
to the President, describing the North Vietnamese response to the 69 proposed
changes as follows:
“—They accepted a few changes which were slanted primarily in the
direction of preserving U.S. prestige or adopting technical improvements.
“—They demonstrated absolutely no substantive give and in fact
drastically hardened their position on the political conditions, the problem of
political prisoners, and the presence of U.S. civilian personnel in South
Vietnam following the 60-day withdrawal period.
“—In several important areas they returned to former (pre-October 8) negotiating positions.”
Kissinger continued:
“It is patently clear that in typical Communist fashion they have
hardened their position in order to neutralize the many changes we have asked
of them. It is now apparent that we have some very difficult negotiations ahead
of us which will probably keep us here for the remainder of the week.” He
continued: “During tomorrow’s session we will attempt to reduce the now-serious
areas of difference and focus more clearly on the more crucial changes which we
must have. The task ahead is a considerable one but it is still obvious that
the North Vietnamese do want a settlement. One of the main difficulties
now will be to convince Saigon of the urgent necessity of dropping their petty
demands and the need to focus on the few really critical issues.” (Foreign
Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 116)
***
20230717 Nov 21 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 27
27. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch5
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d27
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_826
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_827
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_828
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_829
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_830
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_831
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_832
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_833
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_834
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_835
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_836
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_837
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_838
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_839
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_840
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_841
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_842
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_843
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_844
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_845
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_846
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_847
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_848
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_849
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_850
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d116
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d27#fnref:1.7.4.4.24.11.8.2
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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