Sunday, August 6, 2023

20230807 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P20

20230807 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P20

 

Trận tái chiếm cổ thành Quảng Trị năm 1972 đã mang lại chiến thắng cho miền Nam, tuy nhiên đây lại là một thất bại cho miền Nam tại hội đàm Paris sau những chuyến đi đêm giửa Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ.

Tái Chiếm Cổ Thành Quảng-Trị Ngày 16-9-72

http://s113345672.onlinehome.us/chiensu/cs-taichiem-cothanhQT.htm

Trong tài liệu “Editorial Note 284” bên dưới cho thấy sau khi miền Nam thành công trong việc tái chiếm cổ thành Quảng Trị đã khiến cho bộ chính trị cộng sản giặc Hồ đổi chiến thuật đàm phán ngay trên bàn hội nghị giửa Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ.

Cộng sản giặc Hồ không đòi hỏi ông Thiệu phải từ chức nửa mà họ tìm mọi cách để cho Hoa Kỳ rút quân càng sớm càng tốt và cuối cùng kết quả là quân đội Hoa Kỳ đã rút đi khỏi miền Nam Việt-Nam trong một giai đoạn ngắn nhất như ý của cộng sản giặc Hồ.

Kết quả là miền Nam sụp đổ khi chiến thuật Việt-Nam hóa chiến tranh của Hoa Kỳ chưa hoàn tất.

Editorial Note 284

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v08/d284

… “Based on the work of Sub-Committee CP50, Nguyen Co Thach recommended concessions (“loosening up” the CP50 called it) on the issue of the future structure of the government in the South. He and the specialists in the Sub-Committee believed that this was the best way to get the Americans out of Vietnam. Therefore, as Doan later observed, “we do not need to demand that the Saigon government be eliminated or that Thieu be forced to resign. All we needed, he [Thach] said, was some kind of governmental structure involving national reconciliation and concord, in accordance with our lowest-level requirement.” (Ibid., page 140) The Politburo accepted the recommendations presented by Nguyen Co Thach and together they became the approach Le Duc Tho was to follow in Paris.” …

Nếu đọc kỷ tài liệu đính kèm độc giả sẽ thấy Xuân Thủy tuyên bố hội nghị sẽ kéo ít nhất là ba ngày, nếu cần có thể kéo dài thêm cho đến khi hai bên thỏa thuận.

… “Xuan Thuy: Last time we have agreed that we would meet for three consecutive days beginning today. It will depend on our work. We may prolong our meetings if necessary. Probably we shall keep our agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s agreeable to me. It’s just that our airplane is in Frankfurt. It’s purely technical. We’re prepared to meet for three days and if necessary even longer.” …

Và dĩ nhiên sau khi Hoa Kỳ rút quân khỏi miền Nam, quân cộng sản giặc Hồ vẩn trấn đóng miền Nam cùng lúc với những đơn vị quân cộng sản giặc Hồ tại Lào và Cambodia vẩn giử nguyên hiện trạng.

Kissinger biết, chính phủ Hoa Kỳ biết, đó là điều bất lợi cho miền Nam thế nhưng hiệp định Paris vẩn được ký kết.

Bất công và tàn nhẩn khi đồng minh đâm sau lưng mình để tháo chạy.

Tay đồng minh đã vấy máu đồng bào miền Nam Việt-Nam sau cuộc tháo chạy vô lương tâm.

Đây là vết nhơ trong lịch sử Hoa Kỳ, vết nhơ sẽ không bao giờ gột rữa được trước dư luận quốc tế trên thế giới.

Thiet Giap! The Battle of An Loc, April 1972

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/thiet-giap-the-battle-of-an-loc-april-1972.pdf

"Send Me Some Stukas!"

https://www.army.mil/article/18883/send_me_some_stukas

The Battle for An Loc 5 April-26 June 1972

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA486941.pdf

The Easter Halt

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0998easter/

***

Có một vấn đề quan trọng khác chúng ta nên lưu ý.

Đó là việc cộng sản giặc Hồ đòi hỏi cho bằng được là lực lượng hải quân và không quân Hoa Kỳ phải rút hoàn toàn ra khỏi biển Đông Việt-Nam sau khi ký hiệp định Paris.

Đây có phải là việc cộng sản giặc Hồ đã âm thầm dọn đường cho Trung-cộng tiến chiếm Hoàng-Sa vào ngày 19 tháng Giêng 1974?

Và đây củng là lý do hải quân Hoa Kỳ từ chối cứu vớt những thủy thủ của Hải Quân Việt-Nam Cộng-Hòa trên chiến hạm HQ-10 rời bỏ tàu theo lệnh của hạm trưởng Huỳnh Văn Thà khi bị tàu hải quân Trung-cộng bắn chìm?

Cuộc rút quân của Hoa Kỳ từ 16 tháng, rút xuống còn 12 tháng, 6 tháng và sau cùng là 75 ngày!

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

20230717 Oct 8 72 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 21

21. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch4 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d21 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_544

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_545

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_546

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_547

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_548

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_549

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_550

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_551

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_552

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_553

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_554

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_555

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_556

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_557

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_558

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_559

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_560

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_561

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_562

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_563

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_564

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_565

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_566

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_567

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_568

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_569

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_570

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_571

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_572

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_573

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_574

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_575

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_576

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_577

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_578

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_579

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_580

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_581

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_582

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_583

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_584

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v08/d284

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d21#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.31.8.2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d21#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.31.770.4

 

No comments:

Post a Comment