Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20251204 CDTL GRF Biên Bản Đàm Thoại Washington 13 January 1975 D161

20251204 CDTL GRF Biên Bản Đàm Thoại Washington 13 January 1975 D161

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973–July 1975

161. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 13, 1975, 9:25–10:20 a.m.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d161

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_602

161. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 13, 1975, 9:25–10:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: I still think the moves in Southeast Asia are right, but Defense is so opposed to them that they would leak them and cause us an enormous problem with the Hill. Then you would have to say a thousand ways what you would not do. This is the worst way to deal with the North Vietnamese.

President: Who in Defense is opposed?

Kissinger: There was no opposition by Defense at the WSAG. It is at the top and designed to put some space between Schlesinger and Vietnam and put the heat on you and me.

The best way to make these moves is quietly.

President: Could we just leave out the F–4s?

[Page 602]

Kissinger: I think any of these moves would give us the same problem. The softest would be the F–4s to the Philippines as a training exercise.

Scowcroft: Or the B–52s to Guam.

President: Why don’t we move the B–52s to Guam?

Kissinger: And the F–4 to the Philippines. Make sure Defense says it is a training exercise.

On the Vietnam supplemental. There are several options: One is the $300 million; Martin wants to go back to the original request.

The Cambodia economic aid we can do by just renewing the PL–480 from the ceiling. There are two ways to go on Cambodia military.

President: If you can avoid going to the Foreign Relations Committees right away, it would help.

Kissinger: You are the best judge of that. I would like $700, but would rather have $300 now than $700 in June.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to Southeast Asia.]

Google Translated

161. Biên bản ghi nhớ cuộc hội đàm1

Washington, ngày 13 tháng 1 năm 1975, 9:25–10:20 sáng

THAM GIA

Tổng thống Ford

Tiến sĩ Henry A. Kissinger, Ngoại trưởng kiêm phụ tá Tổng thống phụ trách An ninh Quốc gia

Trung tướng Brent Scowcroft, phụ tá Tổng thống phụ trách An ninh Quốc gia

Kissinger: Tôi vẫn nghĩ những động thái ở Đông Nam Á là đúng đắn, nhưng Bộ Quốc phòng lại phản đối mạnh mẽ đến mức họ sẽ tiết lộ thông tin và gây ra cho chúng ta một vấn đề lớn với Quốc hội. Vậy thì ông sẽ phải nói hàng ngàn cách để nói rằng ông sẽ không làm gì cả. Đây là cách tồi tệ nhất để đối phó với Bắc Việt Nam.

Tổng thống: Ai trong Bộ Quốc phòng phản đối?

Kissinger: Bộ Quốc phòng không hề phản đối gì tại WSAG. Bộ này ở cấp cao nhất và được thiết kế để tạo khoảng cách giữa Schlesinger và Việt Nam, đồng thời gây sức ép lên ông và tôi.

Cách tốt nhất để thực hiện những động thái này là âm thầm.

Tổng thống: Chúng ta có thể bỏ qua F-4 được không? [Trang 602]

Kissinger: Tôi nghĩ bất kỳ động thái nào trong số này cũng sẽ gây ra vấn đề tương tự. Biện pháp nhẹ nhàng nhất sẽ là đưa F-4 đến Philippines để huấn luyện.

Scowcroft: Hoặc B-52 đến Guam.

Tổng thống: Tại sao chúng ta không chuyển B-52 đến Guam?

Kissinger: Và F-4 đến Philippines. Hãy đảm bảo Bộ Quốc phòng nói rằng đây là một cuộc tập trận.

Về khoản viện trợ bổ sung cho Việt Nam. Có một số lựa chọn: Một là 300 triệu đô la; Martin muốn quay lại yêu cầu ban đầu.

Viện trợ kinh tế cho Campuchia, chúng ta có thể thực hiện chỉ bằng cách gia hạn PL-480 từ mức trần. Có hai cách để giải quyết vấn đề quân sự cho Campuchia.

Tổng thống: Nếu ngài có thể tránh việc phải đến Ủy ban Đối ngoại ngay lập tức, điều đó sẽ hữu ích.

Kissinger: Ngài là người đánh giá tốt nhất về điều đó. Tôi muốn 700 đô la, nhưng thà có 300 đô la ngay bây giờ còn hơn là 700 đô la vào tháng Sáu.

[Phần thảo luận không liên quan đến Đông Nam Á bị lược bỏ ở đây.]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d161

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_602

161. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 13, 1975, 9:25–10:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: Who in Defense is opposed?

Kissinger: There was no opposition by Defense at the WSAG. It is at the top and designed to put some space between Schlesinger and Vietnam and put the heat on you and me.

The best way to make these moves is quietly.

President: Could we just leave out the F–4s? [Page 602]

Kissinger: I think any of these moves would give us the same problem. The softest would be the F–4s to the Philippines as a training exercise.

Scowcroft: Or the B–52s to Guam.

President: Why don’t we move the B–52s to Guam?

Kissinger: And the F–4 to the Philippines. Make sure Defense says it is a training exercise.

On the Vietnam supplemental. There are several options: One is the $300 million; Martin wants to go back to the original request.

The Cambodia economic aid we can do by just renewing the PL–480 from the ceiling. There are two ways to go on Cambodia military.

President: If you can avoid going to the Foreign Relations Committees right away, it would help.

Kissinger: You are the best judge of that. I would like $700, but would rather have $300 now than $700 in June.

[Omitted here is discussion not related to Southeast Asia.]

Google Translated

161. Biên bản ghi nhớ cuộc hội đàm1

Washington, ngày 13 tháng 1 năm 1975, 9:25–10:20 sáng

THAM GIA

Tổng thống Ford

Tiến sĩ Henry A. Kissinger, Ngoại trưởng kiêm Phụ tá Tổng thống phụ trách An ninh Quốc gia

Trung tướng Brent Scowcroft, Phụ tá Tổng thống phụ trách An ninh Quốc gia

Tổng thống: Ai trong Bộ Quốc phòng phản đối?

Cách tốt nhất để thực hiện những động thái này là âm thầm.

Tổng thống: Chúng ta có thể bỏ qua F-4 được không? [Trang 602]

Scowcroft: Hoặc B-52 đến Guam.

Tổng thống: Tại sao chúng ta không chuyển B-52 đến Guam?

Kissinger: Và F-4 đến Philippines. Hãy bảo đảm Bộ Quốc phòng nói rằng đây là một cuộc tập trận.

Về khoản viện trợ bổ sung cho Việt Nam. Có một số lựa chọn: Một là 300 triệu đô la; Martin muốn quay lại yêu cầu ban đầu.

Viện trợ kinh tế cho Campuchia, chúng ta có thể thực hiện chỉ bằng cách gia hạn PL-480 từ mức trần. Có hai cách để giải quyết vấn đề quân sự cho Campuchia.

Tổng thống: Nếu ngài có thể tránh việc phải đến Ủy ban Đối ngoại ngay lập tức, điều đó sẽ hữu ích.

Kissinger: Ngài là người đánh giá tốt nhất về điều đó. Tôi muốn 700 đô la, nhưng thà có 300 đô la ngay bây giờ còn hơn là 700 đô la vào tháng Sáu.

[Phần thảo luận không liên quan đến Đông Nam Á bị lược bỏ ở đây.]

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d161

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_602

Thân thế (các) nhân vật/

Ford Gerald R.,

Republican Representative from Michigan until October 13, 1973; House Minority Leader until October 13, 1973; Vice President of the United States from October 13, 1973, until August 8, 1974; President of the United States from August 8, 1974

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerald_Ford

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_Minority_Leader

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leader_of_the_House_Republican_Conference

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chair_of_the_House_Republican_Conference

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives

https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/gerald-r-ford/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/

https://geraldrfordfoundation.org/gerald-r-ford-biography/

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/grf/timeline.asp

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Gerald_Ford

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/research-guides/modern-biographical-files-ndl/modern-bios-f/ford-gerald.html

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/ford_vp_papers.asp

Hill, Robert C.,

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from May 11, 1973, until January 5, 1974

https://archives-manuscripts.dartmouth.edu/agents/people/1226

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assistant_Secretary_of_Defense_for_International_Security_Affairs

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_C._Hill

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Costa_Rica

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_El_Salvador

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Mexico

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Spain

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Argentina

Henry A Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; also Secretary of State from September 21, 1973

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/bilderberg-meeting-group-lisbon-kissinger

https://www.theguardian.com/world/bilderberg

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/summary

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip

https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/styles/article_node_featured/public/article/featured-image/kissinger-zhou-sm_0.jpg?itok=qDjPx2_m

https://china.usc.edu/catalog/documents/us-china

http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-47.html

https://china.usc.edu/talking-points-july-22-august-3-2011

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#meetings

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#nixon-announcement

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#chinese-accept

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#signals

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#the_aim

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d4

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d12

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d13

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d141

https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100324.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger_and_the_Vietnam_War

Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”

(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280

Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf

https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html

“Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger on 3 August 1972,” Conversation 760-006, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Huges] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014-). URL:https://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006748

https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0

https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/nixon-kissinger-and-the-decent-interval

https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0

Discover the Truth at:

http://www.theblackvault.com

https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/

The secret life of Henry Kissinger minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger

https://etan.org/news/kissinger/secret.htm

Martin, Graham A.,

Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) from July 20, 1973, until April 29, 1975

https://www.fallofsaigon.org/orig/martin.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Martin

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_South_Vietnam

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Italy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Thailand

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_of_the_United_States_to_the_European_Office_of_the_United_Nations

https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/martin-graham-anderson

https://www.state.gov/biographies-list/

https://www.state.gov/resources-bureau-of-global-talent-management/#ambassadors

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ambassadors_of_the_United_States_to_South_Vietnam

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.,

President’s Special Assistant

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_M._Schlesinger_Jr.

https://www.historians.org/research-and-publications/perspectives-on-history/may-2007/in-memoriam-arthur-m-schlesinger-jr

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d86

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18285-national-security-archive-doc-02-memorandum

file:///C:/Users/nguye/Downloads/National-Security-Archive-Doc-02-Memorandum-from.pdf

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d7

https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/mep/displaydoc.cfm?docid=erpn-artsch2

Scowcroft, Brent,

General, USAF, Military Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from August 1973 until 1975

https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/brent-scowcroft-and-american-military-intervention/

https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/blame-it-on-the-blob-how-to-evaluate-american-grand-strategy/

https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/aspen-strategy-group/about-asg/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/piab/

https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/bartholomew-sparrow/the-strategist/9781586489632/

http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_1999_1112_scowcroft.pdf

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/politics/brent-scowcroft.html

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/remembering-brent-scowcrofts-accomplishments-on-arms-control

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-13/scowcroft-model

https://archive.org/stream/towercommission00unit?ref=ol#mode/2up

https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/253135/the-man-who-ran-washington-by-peter-baker-and-susan-glasser/9780385540551

https://www.twelvebooks.com/titles/philip-zelikow/to-build-a-better-world/9781538764688/