Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20251202 CDTL Biên Bản Đàm Thoại Washington 8 January 1975 D159

20251202 CDTL Biên Bản Đàm Thoại Washington 8 January 1975 D159

159. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 8, 1975, 9:24–10:48 a.m.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d159

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_599

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d156

159. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 8, 1975, 9:24–10:48 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

President: One quick thing on Vietnam.

Kissinger: We had a WSAG.2 Here is the situation. The cuts last year put them on static defense. You know that the GVN needs mobility and firepower to survive. If we don’t get a supplemental, the WSAG think it will unravel.

President: Let’s ask for one. [Page 599]

Kissinger: And I would mention in the State of the Union that here is a people who agreed to peace on the assumption of our support.3

The only thing North Vietnam knows is massive brutality. There are signals we can give, but all it would cause is a little hell here. B–52’s to Guam or Thailand. The problem in Thailand is elections—I don’t agree. We could put a carrier into the Tonkin.

The Pentagon should stop signalling carrier moves. We could move F–4’s to Clark.

Another problem is that South Vietnam doesn’t have mines. They could mine if things get out of control. But the DOD lawyers oppose it on the basis of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. That is insane. North Vietnam hasn’t obeyed Article 7 at all. My people want to be able to claim we have obeyed Article 7.

President: I think we should do it.

Kissinger: One other thing. State wants a contingency paper in case we don’t get the Supplemental, and we will face negotiations. But negotiations are useful only if there is a real military stalemate. [He described the “Ducky” example.]4 They are the toughest in the world to deal with.

Google Translated

159. Biên bản ghi nhớ cuộc hội đàm

Washington, ngày 8 tháng 1 năm 1975, 9:24–10:48 sáng

THAM GIA

Tổng thống Gerald R. Ford

Tiến sĩ Henry A. Kissinger, Ngoại trưởng kiêm Trợ lý Tổng thống phụ trách An ninh Quốc gia

Trung tướng Brent Scowcroft, Phó Trợ lý Tổng thống phụ trách An ninh Quốc gia

[Bỏ qua phần thảo luận không liên quan đến Việt Nam ở đây.]

Tổng thống: Một điều ngắn gọn về Việt Nam.

Kissinger: Chúng ta đã có một cuộc họp WSAG. Tình hình là như thế này. Việc cắt giảm ngân sách năm ngoái đã đặt họ vào thế phòng thủ chết cứng. Ông biết đấy, Chính phủ Việt Nam Cộng hòa cần khả năng cơ động và hỏa lực để tồn tại. Nếu chúng ta không nhận được khoản ngân sách bổ sung, WSAG nghĩ rằng tình hình sẽ sụp đổ.

Tổng thống: Hãy yêu cầu một khoản ngân sách. [Trang 599]

Kissinger: Và tôi muốn đề cập trong Thông điệp Liên bang rằng ở đây có một dân tộc đã đồng ý hòa bình với điều kiện là chúng ta ủng hộ.

Điều duy nhất Bắc Việt Nam chỉ biết là sự tàn bạo khủng khiếp. Chúng ta có thể đưa ra những tín hiệu, nhưng tất cả những gì nó gây ra chỉ là một chút địa ngục ở đây. Máy bay B-52 đến Guam hoặc Thái Lan. Vấn đề ở Thái Lan là bầu cử—tôi không đồng ý. Chúng ta có thể đưa một tàu sân bay đến Bắc Kỳ.

Ngũ Giác Đài nên ngừng ra hiệu di chuyển tàu sân bay. Chúng ta có thể chuyển F-4 đến Clark.

Một vấn đề nữa là Nam Việt Nam không có mìn. Họ có thể thả mìn nếu tình hình vượt khỏi tầm kiểm soát. Nhưng các luật sư của Bộ Quốc phòng lại phản đối dựa trên Điều 7 của Hiệp định Paris. Thật điên rồ. Bắc Việt Nam hoàn toàn không tuân thủ Điều 7. Người của tôi tuyên bố rằng chúng ta đã tuân thủ Điều 7.

Tổng thống: Tôi nghĩ chúng ta nên làm vậy.

Kissinger: Còn một điều nữa. Bộ Ngoại giao muốn có một văn bản dự phòng trong trường hợp chúng ta không nhận được Văn bản Bổ sung, và chúng ta sẽ phải đối mặt với các cuộc đàm phán. Nhưng đàm phán chỉ hữu ích nếu có một bế tắc quân sự thực sự. [Ông mô tả ví dụ về "Ducky".] Họ là những người khó đối phó nhất trên thế giới.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d159

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_599

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d156

Thân thế (các) nhân vật/

Ford Gerald R.,

Republican Representative from Michigan until October 13, 1973; House Minority Leader until October 13, 1973; Vice President of the United States from October 13, 1973, until August 8, 1974; President of the United States from August 8, 1974

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerald_Ford

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_Minority_Leader

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leader_of_the_House_Republican_Conference

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chair_of_the_House_Republican_Conference

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives

https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/gerald-r-ford/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/

https://geraldrfordfoundation.org/gerald-r-ford-biography/

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/grf/timeline.asp

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Gerald_Ford

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/research-guides/modern-biographical-files-ndl/modern-bios-f/ford-gerald.html

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/guides/findingaid/ford_vp_papers.asp

Henry A Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; also Secretary of State from September 21, 1973

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/20/bilderberg-meeting-group-lisbon-kissinger

https://www.theguardian.com/world/bilderberg

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve13/summary

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip

https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/styles/article_node_featured/public/article/featured-image/kissinger-zhou-sm_0.jpg?itok=qDjPx2_m

https://china.usc.edu/catalog/documents/us-china

http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-47.html

https://china.usc.edu/talking-points-july-22-august-3-2011

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#meetings

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#nixon-announcement

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#chinese-accept

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#signals

https://china.usc.edu/getting-beijing-henry-kissingers-secret-1971-trip#the_aim

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23927/richard-m-nixon/asia-after-viet-nam

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d4

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d12

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d13

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d141

https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/100324.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger_and_the_Vietnam_War

Lesson in Vietnam from Kissinger to Nixon: “when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would not help them fight it.”

(We also had trouble with excesses here: when we made it “our war” we would not let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war,” we would not help them fight it. Ironically, we prepared the South Vietnamese for main force warfare after 1954 (anticipating another Korean-type attack), and they faced a political war; they had prepared themselves for political warfare after 1973 only to be faced with a main force invasion 20 years after it had been expected.)

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d280

Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf

https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html

“Richard M. Nixon and Kissinger on 3 August 1972,” Conversation 760-006, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Huges] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014-). URL:https://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006748

https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0

https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/nixon-kissinger-and-the-decent-interval

https://player.vimeo.com/video/889937807?h=e44572c8f3&color=e57200&title=0&byline=0&portrait=0

Discover the Truth at:

http://www.theblackvault.com

https://www.theblackvault.com/documentarchive/the-cias-vietnam-document-cd-rom/

The secret life of Henry Kissinger minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger

https://etan.org/news/kissinger/secret.htm

Le Duc Tho,

member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Special Advisor to, and de facto head of, the DRV Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam until 1973; Special Adviser to the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from January 1973

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/people

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/people/le-duc-tho-le-duc-tho

https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/tho/speedread/

Scowcroft, Brent,

General, USAF, Military Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from August 1973 until 1975

https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/brent-scowcroft-and-american-military-intervention/

https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/blame-it-on-the-blob-how-to-evaluate-american-grand-strategy/

https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/aspen-strategy-group/about-asg/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/piab/

https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/bartholomew-sparrow/the-strategist/9781586489632/

http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_1999_1112_scowcroft.pdf

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/politics/brent-scowcroft.html

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/remembering-brent-scowcrofts-accomplishments-on-arms-control

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-13/scowcroft-model

https://archive.org/stream/towercommission00unit?ref=ol#mode/2up

https://www.penguinrandomhouse.ca/books/253135/the-man-who-ran-washington-by-peter-baker-and-susan-glasser/9780385540551

https://www.twelvebooks.com/titles/philip-zelikow/to-build-a-better-world/9781538764688/