Saturday, September 2, 2023

20230903 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P47

20230903 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P47

 

Bên dưới đây là phần thảo luận của Tổng Thống Thiệu và tướng Haig trong việc ký hiệp ước hòa bình giả tạo giửa Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ.

… “After Kissinger had failed to get Thieu’s agreement in October, Nixon made Haig his chief emissary to Thieu. In trips to Saigon in November, December, and January, Haig delivered increasingly tough messages from Nixon, essentially ultimatums, that signaled irrevocably the United States’ intention to sign the agreement even if South Vietnam did not. Furthermore, if South Vietnam did not sign, it could not depend on future U.S. assistance. In response to this pressure, Thieu agreed. On December 19, 1972, however, he perceptively commented to Haig, when the latter delivered the penultimate ultimatum: “Given the realities of the situation, what I am being asked to sign is not a treaty for peace but a treaty for continued U.S. support.” Haig replied: “I agree with your analysis.” (Haig, Inner Circles, p. 331)”….

Trong phần đàm phán nầy Lê Đức Thọ vẩn luôn hướng về việc thảo luận tiền đền bù cho chiến tranh giửa Hoa Kỳ và Bắc Việt (hay bộ chính trị cộng sản giặc Hồ?) mà không đề cập gì về sự tổn thất hay mất mát của miền Nam Việt-Nam.

Mời độc giả xem phần “bánh vẻ” mà Kissinger đang trình làng với Lê Đức Thọ.

Sau khi hiệp ước hòa binh giả tạo ký xong, Hoa Kỳ phủi tay và cấm vận Việt-Nam từ năm 1975 cho tới 1995, cộng sản giặc Hồ không có một xu đền bù nào từ phía Hoa Kỳ sau khi Nixon phải từ chức vì vụ án “Watergate”. 

 Le Duc Tho: After so many years of war, as you know, the losses are very great, therefore the amount of $3 billion is still not up to the [Page 1360] same level as the losses. Moreover, the grant aid you will give us is not only beneficial to us but also to the United States, too. So we propose $4.5 billion of grant aid. But $3 billion is too little. Therefore if you don’t agree to $4.5 billion at least it should be $4 billion. Besides this amount, as to concessional aid, I would propose that we would put “Besides this grant aid the two parties will agree on the form of the aid to be taken.”

20230717 Jan 23 73 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 48

48. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch6 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d48 

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1344

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1345

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1346

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1347

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1348

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1349

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1350

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1351

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1352

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1353

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1354

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1355

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1356

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1357

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1358

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1359

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1360

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1361

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1362

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1363

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1364

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1365

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1366

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1367

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d329

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d48#fnref:1.7.4.4.28.23.8.2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d48#fnref:1.7.4.4.28.23.230.6

320. Letter From South Vietnamese President Thieu to President Nixon 1

Saigon, January 21, 1973.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_1130

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_1131

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d305

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d310

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d313

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.233.8.6

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.233.14.4

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.233.16.8

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.233.24.12

322. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) in Paris1

Washington, January 21, 1973, 1957Z.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_1133

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d316

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d317

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d320

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d324

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.237.8.6

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.237.12.4.2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.237.12.4.6

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d322#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.237.12.28.4

329. Message From the President’s Military Assistant (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, January 22, 1973, 2300Z.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d329

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/pg_1147

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v09/d329#fnref:1.7.4.4.20.257.8.6

Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973

http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html

Agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Viet-Nam. Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf

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NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

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