Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20230730 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P12

20230730 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P12

Trong phần đàm phán nầy chẳng có gì khác lạ ngoại trừ việc Kissinger lặp lại những gì đã thảo luận trước với phái đoàn cộng sản giặc Hồ.

Một lần nửa, điểm thỏa hiệp số 4 được Kissinger mớm cho cộng sản giặc Hồ là Nixon hứa sẽ yêu cầu quốc hội Hoa Kỳ trợ giúp cho cộng sản giặc Hồ từ 2 tỷ cho tới 2,5 tỷ dollars sau khi ký hiệp định hòa bình Paris.

Vì lòng tham cho nên phía cộng sản giặc Hồ luôn làm áp lực với Hoa Kỳ việc loại bỏ chính phủ miền Nam, buộc Tổng Thống Thiệu phải từ chức để thay đổi chính quyền cho chính phủ bù nhìn của cộng sản giặc Hồ là Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng Miền Nam lên thay thế và củng để trì hoản thời gian việc thỏa hiệp để mong Hoa Kỳ sẽ tăng thêm tiền trợ giúp, nói đúng hơn là tiền nợ cho vay và dân Việt phải è cổ ra trả nợ cho chúng trong tương lai.

Điều trì hoản thời gian nầy là ý muốn và trong dự tính của Kissinger để chờ đợi vụ án Watergate tiến hành vì đây là cớ cho Hoa Kỳ phủi tay quịt nợ hợp pháp.

Câu nói cuối buổi đàm phán của Xuân Thủy là:

“So we have come to that point. If there is nothing more to say, then I propose we adjourn.”

Như chúng ta đã biết là sau năm 1995 khi Hoa Kỳ hủy bỏ cấm vận Việt-Nam, số tiền trợ cấp cho Việt-Nam sau cuộc chiến đã bị Hoa Kỳ lờ đi như không có gì vì Nixon đã phải từ chức trong vụ án Watergate, không được làm tổng thống trọn nhiệm kỳ, vì thế những gì Nixon đã hứa đều coi như không có như việc Nixon hứa với ông Thiệu sẽ trừng phạt cộng sản giặc Hồ nếu họ vi phạp hiệp định Paris năm 1973, kết cuộc chẳng có chuyện gì xảy ra và Hoa Kỳ phủi tay.

Xong.

***

… “Kissinger:

Since May 31 we have done the following things:

—We have agreed to fix a date for American and allied withdrawals as part of a negotiated settlement.

In all our proposals, incidentally, we have followed the outline of your seven and nine points and drawn on the language of your formulations to the maximum extent possible in order to show our good will and serious intent.

—We have said that if the other aspects of a settlement are agreed, we would consider some adjustments in that timetable.

—We have agreed that the question of the armed forces of Indochina should be settled among the Indochinese parties themselves, as you proposed.

—With respect to prisoners of war we have changed our position that the release should be completed two months before completion of withdrawals and agreed to your proposal that release be completed at the same time as withdrawals.

—We have agreed that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements should be respected, that there should be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries, and that the Indochinese people be left to settle their own affairs, in effect your points 5 and 6.

—We have agreed that the problems of the Indochinese countries be settled on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference, which is drawn verbatim from the first sentence of your point 6.

—We have agreed that South Vietnam should adopt a foreign policy of neutrality, based on Madame Binh’s points 4B and 5.

—We have agreed that reunification should be left to North and South Vietnam, in effect, Madame Binh’s point 4A.

—We have agreed that there should be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina as part of an overall settlement instead of an immediate ceasefire before a settlement which we proposed on October 7. Of course, we continue to prefer an immediate ceasefire.

—On the political issues we have agreed to include political as well as military issues in a negotiated settlement.

—We have declared that the South Vietnamese should determine their own political future and that we would not attempt to shape it.

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—We have agreed to make a series of declarations that would give force to that pledge and which we believe would have a major political impact on South Vietnamese political life.

—We have said that we would support no candidate, and would remain neutral in the South Vietnamese election.

—We have said that we would abide by the outcome of either these elections or any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese.

—We have said we would agree to a limitation on our military and economic assistance relationship with any government in South Vietnam.

—We have told you honestly that we are not experts on South Vietnamese politics and perhaps we don’t understand them sufficiently. And we have asked for some counter formulation and we are prepared to listen to counter proposals from you. We have received nothing but vilification and untrue statements.

—Finally we have told you that upon signature of an agreement in principle, the President is prepared to recommend to Congress a $7.5 billion aid program for all Indochina, of which $2 to $2.5 billion would be earmarked for North Vietnam.

These are not the actions of a government which does not want an agreement.

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

20230716 Sept 13 71 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 13

13. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d13

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_249

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_250

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_251