Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 202307298 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem 10

202307298 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem 10

Những điều khoản quan trọng trong thỏa hiệp đình chiến giữa cộng sản giặc Hồ và Kissinger là điều 3 và điều 4.

Điều 3 là Kissinger phải thay thế chính quyền Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm.

Điều 4 là khoản tiền Hoa Kỳ “trợ giúp” và cho “vay lãi nhẹ” 7 tỷ rưỡi dollars trong vòng 5 năm cho Việt-Miên-Lào, riêng miền Bắc Việt-Nam từ 2 tỷ cho tới 2,5 tỷ dollars dưới đây:

… “Kissinger:

boasting on either side.

Now let me turn to your points.

[Page 208]

I owe you an answer to Points 1, 3, and 4.

On Point 4, it is the easiest, and I will therefore take it first.

I told the Minister the last time I was here that I would study in Washington what is possible in the field of economic aid. The President is prepared, upon signature of an agreement in principle, to go to the Congress and to recommend to the Congress a five-year program of assistance for all the countries of Indochina.

The sum he is prepared to recommend to Congress is about seven and a half billion dollars over a five-year period, of which two to two and a half billion dollars would be dedicated to North Vietnam.

The question of repayment would not be a problem. Over two-thirds of the funds would be in outright grants. The remainder would be in very long term, very low interest rate loans which pose no practical problems of repayment. Even that is adjustable.

There would be no conditions attached to this assistance program.

We propose this as a sign of our desire to start a new relationship with the people of Indochina and especially with the people of North Vietnam.

Now as to Point 1.

We are prepared to fix a date for the withdrawal of all our forces as well as the forces allied with us, to be completed nine months after the signature of an agreement.

Now let me turn to Point 3 of yours. If the Special Adviser would prefer to discuss our Point 3, I would be prepared to do that too. I agree that Point 3 is the crucial problem for your side.

What you are asking us is to replace the Administration in Saigon, and to substitute for it an administration which you consider peaceful by your special definition, and therefore to bring about the objectives that you have fought for by our actions.

We have told you on innumerable occasions that we cannot do this because it is beyond our power to do it, and because it would be dishonorable to do it.

You cannot expect us both to withdraw from Vietnam rapidly and to do all your political work for you.

If these are your last words, we will withdraw at our own pace, and you will have to do your own political work. We have shown our good will, both by the proposals we have made with respect to Point 4 and by the proposals we have made with respect to Point 1, and I will now give you some observations on Point 3 in addition.

We have told you on innumerable occasions that we are prepared to accept the outcome of any political process which develops after our departure.

[Page 209]

We believe that our withdrawal will have certain consequences, as you yourselves have repeatedly pointed out.” …

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Ở phần cuối cuộc đàm phán Kissinger hé lộ hai điều khiến cho Lê Đức Thọ và Xuân Thủy bất an.

Điều thứ nhất: Kissinger hé lộ chuyến đi sang tàu gặp Mao.

Điều thứ hai: Số nhỏ lượng chuyên viên Hoa Kỳ sẽ ở lại để huấn luyện cho miền Nam việc xử dụng các máy móc Hoa Kỳ để lại.

Phần sau cùng về phương diện quốc-gia, dân-tộc, tình đồng-bào, nghĩa đồng-bộc cho thấy rõ cộng sản giặc Hồ không còn nhân tính con người Việt-Nam.

Đó là việc cộng sản giặc Hồ (trắng trợn) muốn Kissinger lật đổ chính quyền miền Nam thay cho chúng.

Nghĩa là người Việt bán đứng người Việt cho giặc (Hoa Kỳ là giặc đối với cộng sản giặc Hồ).

Như thế nó cho ta thấy một vấn đề nửa là những tên cộng sản giặc Hồ không phải là người Việt-Nam.

Phần tài liệu đàm phán bên dưới giửa Xuân Thủy và Kissinger trong việc cộng sản giặc Hồ muốn Kissinger loại bỏ Nguyễn Văn Thiệu thay cho chúng nó.

***

… “Xuan Thuy: Another remaining issue is connected with political problems. Mr. Special Adviser endeavors to elude the substance of this question. You said that to replace Nguyen Van Thieu is beyond your power and is dishonorable. We think you have the capability to do so and are unwilling to do so. The last time we made a number of suggestions and you said you would study the suggestions, but you have not studied it.

Kissinger: Oh, I have studied it.

Xuan Thuy: Because this would be harmful to your honor to maintain Nguyen Van Thieu. On the other hand, if you replace Nguyen Van Thieu you will be welcomed by the South Vietnamese people, the American people, and world public opinion.

Moreover when doing that, we do not ask you to make a public statement. You should do that secretly. No one knows. Let you do that secretly and it will not reflect on your honor.

Kissinger: But it would become pretty obvious, don’t you think?

Xuan Thuy: No one knows that. This understanding is between us only. It is not divulged.” …

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

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20230716 Jul 26 71 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 11

11. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d11

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_197

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_198

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_199