20230726 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P8
Cuộc đàm phán của Kissinger và Lê Đức Thọ tiếp theo…
Từ những phản luận trói buộc của Lê Đức Thọ đối với Kissinger cho chúng ta thấy Lê Đức Thọ không phải là một tay mơ đàm phán chính trị mà là một niễu hùng, có một đều thắc mắc Lê Đức Thọ là người Việt hay không thì không chắc!
Đọc lý luận trói buộc Kissinger của Lê Đức Thọ nghe rất
quen thuộc vì đây là luận điệu phân tích của các tình báo Hoa Nam, so với luận
điệu của Xuân Thủy thì chúng ta thấy Xuân Thủy chỉ quanh quẩn trong những câu
nói chất vấn Kissinger rất thông thường, nghĩa là chỉ học thuộc lòng rồi “nhai
lại”.
Đọc những lời dưới đây của Lê Đức Thọ rồi chúng ta đem
so sánh lại tình hình chính trị của Hoa Kỳ, chúng ta sẽ thấy dường như là Lê Đức
Thọ hiểu rõ về vấn đề “Watergate” của Nixon, mặc dù nó chưa xảy ra.
… Lê Đức Thọ:
“I think that in this term of President Nixon,
even if he is reelected once again, he will not succeed in carrying
out his policy. I think that [Page 162] time is not on your side.
And I think you should not continue your policy of Vietnamization of the war;
you should look to reality and begin genuine negotiations so as to
peacefully settle the Vietnam problem. This is the only concrete way. We know
how to look to reality. We know how to look to the balance of forces on
the battlefield so as to settle the problem in a realistic way.” …
Nếu đúng như thế thì làm sao Lê Đức Thọ có thể dự đoán
được chuyện tương lai chính trị của Nixon khi sự việc chưa xảy ra?
Ngoại trừ đây là những dự tính, kế sách của quyền lực
ngầm bên sau chính phủ Hoa Kỳ tìm cách dứt điểm chiến tranh Việt-Nam để bắt tay
ban giao với Trung cộng theo kế hoạch Win-Win!
Như vậy Lê Đức Thọ là ai?
Qua sách lược của Lê Đức Thọ cho thấy rõ đây là kế hoạch
của Trung cộng trung lập hóa vùng Đông Dương, Việt, Miên, Lào nhưng thật thụ
vùng nầy nằm trong tầm tay của Trung cộng.
Cộng sản giặc Hồ chỉ đòi hỏi quân đồng minh rút khỏi
miền Nam Việt-Nam mà không đề cập gì đến việc rút quân của cộng sản giặc Hồ
cùng lực lượng quân sự việt cộng tại miền Nam Việt-Nam.
Sau đây là 9 điều kiện của cộng sản giặc Hồ
đưa ra cho Kissinger.
Tất cả 9 điều nầy không có lợi cho miền
Nam Việt-Nam.
“(Xuan Thuy then reads the nine points from a
prepared text.)
Point One. The withdrawal of the totality of
U.S. forces and those of foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam
and other Indochinese countries should be completed within 1971.
Point Two. The release of all military men and
civilians captured in the war should be carried out in parallel and completed
at the same time as the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point One.
Point Three. In South Vietnam the U.S. should stop supporting Thieu/Ky/Khiem so that there may be set up in Saigon a new
Administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy.
The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Vietnam will enter into talks with that Administration to
settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam and to achieve national concord.
Point Four. The United States Government
must bear full responsibility for the damages caused by the United
States to the peace of the whole of Vietnam. The government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of South Vietnam demand from the U.S. Government reparations for
the damage caused by the U.S. in the two zones of Vietnam.
Point Five. The U.S. should respect the 1954
Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. It should stop
its aggression and intervention in the Indochinese countries and let their
people settle by themselves their own affairs.
Point Six. The problems existing among the
Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on
the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-interference in each other’s affairs. As far as it is
concerned, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is prepared to join
in resolving such problems.
Point Seven. All the parties should achieve a
cease-fire after the signing of the agreements on the above
mentioned problems.
Point Eight. There should be an international
supervision.
Point Nine. There should be an international
guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples,
the neutrality of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and lasting peace
in this region.
The above points form an integrated whole and are closely related to one another.”
Chiến Dịch Bình Tây (Hành Quân Kampuchia 1970)
https://nhaydu.com/index_83hg_files/left_files/T-Chien/ChienDichBinh%20Tay-HanhQuanKampuchea.pdf
LỮ ÐOÀN B/TQLC HÀNH QUÂN VƯỢT BIÊN QUA KAMPUCHEA NĂM
1970
http://www.tqlcvn.org/chiensu/cs-ldb-hq-cambodia.htm
Tấn công Campuchia –
Cambodian Incursion 1970
https://chientruongvietnam.com/2018/02/12/tan-cong-campuchia-cambodian-campaign-1970/
Chiến
dịch Campuchia – Cambodian Campaign 1970 – P2
https://chientruongvietnam.com/2018/02/12/chien-dich-campuchia-cambodian-campaign-1970/
CHIẾN DỊCH BÌNH TÂY (HÀNH
QUÂN TOÀN THẮNG 41&42 KAMPUCHIA TỪ 27-3-1970 ĐẾN 22-7-1970).
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
9. Memorandum of Conversation
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch2
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d9
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_153
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_154
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_155
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_156
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_157
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_158
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_159
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_160
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_161
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_162
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_163
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_164
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_165
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_166
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_167
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_168
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_169
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_170
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_171
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_172
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_173
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_174
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_175
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d9#fnref:1.7.4.4.12.13.8.2
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