Lãnh Thổ Lãnh Hải Việt-Nam: 20230727 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P9

20230727 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P9

Phần cuộc đàm phán nầy, July 12 1971, có 9 điểm đàm phán từ phía cộng sản giặc Hồ đưa ra làm áp lực với Hoa Kỳ được Kissinger trình bày và phân tích. Từ đây cho chúng ta thấy rõ chính quyền của Tổng Thống Thiệu không thể nào tồn tại.

Xin mời đọc giả.

Operation Lam Son 719 (1971)

https://libguides.fau.edu/vietnam-war/us-military-lam-son-719

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6d/Map_Lam_Son_719.jpg/1200px-Map_Lam_Son_719.jpg

The Consequences of Operation Lam Son 719 and the Search for a Settlement, April 8–October 6, 1971

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v07/ch4

Trao tra tu binh sau hiep dinh Paris 1973

https://kyvancuc.wordpress.com/2015/11/29/trao-tra-tu-binh-sau-hd-paris-nhung-tai-lieu-lich-su-quy-va-bat-ngo/

TÀI LIỆU: Sự Thật Về Trại Tù Phú Quốc và Trao Trả Tù Binh tại Lộc Ninh 1973

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Ueqkgueqs0

Trao Trả Tù Binh VC tại Lộc Ninh 13/03/1973 và tù inh Mỹ ở Hòa Lò Hà Nội

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0G0JmIgTzgs

Trại tù binh chiến tranh Phú quốc 1973

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvRdgFc7olw

So Phan Tu Binh VC Duoc VNCH Tha

https://www.intermati.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1054969

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0G0JmIgTzgs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvRdgFc7olw

Tù Binh VC Không Chịu Quay Về Với Cộng Sản

http://pham-v-thanh.blogspot.com/2015/08/tu-binh-vc-khong-chiu-quay-ve-voi-cong.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZbdIWfIs_U

***

… “Kissinger: Alright, I will do that, but let me just say two things simply for your information.

You spoke of the bombing in the northern half of the DMZ. Our military experts tell us, including my conversations with General Abrams in Vietnam, that there is the heaviest infiltration of the DMZ since 1967 and the heaviest concentration of forces north of the DMZ since 1967.

[Page 182]

We get daily requests from our military commanders to authorize bombardments of those units north of the DMZ. Particularly in light of the understandings associated with the bombing halt.

We have so far rejected all these requests, because we want peace as quickly as possible.

But I agree with the Special Adviser that we should begin negotiating about the 9 and the 7 points and prove our good will that way.

The only thing I would like to point out is that we are negotiating with the Special Adviser and the Minister and not with the New York Times.

And you have to choose.

Should I make some of my remarks? I notice you have some points.

Xuan Thuy: I would like to say only that you want to say we are making propaganda, but we want to say you are making propaganda.

And then there is another point. The difference between the 7 points of Madame Binh and our 9 points have been pointed out by Mr. Le Duc Tho. But I would like to point out this very important difference: she only speaks about within Vietnam, but in our 9 points we have raised the question of the whole of Indochina. It is a very important point.

Kissinger: I just want to make sure that when we reach an agreement you will not quarrel so much with Mme. Binh that it will destroy the agreement.

Le Duc Tho: What about you and Saigon? I understand that there was a meeting of minds between you and Saigon. We take note of that.

Kissinger: We will take care of our Allies.

Xuan Thuy: And will you take care of them very carefully?

Kissinger: I did not take this trip to Saigon for nothing.

Xuan Thuy: Let us see the results of your trip. We will see what you brought.

Kissinger: This was approved by the President before the trip and is an effort to look at your 9 points and our 7 points to see what we can combine along the lines that the Special Adviser has already done.

Then after I have done it, perhaps you can give me your approach and we can see where we can combine them.

Let me now give you our specific position on the 9 points one by one.

With respect to point one, we are prepared to give you a date for the total withdrawal of U.S. and Allied Forces as the first item of business once we have come to an agreement on the framework. We agree that this be the first item of business and that it would be mutually agreed.

[Page 183]

Le Duc Tho: Please repeat the last sentence.

Kissinger: (Repeats). Once we know what the general framework will be, not every detail.

Let me give you an example. If we continue what the Special Adviser started before, that is if we take the points one by one and agree on a general framework, then the first detailed item of business will be point one.

Is that clear? I am not asking whether you accept it.

Le Duc Tho: It is clear now.

Kissinger: As for the second point, we accept your formulation with two elaborations -nỗ lực-, which are drawn from our 7 points. The elaborations are as follows:

—Both sides would present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day agreement is reached.

—The release of these prisoners would begin on the same day as our withdrawal under the agreed time table and would end on the day the withdrawals are completed.

You will notice that we have dropped the provision that the POWs be released two months before withdrawals conclude, as a gesture of good will and in order to speed progress.

Point three I want to put aside and discuss separately at the end of my remarks. I will make a comment on it, but later.

The fourth point is unacceptable in principle, as I told you last time. I will have a comment on it later as well.

Point five we accept in principle but not in the language in which it is now drafted. We are prepared to respect the 1954 and 1962 Accords on the basis of reciprocity -có đi có lại- applying to all countries. We consider phrases like “U.S. aggression -hiếu chiến-” rhetorical -biện luận- and unacceptable -không chấp nhận được- and they must be removed.

Le Duc Tho: But it is the facts.

Kissinger: The Special Adviser can write a historical treatise -dự án lịch sử- which I will do my best to get published in the United States, but he will not get the United States Government to sign such a document.

But we accept the principle. The Special Adviser has to decide between rhetoric -biện luận- and principle -nguyên tắc-.

Sometimes I suspect that the Special Adviser understands French much better than he admits. And the Minister probably speaks English very well by now.

Xuan Thuy: You are making propaganda.

Kissinger: You can make propaganda if you say something good about me sometimes.

[Page 184]

Point six, we accept the principle that the future of Indochina should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each others affairs. We think that the last sentence of your point should be removed because contrary to your intentions it implies that you have special rights which I am sure you have no wish to claim.

We accept point seven in principle, but we want to define it as follows on the basis of our points three and four: There should be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina, to begin when an agreement is signed. As part of that ceasefire, there should be no further infiltration of outside forces into all the countries of Indochina.

We accept points eight and nine.

This means that we agree on points eight and nine and have agreement in principle on points one, two, five, six and seven.

Now let me turn to your point four.

Do you want to quit while you are ahead?

Xuan Thuy: We are prepared to continue to listen to you. We have not yet made comment.

Kissinger: As I said at our last meeting, the concept of reparations is unacceptable and non-negotiable.

However, the President has authorized me to say that we want to inaugurate -khánh thành, ăn mừng- a new relationship with you as well as all the other countries of Indochina.

I have told you that we believe your independence and development are in our interest, and that we are vitally interested in the progress of all the people of Indochina. Therefore, upon conclusion of peace, the President is prepared to inaugurate a large aid program -viện trợ nhân đạo!- for all the countries of Indochina as a gesture of good will. He will do this as a voluntary act on which you can count, but not as an obligation or a condition of peace.

This brings me to the key issue discussed in your point three.

I must tell you that if you persist -kiên trì, ngoan cố- in your political demands you are asking something that we cannot possibly fulfill. The more the conflict goes on and the longer our withdrawals proceed under the Vietnamization policy, the less influence we will have on a political solution.

You are thus in the curious position of threatening to continue the war to gain an objective which the continuation of the war makes impossible.

On the other hand we could accept the principle of your point three in its general sense. We could agree that we are not committed [Page 185] to any one government in Saigon but to work in the same way with any government which exists there. We are willing to agree to a defined relationship with whatever government there is in Saigon after a peace agreement is signed. That is to say we are willing to define the precise economic, military and political relationship which a South Vietnamese government can have with us under conditions of peace.

In this connection, we are prepared to look seriously at some of the thoughts contained in points 4B and 5 of the proposal presented by Mme. Binh on July 1, which recall the 1954 Geneva injunctions against foreign military alliances, foreign military bases and foreign forces.

This is as far as we can go and as much as you can realistically expect.

I want to point out, too, that you must have some confidence in the political evolution in Saigon, and my visit to Saigon has convinced me that the best way to begin that political evolution is to come to an agreement this summer.

Finally, for your information, we are not opposed to the ideas about the reunification of Vietnam contained in paragraph 4A of Mme. Binh’s statement.

But for purposes of this meeting we will discuss the nine points and not her seven points.

I also have to point out that we maintain point 2 of our 7 points proposal.

Let me conclude -kết luận-. Though it is not your habit. Do you have my statement already? I want to know how good your intelligence is. I know it is good in Saigon. I didn’t know it was so good in Washington.

We have examined your 9 points sympathetically and with an attempt to look for areas of agreement rather than disagreement. I hope you will have the same attitude.

It is my belief that we are now at a crucial juncture in which each of us must make renewed efforts to find substantial progress which will lead to a settlement. There will be no better opportunity to bring peace to our people and to the world.

That is all I have to say.” …

***

NLF=National Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,

PRG=Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng Lâm thời Việt Nam,

DRVN= Democratic Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.

DRV (also DRVN), Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam

NLF, National Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam

NVA, North Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PAVN, People’s Army of (North) Vietnam

PLAF, People’s Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with Viet Cong

PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms are often used interchangeably

Paris Peace Talks, a loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from 1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks

Rue Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.

Avenue Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris Peace Talks

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Seven Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho; peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Nine Points, peace plan presented by Xuan Thuy on June 26, 1971

Ten Points, peace plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2, 1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks

Twelve Points, peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho

strategic hamlets, a South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly failed.

GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam

RVN, Republic of (South) Vietnam

RVNAF, Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms

***

20230716 Jul 12 71 Hak Tho Negotiations Memorandum 10

10. Memorandum of Conversation

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/ch2

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d10

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_176

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_177

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_178