20230917 Cong Dong Tham Luan Chuyen Di Dem P61
Qua đoạn tin của Kissinger gửi về Nixon đã cho thấy rằng
vấn đề bàn giao miền Nam cho cộng sản giặc Hồ là một sự sắp xếp của cả Nga và
Tàu, tức là có sự nhúng tay của quyền lực tài phiệt thế giới (Skull & Bone,
Rockefeller, Rothschilds) vào đất nước Việt-Nam. Nghỉa là quyền định đoạt vận mệnh
quốc gia không nằm trong tay người Việt của cả hai miền Nam và Bắc.
“Kissinger: …The key to success lies in
pressures we can exert between now and June 6 through
the Russians and Chinese.
Fortunately, your forthcoming meeting with Brezhnev
and the Chinese concerns about it give us some
leverage. In any event, the prospect of a conclusive meeting beginning on June 6 should make it possible to defer, at least
until after that meeting, any unfortunate legislation aimed at further
restricting our actions in Southeast Asia….”
59. Memorandum From the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Washington, May 24,
1973.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d59
62. Memorandum of Conversation1
Paris, May 23, 1973, 10:30 a.m.–5:05 p.m.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d62
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1617
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1618
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1619
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1620
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1621
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1622
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1623
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1624
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1625
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1626
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1627
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1628
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1629
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1630
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1631
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1632
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1633
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1634
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1635
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1636
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1637
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1638
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1639
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1640
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1641
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1642
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1643
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1644
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1645
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/pg_1646
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d59
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/d62#fnref:1.7.4.4.32.47.8.2
59. Memorandum From the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1
Washington, May 24,
1973.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d59
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_287
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_288
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/pg_289
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d59#fnref:1.7.4.4.8.186.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d59#fnref:1.7.4.4.8.186.14.4.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d59#fnref:1.7.4.4.8.186.14.12.4.4.4.4
Lesson in Vietnam
from Kissinger to Nixon:… “when we made it “our war” we would not
let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would
not help them fight it.”
Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf
https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring
peace in Viet-Nam.
Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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