20231114 CDTL Dao Chanh 1111963 Thanh Hinh 20
Vietnam (Documents 1–383)
Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963
227. Telegram From the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (Harkins)1
Washington , October
29, 1963 .
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/pg_456
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.8.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.12.6
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.12.12
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d209
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.12.16
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.12.20
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d214
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.12.22
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d207
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d227#fnref:1.7.4.6.16.60.14.4
Henry Cabot Lodge
https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/henry-cabot-lodge
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabot_family
Lodge conducted an intensive study of the situation in
South Vietnam when he took over as ambassador. He quickly decided that
President Diem's corrupt and repressive government would never be able to gain
widespread support from the South Vietnamese people. In fact, Lodge adopted
such a negative view of the Diem government that he joined some other U.S.
officials in calling for a change in leadership in Saigon. "We are
launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: the
overthrow of the Diem government," Lodge
declared in an August 29, 1963, cable to U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk (see
entry).
Lodge's Message Supporting a Military
Coup
When Lodge became U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam in mid-1963, he
quickly determined that the Saigon government headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem
(see entry) was doomed to fail. For this reason, Lodge urged the Kennedy
administration not to oppose a proposed military coup that would remove Diem
from power. On October 25, 1963, Lodge sent a message to U.S. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy (see entry) in
which he explained his belief that a coup might help the South resist North
Vietnam and its Viet Cong allies. Following
is an excerpt from that message:
We should not thwart [stop] a coup for two reasons. First,
it seems at least an even bet that the next government would not bungle and
stumble as much as the present one has. Secondly, it is extremely unwise in the
long range for us to pour cold water on attempts at a coup, particularly when
they are just in their beginning stages. We should remember that this is the
only way in which the people in Vietnam can possibly get a change of
government. Whenever we thwart attempts at a coup, as we have done in the past,
we are incurring very long lasting resentments, we are assuming an undue
responsibility for keeping the incumbents in office, and in general are setting
ourselves in judgment over the affairs of Vietnam. Merely to keep in touch with
this situation and a policy merely limited to 'not thwarting' are courses both
of which entail some risks but these are lesser risks than either thwarting all
coups while they are stillborn [still being considered] or our not being
informed of what is happening . . . . In judging proposed coups, we must
consider the effect on the war effort. Certainly a succession of fights for
control of the Government of Vietnam would interfere with the war effort. It
must also be said that the war effort has been interfered with already by the
incompetence of the present government and the uproar which this has caused.
One week later, a group of South Vietnamese military generals executed
Diem and seized power over the country. But the generals proved unable to
maintain their hold over the country. Instead, the coup ushered in a period of
even greater political instability in Saigon, as nine different governments
took power over the following two years.
https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/henry-cabot-lodge
T T NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM Phần 1 (Cuốn DVD đầu tiên về TT Ngô
Đình Diệm)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbIRZrcFZ2E
T T NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM Phần 2 - (Cuốn DVD đầu tiên về TT
Ngô Đình Diệm)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0IzazKMcuG0
JFK and the Diem Coup by John Prados
For more
information: John Prados 301/565-0564
National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 101
Posted - November 5, 2003
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/clip.wma
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index.htm
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index.htm#audio
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn01.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn02.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn03.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn04.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn05.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn06.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn07.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn08.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn09.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn10.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn11.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn12.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn13.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn14.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn15.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn16.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn17.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn18.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/clip.wma
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn19.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn20.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn21.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn22.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn23.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn24.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn25.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn26.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn27.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn28.pdf
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/vn29.pdf
List of presidents of the United States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States
Eisenhower
Administration
https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/dwight-d-eisenhower-administration
Lesson in Vietnam
from Kissinger to Nixon:… “when we made it “our war” we would not
let the South Vietnamese fight it; when it again became “their war”, we would
not help them fight it.”
Lesson of Vietnam May 12 1975 by Henry A. Kissinger
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/vietnam/032400091-002.pdf
https://thebattleofkontum.com/extras/kissinger.html
List of Participants in the Geneva
Conference on Indochina
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/ch5subch4
The Geneva Conference on Indochina May
8–July 21, 1954
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/comp2
Geneva Agreements 20-21 July 1954
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KH-LA-VN_540720_GenevaAgreements.pdf
March 10 1956 Election in South Vietnam
Election processes in South Vietnam
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010040-7.pdf
Vietnam’s Un-held 1956 Reunification
Elections
https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/020691c4-6762-44f0-903b-390c67a04188/content
Van Ban Hiep Dinh Paris 27011973
http://suthat-toiac.blogspot.com/2008/07/hip-nh-paris-2711973-vn-bn.html
Agreement on ending the war and restoring
peace in Viet-Nam.
Signed at Paris on 27 January 1973
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/volume-935-I-13295-English.pdf
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20935/v935.pdf
***
NLF=National
Liberation Front=Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng,
Mặt Trận Dân Tộc Giải Phóng Miền Nam NLF
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Liberation-Front-political-organization-Vietnam
PRG=Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam = Chính phủ Cách mạng
Lâm thời Việt Nam,
DRVN= Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam=Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hòa=cộng sản Bắc Việt.
DRV (also DRVN), Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam
NLF, National
Liberation Front, Communist front organization in South Vietnam acting as
political government of the insurgency; later renamed Provisional Revolutionary
Government of Vietnam
NVA, North
Vietnamese Army, term used by the United States for the People’s Army of
(North) Vietnam
PAVN, People’s
Army of (North) Vietnam
PLAF, People’s
Liberation Armed Forces, Communist forces in South Vietnam, synonymous with
Viet Cong
PRG, Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam, political wing of the South Vietnamese
Communist movement, replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF), but the terms
are often used interchangeably
Paris Peace Talks, a
loosely defined term that, depending on context, could mean the secret meetings
between Henry Kissinger for the United States and Le Duc Tho for the Democratic
Republic of (North) Vietnam or the 174 meetings of the public talks held from
1968 to 1973 between the United States and the Republic of (South) Vietnam on
one side and the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Provisional
Revolutionary Government of Vietnam on the other; the latter were also known as
Plenary or Avénue Kléber talks
Rue
Darthé, 11 Rue Darthé, the address of one of the residences
of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam in the Paris suburb of
Choisy-le-Roi used as a venue for the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho negotiations.
Avenue
Kléber (also Ave. Kléber or Kléber), address
of the International Conference Center at the Hotel Majestic in Paris, the site
of the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks; see also Paris
Peace Talks
SALT, Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks
Seven Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on May 31, 1971, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho;
peace plan presented by the NLF Delegation in July 1971 at the (plenary) Paris
Peace Talks
Nine
Points, peace plan presented by Xuan
Thuy on June 26, 1971
Ten Points, peace
plan presented by NLF delegate Madame Binh on May 8, 1969, at the (plenary)
Paris Peace Talks; peace plan presented by Le Duc Tho on August 1, 1972, at his
meeting with Kissinger; peace plan presented by Kissinger on August 14, 1972,
at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
Two-Point Elaboration, elaboration
of the Ten Point peace plan presented by the DRV Delegation on February 2,
1972, at the (plenary) Paris Peace Talks
Twelve Points, peace
plan presented by Kissinger on August 1, 1972, at his meeting with Le Duc Tho
strategic hamlets, a
South Vietnamese Government program to counter Viet Cong control in the
countryside. The government relocated farmers into fortified hamlets to provide
defense, economic aid, and political assistance to residents. The hope was that
protection from Viet Cong raids and taxation would bind the rural populace to
the government and gain their loyalty. The program started in 1962, but was
fatally undermined by over expansion and poor execution. By 1964 it had clearly
failed.
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
RVN, Republic
of (South) Vietnam
RVNAF, Republic
of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v42/terms
***
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